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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Mitigating maritime pollution linked to the oil and gas sector is increasingly seen as a priority 
issue in national and international contexts alike. A key policy tool that has been used to 
address this issue is Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). It has become the primary 
means by which potentially adverse environmental impacts can be assessed and mitigated, 
and in theory, provides a variety of mechanisms for stakeholder engagement in the policy 
process. However, the governance of EIA in developing countries is embryonic, emergent, 
and in parts contradictory. This thesis reviews and evaluates EIA procedures as they relate to 
the Nigerian Maritime Oil and Gas Sector (NMOGS), relying, in particular, on Matland’s 
work on ambiguity and conflict in policy implementation. I argue that Matland’s scholarship 
affords valuable new insights into EIA implementation processes, particularly in terms of 
understanding the complex interactions among policy, business and civil society actors both 
within and beyond implementing agencies. Thus, the thesis’s broader contribution is to 
consider how the complex institutional mosaic sorrounding EIA might be conceptualised and 
understood theoretically by drawing on the rich literature on policy implementation. The 
empirical analysis utilises semi-structured face-to-face interviews with fifty-six respondents 
in key government implementing agencies, academia, and civil society. This is supplemented 
by secondary data on national level environmental policies, as well as surveys of EIA reports 
of multinational and national oil company projects in two Nigerian states. The thesis has 
demonstrated that the institutional context of NMOGS is characterised by high levels of inter-
agency conflict and policy ambiguity. A key cause of the ambiguity is that two EIA systems 
operate in parallel at the national scale, thus making it difficult for the country to achieve its 
stated aim of attaining sustainable development in the domestic oil and gas sector. I have also 
found ample evidence of conflict over the roles, responsibilities and duties of Government 
actors across the whole spectrum of EIA implementation activities.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis reviews and evaluates EIA implementation as it relates to the Nigerian Maritime 
Oil and Gas Sector (NMOGS). EIA has been institutionalised since the 1990s in the 
NMOGS, remaining the primary means by which potentially adverse environmental impacts 
can be mitigated via legal requirements and procedures. The thesis explores the effects of the 
national policy context on the development of environmental regulations within the Nigerian 
maritime oil and gas sector, while scrutinising the procedural issues associated with the 
implementation of EIA. It illuminates the components of, as well as the reasons for, 
organisational ambiguities and conflicts associated with the implementation of EIA in the 
NMOGS, by using an inter and intra-agency lens. 
 
In a broader sense, the thesis addresses the challenges associated with appraising the impacts 
of environmental global offshore oil exploration, which has increased at a rapid pace since 
1960s (Kaiser, 2007). In addition to demand patterns, the rise of this phenomenon is largely 
thanks to opportunities in the form of technological innovations (Pinder, 2001), which have 
helped in identifying viable new fields to exploit and increase oil production rates (BP, 2009; 
OECD/IEA, 2009). Between 1970 and 2009, however, approximately 5.65 million tonnes of 
oil was lost to the sea, causing certain marine environments to be heavily polluted (Junfeng 
and Leping, 2011). As a result, the political importance of environmental policy has grown in 
recent years (Bond et al., 2010; Tullos, 2009; Jah et al., 2007; Wood, 2003a). 
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Even though it is becoming increasingly recognised that the environmental impacts of oil and 
gas operations can be mitigated and prevented via environmental policies and their 
management options (Bassey, 2010; Steiner, 2008; Goodland, 2005), insufficient attention 
has been paid to the evolution and implementation of environmental regulatory systems. This 
is particularly pronounced in developing country settings (Aishuwaikhat, 2005; Wood, 
2003b), largely because the implementation of related regulatory systems is embryonic 
(Ofori, 2005; Wood, 2003b; Sebastiani et al., 2001; Kakonge, 1999, 1997), emergent 
(Alemagi et al., 2007) and in parts contradictory (Echefu and Akpofure, 2007; Nwafor, 2006; 
Ogunba, 2004; Olokesusi, 2000, 1998). 
 
A variety of policy implementation approaches for managing environmental issues are 
currently in operation across the world (Wilson and Piper, 2010). Many of these are 
‘consistent with the sixth Environmental Action Programme which refers to horizontal 
integration measures as including Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA), Integrated Coastal Zone Management and vertical 
measure’ (ibid, p. 66). EIA is one of the most prevalent operating procedures for 
environmental assessment globally, having become the primary means by which potentially 
adverse environmental impacts can be assessed and mitigated. In theory, it should provide a 
variety of mechanisms for stakeholder engagement in the policy process. The remainder of 
this introductory chapter discusses the rationale for the thesis, as well as its aims, objectives 
and structure.  
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1.2. Rationale for, and relevance of, the thesis 
  
In addition to addressing the adverse impacts of resource extraction and exploitation (Song et 
al., 2011; Borasin et al., 2002), EIA is often used to promote sustainable development 
(Duncan and Hay, 2007; Morrison-Saunders and Fischer, 2006; Robert, 2004; Petts, 1999d), 
as well as serving as a planning and management tool more generally (Crabbe and Leroy, 
2008; Kakonge, 1998). However, studies of the implementation and evaluation of EIA ‘have 
been criticised for failing to bring to life not only the everyday working policies or projects, 
but also the lessons that might be gained from reflecting upon the processes...’ (McKie, 2002, 
p. 263). This links to a broader issue in social science, where numerous authors have noted 
that assessments of policy ‘successes’ or ‘failures’ have been largely based on insufficiently 
robust analytical frameworks (Powell and Maynard, 2007; Mark et al., 2006; Cousins and 
Shulha, 2006; Anderson, 1995). Dahler-Larsen (2006) maintains that early evaluation studies 
were criticised for relying solely on quantitative methods and producing statistically complex 
results that were difficult to interpret. In order to address these issues, I have aimed to create 
a body of empirical evidence specific to the NMOGS. Mark et al. (2006, p. 17) comment that 
‘...with empirical data, the evaluation research could construct...an empirically based 
assessment of what evaluation looks like, under different conditions’.  
 
In Nigeria, offshore oil and gas activities that range from exploration to production have 
generated major environmental and social challenges (Bassey, 2010, 2007, 2004; Goodland, 
2005). The most noticeable are oil spills and gas flaring, which have become endemic and 
attained worldwide notoriety (Steiner 2008; Kloff and Wicks, 2004). For example, Luiselli et 
al. (2006) reported that about 1.3 million barrels of oil was lost in Nigeria due to oil spillage 
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incidents between 1978 and 2001. Similarly, Bassey (2010, p. 61) maintains that nationally 
‘up to 1000 oil spills occur every year although official figure puts this at 300’.  
 
One of the consequences of this high level of domestic environmental pollution is the current 
civil unrest within and outside the Niger Delta. Considering that a larger proportion of 
Nigeria’s wealth comes from the Niger Delta, it comes as little surprise that the people of the 
region have been in conflict with the Federal Government of Nigeria over the control of the 
petroleum resources as a result of having to bear the brunt of environmental damage caused 
by oil exploration activities. Currently, domestic activities such oil and gas exploitation in 
this region are severely constrained due to the negative effects of oil spill and gas flaring 
problems coupled with lack of social amenities (i.e. infrastructures) (Niger Delta Regional 
Development Master Plan 2006; Ukwu, 2002).   
 
It should be pointed out that the issue of environmental policy standards and environmental 
regulation is not new in the African continent (Gray, 2003). The basis of environmental 
policy in Nigeria is contained in section 20 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria (Makinde and Adegoke, 2008; Adelagan, 2004). Similarly, the Nigerian 
Government enacted the EIA Act in 1992 with the stated goal of achieving sustainable 
development (Nwafor, 2006). The Nigerian EIA act stipulates that the public or private 
sectors of the economy shall not undertake or embark on, or authorise projects or activities 
without a prior consideration of the effects on the environment (Nwafor, 2006; Ogunba, 
2004; Olokesusi, 2000, 1999, 1998). Separate legislation established the Department of 
Petroleum (DPR), Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV), State Ministries of 
Environment (SMENV) and National Oil Spill Detection Response Agency (NOSDRA), 
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Nigerian Maritime Administration Safety Agency (NIMASA) among other establishments to 
manage environmental related issues in the NMOGS. 
 
It is also worth noting that there has recently been significant improvement in the 
environmental regulation of the African oil and gas sector more generally. This is evidenced 
by the establishment and hosting of the West Africa Regional Search and Rescue 
Coordination Centre of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), which was 
commissioned in 2008. As a result of being a member of the organisation, Nigeria has ratified 
all IMO environm ental related conventions. Similarly, the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) and FMENV run concurrent EIA systems. 
 
Nevertheless, the problem of environmental degradation still prevails within oil producing 
states. In part, this may be due to the fact that environmental challenges cannot be treated in 
isolation from other societal issues (Crabbe and Leroy, 2008; Sands, 2008) particularly when 
achieving sustainable development is involved, and thus the application of a holistic or 
integrative approach is necessary. Castree et al. (2009, p. 1) comment that ‘...many see 
geography as the original integrated environmental science...’ This approach concerns the 
interrelationships and the interface between formulation of policy and its implementation, 
which for EIA represents ‘a key element to securing both comprehensiveness and consistency 
across the programme’ (Wilson and Piper, 2010, p. 89). Integrated Assessment can probably 
best be described as ‘interdisciplinary and participatory process of combining, interpreting 
and communicating knowledge to allow a better understanding of complex phenomena’ 
(Rotmans and Van Asselt, 2002, p. 78). Therefore, applying an integrated approach is needed 
to assess how national environmental policy objectives have been met (or not). 
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I have identified three areas where a novel contribution can be made by this study. First, even 
though previous researchers have explored the extent to which EIA has been translated into 
practice in Nigeria (See for example, Ameyan, 2008; Nwafor, 2006; Ogunba, 2004; 
Olokesusi, 2000, 1998), far less attention has been given to the implementation successes 
related to the NMOGS’s EIA systems and the reasons for such achievements. This is 
particularly the case in terms of establishing whether the sector’s EIA key implementation 
stages (mitigation compliance monitoring and public participation) are coherent and 
integrated in their approach to assessing environmental impacts through political, social and 
economic factors. Similarly, previous researchers have failed to exhaustively assess the 
sector’s EIA implementation processes through multinational and national oil company 
projects. This gives me the opportunity to identify the system that reflects the principle of 
good practice.  
 
Second, while previous work has established that NMOGS operates two separate EIA 
systems, with issues of overlap between these systems extensively discussed (See for 
example, Nwafor, 2006; Ogunba, 2004; Olokesusi, 2000, 1999, 1998, 1997), there has been 
little consideration of the reasons for this situation. There is a need to examine the ad hoc 
state interventions made to resolve the sector’s EIA implementation challenges and explore 
the stakeholders’ views regarding the operation of the double EIA systems, which has not 
been previously attempted. 
 
A study by Nwafor (2006) emphasised low level of co-operation between FMENV and State 
Ministries of Environment. Nonetheless, Nwafor did not consider why some Nigerian states 
are agitating for their own separate EIA systems (case as is with Lagos and Rivers States). 
Similarly, the reason why the Federal Ministry of Environment is not permitting the State 
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Ministries of Environment to have their own EIA has not been investigated. Through this 
empirical scrutiny, I have sought to demonstrate the dynamic nature of the Nigerian context 
for implementing EIA, and to show the iterative relation between implementation practice 
and national setting, confirming Stern’ observation that evaluating practice is ‘a response to 
the formative contexts that are aimed at changing and reshaping evaluation’ (Stern, 2006, p. 
312). 
 
Third, the study focuses on the multiple ways in which EIA can effectively improve the 
components of its key implementation stages: mitigation compliance monitoring and public 
participation. By doing so, the aim is to better understand current environmental management 
procedures in use within government implementing agencies (GIAs) and to identify a road 
map by which the sector’s EIA goal can be enhanced. Implementation of improved 
environmental policy standards is essential because ‘it is in implementation that GIAs perfect 
the promise of innovation... and put ideas and visions to work’ (Russ, 2007, p. 1). In the same 
manner, analysis of implementation is urgently required in Nigeria, as it is capable of 
revealing and identifying factors that constitute either policy success or failure (Jordan et al., 
1998). Thus, implementation should be seen as what happens between policy expectations 
and policy results and it should not be viewed as ‘failure but as another check...in a system of 
government...’ (deLeon, 1999, p. 320). The expectation is that the GIAs and stakeholders 
should learn from the identified challenges in order to change implementation behaviours 
(Dahler-Larsen, 2006), and thus contribute to more efficient policy outcomes (Mark et al., 
2006). In this way, GIAs and stakeholders in the EIA process mainly will begin to ‘act in 
ways which do not generate environmental problems or which generate problems with lesser 
significance than was previously the case’ (Robert, 2004, p. 3).  
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It is hoped that if regulatory policies on the environment are strictly implemented, civil unrest 
in the country will be reduced and ecological degradation will be minimised (Adinna and 
Attah, 2003). By making recommendations for refining and enhancing existing EIA policies, 
it is further hoped the thesis will therefore enhance institutional, social, environmental and 
economic growth. The research outcome is of direct relevance to government and learned 
societies in Nigeria. 
 
1.3. Aims and objectives 
 
In light of the above, the main aim of this research is to review and evaluate domestic 
environmental standards and regulations with respect to the Nigerian maritime oil and gas 
sector. In particular, the analysis focuses upon one International policy tool – EIA – which 
embodies the difficulties associated in finding ‘consensual approaches to change’ (Wilson 
and Piper 2010, p. 17) when engaging the public and other stakeholders in the treatment of 
environmental issues. 
 
This research partly embraces summative evaluation in understanding whether policy has 
achieved its clear goal (Mark et al., 2006; Tilley and Clarke, 2006). As such, it largely takes 
form of formative evaluation, in terms of seeking to determine the efficiency and 
effectiveness of EIA arrangements in order to improve and refine national procedures (Mark 
et al., 2006; Donaldson and Lipsey, 2006; Rogers and Williams, 2006; Whitmore et al., 2006; 
Cabinet office, 2004; Hall and Hall, 1996; Patton, 1987). Therefore, the overall purpose of 
this research is to contribute to identification of areas of policy implementation that require 
further improvement. In more general terms, the purpose of evaluation includes: programme 
and organisational improvement; oversight and compliance; assessment of merit and worth; 
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and knowledge improvement (Chelimsky, 2006; Donaldson and Lipsey, 2006; Moore et al., 
2005; Morrison-Saunders and Bailey, 2000).     
 
A novel feature of the thesis is that it focuses on the marine environment, since the impact of 
marine pollution is large (Junfeng and Leping, 2011; Veil et al., 2004; UNEP, 1993) and 
contributes a significant threat to the sea environment (Kirby and Law, 2010; IMO, 2008; 
Camphuysen and Heubeck, 2001). It appears that when oil pollution occurs at the sea, it has 
capability of entering other regions because water is dynamic, and this might pose threats to 
the environment by disrupting or destroying marine ecosystems (Orubu et al., 2004).  
 
The research objectives are: 
 
1. To assess the extent to which the NMOGS’s EIA system has been translated into 
practice through mitigation compliance monitoring and public participation stages,     
including an examination of their effectiveness via political, social and economic 
factors.  
2. To identify the effects of the national policy context on the development of 
environmental regulation within the Nigerian maritime oil and gas sector.     
3. To examine the reasons for, and components of, the organisational ambiguities and 
conflicts associated with the implementation of NMOGS’s EIA systems, within an 
inter- and intra-agency context. 
  
 
 
 
- 10 - 
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
   
The thesis addresses the key research objectives as highlighted in section 1.3. The research is 
carried out in the context of assessing the effectiveness of EIA implementation through nine 
chapters, as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 outlines the environmental impacts of oil and gas operations, and reviews the role 
of EIA and its components for example Social Impact Assessment (SIA). It includes the 
examination of what constitutes a ‘good environmental management system’ and the 
contribution of previous frameworks applied in evaluating EIA. It also discusses the 
challenges related to effectiveness of EIA and its components. The concluding section of the 
chapter critically revisits the identified previous frameworks applied in evaluating EIA.  
 
Chapter 3 emphasises the need for policy theories and in particular the application of 
theorization of ambiguity and conflict to understand the national policy context for EIA 
implementation. Its starting point is to elucidate the relationships between policy 
implementation theories and evaluation research. 
 
Chapter 4 sets out the methodology for the research. It presents the methods of data 
gathering and how they are analysed, including a description of the study areas, challenges 
encountered during the fieldwork and techniques adopted to address them. 
 
Chapter 5 outlines the Nigerian national context and national systems of EIA. It discusses 
the historical development of oil and gas in Nigeria, including the assessment of impacts of 
oil and gas operations on the environment and social factors. The chapter further describes 
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the legal frameworks for EIA in the Nigerian maritime oil and gas sector, focusing on the 
Department of Petroleum Resources and Federal Ministry of Environment systems, while 
highlighting the role of government implementing agencies in the EIA implementation 
processes.  
 
Chapter 6 uncovers likely implementation successes in terms of achievements that have been 
recorded in the sector since EIA became operational. The chapter further examines the extent 
to which the contents of previous EIA reports and projects (multinational and national oil 
companies) have been translated into practice through mitigation compliance monitoring and 
public participation, including an assessment of their effectiveness via political, social and 
economic factors. This is necessary in order to understand whether the NMOGS’s EIA 
framework is coherent and integrated in its approach to address the identified environmental 
challenges and difficulties.  
 
Chapter 7 uses the theoretical frameworks set out in chapter 3 to assess the differences and 
similarities between the DPR and FMENV EIA systems in order to see how they have 
influenced the implementation processes. The chapter further explores the reasons for the 
existence of a double EIA system. It examines why conflict persists in the sector within an 
inter-agency context, including a discussion of the strategies adopted towards addressing such 
discrepancies. In addition to this, I explore the stakeholders’ views regarding the sector’s 
double EIA systems in order to identify the one that is more robust.  
 
Building upon the findings in chapter 7, I explore the FMENV’s EIA implementation style in 
Chapter 8, in light of the fact that this organisation has a dedicated environmental policy 
responsibility, and to an extent its EIA system is more robust than the DPR EIA system. The 
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chapter gives a full account of EIA implementation challenges in an intra-agency context by 
investigating the levels of involvement, while outlining the reasons why the SMENV (one of 
the subsidiaries of FMENV) is agitating for their EIA, and why the FMENV is denying it. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the extent to which financial and human resources 
have been sufficient in the sector. 
 
Chapter 9 presents the thesis’ contribution to knowledge. Having summarised the empirical 
results, it revisits the original objectives and makes recommendations for further research and 
policy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
APPRAISING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS: THE ROLE OF EIA 
                                                 
Introduction  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the environmental impacts of maritime oil and gas 
operations, and the use of EIA for appraising them. It places a particular emphasis on the role 
of EIA and its components, such as Social Impact Assessment (SIA). The chapter also 
discusses implementation challenges related to EIA and its elements. It is divided into four 
sections. Section 2.1 reviews the evidence of environmental impacts of the maritime oil and 
gas sector, including the extent to which they have been hindering water, fisheries, global 
climate and human health among others. Section 2.2 elucidates the broader purpose of EIA, 
while providing examples of best practice in several countries, and including a discussion of 
its key components: Social Impact Assessment and monitoring systems. Section 2.3 describes 
the implementation challenges related to EIA and its components. Finally, the conclusion of 
the chapter (Section 2.4) summarises and critically highlights the main limitations of the main 
frameworks applied in evaluating EIA. 
 
2.1. Environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas operations  
 
Even though oil and gas exploration and development are fundamentally important to 
servicing the energy requirements of global capitalism, they also have significant impacts on 
the environment (O’Rourke and Connolly, 2003; Borasin et al., 2002). Understanding the 
environmental implications of oil and gas operation is required to assess the cost of the 
world’s dependence on oil (Borasin et al., 2002). Marine environmental pollution was 
recognised as a major problem in the maritime oil and gas sector already from the late 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For example, one of the earliest surveys of the 
impact of oil on seabirds was conducted in the 1920s (Camphuysen and Heubeck, 2001).  
 
The main offshore oil and gas activities are exploration, drilling and extraction (O’Rourke 
and Connolly, 2003; E&P Forum/UNEP, 1997). This has the tendency to pollute the 
environment via drilling waste, associated waste, noise generation, air emissions (flaring of 
natural gas), leaks and oil spills (Junfeng and Leping, 2011; Song et al. 2011; Streever, 2008; 
IFC/WB, 2007; Lee, 2005; O’Rourke and Connolly, 2003). Oil spills can occur accidentally 
or intentionally (Cao et al., 2011; O’Hara and Morandin, 2010). The impacts of these 
activities vary, as they affect the water, sediment, sea fauna and flora, atmosphere, and have 
effects on human health (Soderbergh et al., 2010; Kirby and Law, 2010; O’Rourke and 
Connolly, 2003; UNEP, 1993). They are summarised in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1: summary of potential environmental impacts (offshore) 
  
Activity Sources   Potential 
Impact 
Components 
Affected   
Comments  
Seismic  
Operations 
(Offshore) 
Seismic  
Equipment 
 
 
 
 
Vessel  
Operations 
 
 
 
 
Noise 
 
 
 
 
 
Emissions  
And  
Discharges 
 
 
Interference  
Biosphere 
 
 
 
 
 
Atmosphere, 
Aquatic, 
Terrestrial  
 
 
Human   
Acoustic sources, disturbance to 
marine organisms (may need to 
avoid sensitive areas and consider 
seasonality). Short-term and 
transient 
 
Atmospheric emissions from 
vessel engines; discharges to 
ocean: bilges, sewage; spillages; 
waste and garbage disposal to 
shore 
 
Interaction with other resource 
users (e.g. fishing). Short term, 
transient.  
Exploratory 
And 
Appraisal 
Drilling  
(Offshore)   
 
Site 
selection  
 
 
 
 
Interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
Human,  
Biosphere, 
and  
Aquatic. 
 
 
Consider sensitivities in relation 
to biota, resource use, and cultural 
importance. Secondary impacts 
related to support and supply 
requirements and potential impact 
on local ports and infrastructure. 
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Operations  
 
 
 Discharges  
Emissions 
Waste  
 
 
Human,  
Biosphere, 
Aquatic and  
Terrestrial   
  
 
 
Discharges to ocean – mud, 
cuttings, wash water, drainage, 
sewage, spillages and leakages. 
Emissions from plant equipment; 
noise and light; solid waste 
disposal onshore and impact on 
infrastructure. Disturbance to 
benthic and pelagic organisms 
and marine birds. Emissions and 
discharges from well test 
operations, produced water 
discharges, burning and flare, 
additional noise and light impact. 
Effects of vessel helicopter 
movements on human and 
wildlife.    
Development  
And  
Production  
(Offshore) 
Site 
selection  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Operations  
Interactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discharges  
Emissions  
Waste 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Socio-
economic 
Cultural  
Human, 
Biosphere 
and Aquatic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Human, 
Atmosphere,  
Biosphere, 
Aquatic and  
Terrestrial  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Human  
Long-term site selection based 
upon biological and socio-
economic sensitivities and 
minimum disturbance. Risk of 
impact to sensitive species, 
commercially important species, 
resource conflict and access. 
Long-term support and supply 
base requirement and impacts on 
local infrastructure. 
 
Long-term, chronic effects of 
discharges on benthic and pelagic 
biota; sediment and water quality. 
Impact of drill cuttings and mud 
discharges, produced water, 
drainage, spillage and leakage. 
Emissions from power and 
process plant and impact on air 
quality. Noise and light impact 
from facilities and flaring. 
 
Loss of access and resource use 
interaction. Local port, harbour 
and community interactions 
related to supply and support 
functions 
    
 
Source: O’Rourke and Connolly, 2003; E&P Forum/UNEP, 1997, pp. 16-20 
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2.1.1. The impacts on water, fauna and flora 
 
One of the key objectives of Agenda 21 arising from the Rio Earth Summit (1992) was 
protecting and managing the sea (E&P Forum/UNEP, 1997). Oil that is discharged into the 
sea passes through different processes: evaporation, spreading, dissolution, biodegradation 
and emulsification i.e. formation of oil in water and vice versa (Song et al., 2011; Borasin et 
al., 2002; Mackay and McAuliffe, 1989; Riley et al., 1980). The effects of pollution on sea 
water include high concentrations of oil (Kirby and Law, 2010; UNEP, 1993), and sources of 
contamination (Song et al., 2011), which are capable of causing significance adverse effects 
to sea fauna and flora (sea creatures).  
 
For example, in South America alone, over 40 000 sea creatures have been destroyed due to 
the impact of oil spills (Camphuysen and Heubeck, 2001). Similarly, in Kuwait only in one 
year (that is 1991) about 30 000 sea creatures were destroyed as a result of impact of oil spills 
(UNEP, 1993). A study by O’Hara and Morandin (2010) indicated that even thin oil can 
impact the microstructure of seabird feathers and their metabolic rate. Another study by the 
Centre for Environment, Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (CEFAS) in 2011 showed that 
when the sea is polluted, seabirds’ reproductive capacity is reduced (CEFAS, 2011).     
 
Other than the impacts of oil spills, Trannum et al. (2010) maintain that offshore oil and gas 
activities for example drill cuttings and the water-based drilling mud (waste waters/produced 
water)  have affected oxygen consumption and penetration in the sea, thus causing sea fauna 
mortality. However, it has been argued that only oil based drilling and oil cutting could have 
an increased effect on sea water, while water based drilling has limited effects on sea water 
environment because its components are not toxic (Veil et al., 2004; E&P Forum/UNEP, 
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1997). Moreover, a discussion that focuses on the offshore oil and gas environmental impacts 
cannot be completed without considering the impacts of noise pollution that are arising from 
offshore installations, which might endanger the life of fauna when proper mitigation 
measures are not in place from the onset (Streever, 2008; Khan and Islam, 2003; Pinder, 
2001). Apart from offshore installations, other oil and gas activities generating noise 
pollution are seismic operations, drilling and production, and marine traffic (IFC/WB, 2007; 
Borasin et al., 2002). 
 
2.1.2. The impacts on atmosphere and human health  
    
Emissions from offshore oil and gas operation arise from combustion from power and heat 
generation, and the use of compressors and pumps (IFC/WB, 2007). Similarly, large oil spills 
have the capability of producing toxic gases, including those rich in metals (Pandey et al., 
2009). Borasin et al. (2002) reported that levels of mercury in the Gulf of Mexico are high, 
thus contaminating fish, which causes harm to humans in the form of birth defects, heart 
problems and severe neurological disorders.  
 
Other sources of emissions from offshore oil and gas activities include flaring, venting and 
purging gases (E&P Forum/UNEP, 1997). Although flaring is necessary in the case of 
emergency, new technologies should be demonstrated and adopted to ensure that gas is safely 
disposed (IFC/WB, 2007). It is only when the required technology is not in place, flaring 
becomes ‘a waste of valuable resource, as well as a significant source of green house 
emissions’ (P. 3).   
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The key emission gases from offshore oil and gas activities are carbon dioxide, carbon 
monoxide, volatile organic carbons, sulphur and methane (Song et al., 2011; IEA, 2008; E&P 
Forum/UNEP, 1997). Importantly, potential impacts of these emissions vary, it depends upon 
the nature of the process under the consideration, and more emissions are generated during 
the production than exploration because the former is associated with intensive activities 
(E&P Forum/UNEP, 1997). In more general terms, emission gases have the tendency of 
affecting air quality and causing harm to marine environment and human health.  
 
Among fauna for example, the emission gases have affected fish production causing decline 
because of changes in temperature (Sheppard et al., 2010). In humans, emission gases have 
caused nausea, dizziness, headaches and irritation (Song et al., 2011; Pandey et al., 2009; 
Demayo et al., 1998), and in some cases loss of human life have occurred (BP, 2011). One of 
the recent examples of emission gases that have resulted in loss of human life is the 
deepwater horizon accident, which occurred on 20
th
 April 2010 at Gulf of Mexico, where 
gases were not only emitted into the atmosphere but subsequently explosion that lasted for 36 
hours also occurred (BP, 2011). This is not different from the occurrence in Kuwait, where 
about 613 oil wells were burnt (UNEP, 1993), which remained a potential hazard to human 
health (UNEP, 1993), as the emissions lasted for several months (Borasin et al., 2002).           
 
Wilson and Piper (2010) established that between year 2000 and 2008, fossil fuel emissions 
have increased by 29 percent. The energy-related CO2 emissions are projected to increase by 
45% between 2006 and 2030, with three-quarters of this increment arising in China, India and 
the Middle East, and 97% in non-OECD countries as a whole (OECD/IEA, 2009). Notably, 
since 1973 oil consumption has remained a very substantial source of CO2 emissions (See 
Figures 2.1 and 2.2), despite changing patterns of fossil fuel consumption. This is partly 
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because natural gas is a relatively clean fuel with low emissions of greenhouse gases 
compared with oil (Paltsev et al., 2011). It appears that further reductions of CO2 emissions 
are required to mitigate the effect of anthropocentric climate change (Jayanthakumaran et al., 
2012). 
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Figure 2.1: Fuel shares of the world’s CO2 emissions in 1973 
 
Source: OECD/ International Energy Agency, 2009, p. 18 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Fuel shares of the world’s CO2 emissions in 2007  
 
Source: OECD/International Energy Agency, 2009, p. 18     
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However, addressing the CO2 production impacts in the oil and gas sector by embracing 
renewable energy alone could greatly increase unemployment because oil production rates 
will be reduced (Esteban et al., 2011). As documented by Cavalett and Ortega (2010) the use 
of these alternative sources of energy for example biodiesel has not proved effective for 
countries such as Brazil. Similarly, the way out is not even by concentrating largely on 
response for example oil spill response, as it might contribute additional threats to the sea 
fauna and flora (CEFAS, 2011). On this note, it seems that prevention is better than cure.  
 
Therefore, mitigation tools that recognise the human dimension and the environment might 
help in preventing the oil and gas environmental related problems before they occur (Kirby 
and Law, 2010; Demayo et al., 1998; E&P Forum/UNEP, 1997). In this context, there are 
several ways by which environmental impacts can be mitigated. However, in light of the 
research gaps and aims identified in the previous chapter, the next section focuses on the role 
of EIA, including the contributions of Social Impact Assessment and monitoring systems. 
While acting as components of EIA positioned to complement EIA, they should also allow 
for measuring the effectiveness of EIA implementation processes.  
 
2.2. The role of EIA and its components 
 
In the late 1960s, environmental problems became serious political issues in the U.S. leading 
to enactment of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970 (Wood, 2003a, 1999, 
1995) providing the first comprehensive environmental legislative framework in U.S. history 
(Bond et al., 2010; Tullos, 2009; Jah et al., 2007). This legislation is described as ‘a decision 
tool in response to increase eco-centric concerns to mediate between a techno-centric view of 
continued development and the ability to create growth while overcoming environmental 
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problems’ (El-fadi and El-fadel, 2004, p. 555). Broadly, similar developments took place in 
Europe at this time. Thus, according to Tope (1999) the UK was at the forefront of 
implementing a goal- setting regulatory system. Interestingly, oil-related projects have been 
in existence in the UK as far back as 1973 (mainly in Scotland) (OECD, 1979). However, the 
projects were subjected to environmental analysis rather than EIA (Wood, 1995; OECD, 
1979). In 1974, the UK produced its first offshore oil and gas Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS), which was on an informal basis (Bond and Wathern, 1999).  
 
Moreover, the EIA became prominent in the UK in 1980s and it was officially introduced to 
Member States of the European Union in July 1988, following the approval of 85/337/EEC 
(Peterlin et al., 2008; Wood et al., 2006; Barker and Wood, 1999) and later amended in 1997 
(97/11/EEC) and 2003 (Wilson and Piper, 2010). In the same context, this EIA Directive 
aims to ‘ensure that certain public and private projects, likely to have significant effects by 
virtue of their nature, size, or location are subjected to EIA prior to development consent’ 
(Wilson and Piper, 2010, p. 143). EIA systems have been institutionalised more in other 
developed countries such as Canada in 1973, Australia in 1974, West Germany in 1975 and 
France in 1976 (Ogunba, 2004).   
 
This section discusses EIA together with Social Impact Assessment (SIA) and monitoring 
systems as integral components of the EIA procedure, including what constitutes ‘good 
practice’ for EIA systems. As EIA is a policy tool, it is the primary means by which 
potentially adverse environmental impacts can be prevented and mitigated (Cashmore, 2004; 
El-fadi and El-fadel, 2004; Petts, 1999b), and in principle, should lead to the rejection of 
environmentally unacceptable actions (Wood, 2003a, 1995). The objectives of EIA include 
impact avoidance, public involvement, intergovernmental coordination, and agency 
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accountability to the public (Bass and Herson, 1999; Clark and Richard, 1999; Kakonge, 
1998; Wood, 1995; Ebisemiju, 1993). EIA is further defined as a procedural technique of 
determining the environmental consequences of a specific project (Coskun and Turker, 
2011). This implies that the objectives of EIA have moved beyond mere saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
to development, towards ensuring that projects are effectively managed (Morrison-Saunders 
and Bailey, 2009, 2000) and potential problems are addressed as early as possible (Kakonge, 
1998). The basic process of EIA contains four comprehensive stages: activity definition, EIA 
report preparation, decision, and implementation (Petts, 1999a and see Figure 2.3). In more 
general terms, the EIA process ranges from consideration of alternative to screening, scoping 
and review of the EIA report, decision-making and monitoring (Wood, 2003a, 1999 and see 
Figure 2.4).  
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Figure 2.3: The environmental impact assessment decision-support system  
Source: Petts, 1999a: 6   
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Figure 2.4: The environmental impact assessment process  
Source: Wood, 1999 p. 11 
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The EIA processes identified in Figure 2.4 are of great importance, because when they are 
not treated properly in practice the quality of projects might be affected (Wood, 2003a, 
1999). These processes should be considered as early as possible when a project is 
undergoing design and planning (Brookes, 1999). Pinho et al. (2010) describes screening as 
of the early and essential steps of EIA procedure, aimed at identifying whether or not a 
project require EIA. Scoping for example has been described as one of the paths towards EIA 
success (Brookes, 1999), only when it is not influenced negatively by management issues, 
guidance issues, external influences, internal influences and policy issues (Barnes et al., 
2010). The criteria and checklist for an effective and efficient scoping are outlined in Table 
2.2, and the stages in the analysis of alternatives in Figure 2.5.  
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Table 2.2: Towards ‘sound practice’ principles of impact scoping requirements  
 
 
The responsible authority makes determination 
of scope i.e. requirements: 
  
Key action and principles 
 In accordance with EIA laws, 
provisions and guidelines that apply in 
a jurisdiction. 
 Consistent with characteristics of the 
proposed activity and the condition of 
the receiving environment and  
 Taking account of the concerns of those 
affected by the project. 
 
 Pre-identity the possible range of 
issues and impacts associated with a 
proposed activity 
 Fix a ‘reasonable’ time for public 
review and consultation (i.e. having 
regard to severity of issues) 
 Establish, as far as possible, the 
relative and aggregate significance 
of impacts, based on technical 
analysis and public concerns 
 Draft terms of reference to focus the 
EIA study on priorities 
 Begin, confirm or refocus baseline 
studies and/or monitoring as 
appropriate 
 Determine suitable methodologies 
and methods for next-phase impact 
analysis and public consultation 
 Recognise that this process also 
constitutes a re-scoping exercise, 
track accordingly and maintain 
flexibility 
 Prepare a scoping statement or 
report with brief updates as 
necessitated by changes. 
 
 
 
Source: Jones, 1999, p. 211 
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Figure 2.5: Stages in the analysis of alternatives 
Source: Jones, 1999: 220 
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range of indicators and measures (Wood, 1999, p. 14). These have been grouped into three 
categories, including: 
- Effective criteria (information generated in the EIA contributed to decision-making, 
prediction of the effectiveness of impact management measures were accurate; proposed 
mitigation and compensation measures achieved approved management objective); 
- Efficiency criteria (EIA decisions are timely, and relative to economic and other factors that 
determine project decisions; costs of conducting EIA and managing inputs during project 
implementation can be determined and reasonable); 
- Fairness criteria (all interested parties (stakeholders) have equal opportunity to influence the 
decision before it is made; people directly affected by projects have equal access to 
compensation). 
 
Apart from the application of such criteria frameworks, some researchers have assessed the 
effectiveness of EIA using broader procedural approaches. For example, four stages of 
evolution have been proposed by Gibson (2002) to explain EIA systems in Canada. These are 
summarised as: first, reactive pollution control to address the identified local problems; 
second, proactive impact identification; third, the integration of broader environmental 
considerations in project selection; and fourth, integrated planning and decision-making for 
sustainability (Gibson, 2002). Ogunba (2004) has offered an expansion of this model by 
proposing two additional stages, which he uses in explaining the EIA situation in Nigeria: 
first, building-up environmental awareness and second, putting in place national policy 
statements that might lead to the creation of EIA institutions and formalisation of EIA 
legislation. Other researchers have suggested adaptation, that is using a framework that has 
been applied elsewhere (Bailey and Dixon, 1999); some have advocated using assumptions 
such as issues determine politics and politics determine policy (Christiansen and Kellow, 
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2002); and in some cases no framework is suggested as long as EIA legislation has been 
institutionalised (Bartlett, 1997).  
 
However, there is evidence to suggest that a comprehensive and robust EIA system might not 
be fully guaranteed through the application of evaluation criteria alone. Indeed, the main 
driving force for ‘best practice’ EIA is likely to address how environmental policy is 
administered nationally, while assessing the amount of time, and resources needed to prepare 
the EIA reports, and gauging environmental awareness among the public, NGOs and political 
expectations (Pinho et al., 2007). Similarly, a ‘good’ EIA must be operative throughout the 
whole project cycle (Sebastiani et al., 2001). Petts (1999d, p. 8) argues that ‘best practice 
EIAs should improve the openness, comprehensiveness, transparency and robustness of 
environmental decision-making’. This should be done in the interest of environment and 
people (Glasson, 1999), as one of the original intentions of EIA was to improve public 
involvement in decision-making (Jah et al., 2007; Kvaerner, 2006; Petts, 1999b).  
 
Sadler (1996) suggests that part of the yardsticks to measure the effectiveness of an EIA 
system should be based on three factors. First is ‘procedural issue (does the process conform 
to the established provisions and principles?); second is substantive outcome (does the 
process achieve the objectives set, for example support well-informed decision-making and 
result in environmental protection?); and third is transactive outcome (does the process 
deliver tangible outcome that is, is it effective and efficient?)’ (Sadler, 1996 p. 39).  In 
addition to this, effective EIA might be achieved by starting early, identifying priority issues 
(scoping), establishing clear time lines to decision-making (Terms of Reference), using 
appropriate methods (impact analysis), ensuring that affected people have a say and their 
input should be respected, ensure that up-to-date mitigation measures are in place, EIA 
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reports should be written in a clear language, and it should be reviewed, evaluated and 
monitored (Sadler 1996).  
 
Apart from preparation of a set of Terms of Reference as mentioned above, Marara et al. 
(2011 p. 287) comment that an EIA system might be categorised as sound and effective under 
the following conditions: (a) ‘a law or written administrative direction, which dictates the 
EIA process is a necessary condition for viable EIA (b) a transparent government decision-
making and approval stages where what is required of proponents and government agencies 
is made clear to all and (c) adequate administrative support’. Putting in place administrative 
support is not sufficient but institutional factors that will influence the procedural aspect of 
EIA system should be encouraged, as they are embedded in ‘legislature, administrative 
structures, economic and financial arrangement, political structures and processes, and 
historical and traditional custom and values’ (Morrison-Saunders and Bailey, 2009 p. 285). It 
is on this note Marara et al. (2011) argue further that the contextual set-up such as the socio-
economic and political situation play an important role in achieving an effective EIA system. 
  
Importantly, effective EIA can be achieved in practice when there is cooperation among the 
policy actors and Government Implementing Agencies in particular, and this is what has been 
titled as ‘the Partnering Agreement Approach’ (Morrison-Saunders and Bailey, 2009, p. 293), 
while Polonen et al. (2011 p. 127) see it as ‘communication chains’. Similarly, knowledge 
management among Government Implementing Agencies is viewed as a pathway towards 
achieving effective EIA implementation, as knowledge management itself aims at stimulating 
and enhancing collective organisational skills and competencies (Sanchez and Morrison-
Saunders, 2011 p. 2260).         
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According to Glasson and Bellanger (2003), EIA should also provide answers to basic 
questions – which development is the best for a given location? How should the development 
be planned to limit the negative to reduce its impact on the environment and maximise the 
positive impacts? Based on these questions, the principles for designing and developing 
effective EIA processes are shown in Table 2.3 and the principles for effective EIA practice 
in Table 2.4.  Table 2.3 outlines the principles associated with clear EIA legislation goals and 
objectives, a uniformity of approaches towards assessment of environmental problems, and 
selection of the relevance scope of alternative among other principles of effective EIA 
processes. Table 2.4 summarises the practical ways of achieving effective EIA; it 
concentrates on the reasons for the application of EIA and how EIA should be undertaken 
and addressed among other issues.                 
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Table 2.3: The principles for design and development of effective EIA processes 
 
 
Clear mandate and provisions: Vested in law, have specific, enforceable 
requirements and prescribe the responsibilities and 
obligations of the proponents and other parties 
Explicit goals and objectives: A clear purpose is required to achieve environmental 
protection and/or sustainable development   
Uniform, consistent application: To be applied to all proposals and actions with 
potential environmental effects and consequences    
Appropriate level of assessment: Scaled to the degree of environmental significance 
and extent of public concerns associated with a 
proposal  
Relevant scope of consideration: This can be achieved by examining all pertinent 
environmental options to aspects of a proposal, 
including cumulative effects, cultural and health 
factors and sustainability implications  
Flexible, problem solving: It is adapted to deal with a range of proposal, issues 
and decision-making situations   
Open facilitative procedures: This must be transparent and readily accessible, with 
traceable of assessment decisions and timely 
opportunities for public involvement and input at key 
stages     
Necessary support and guidance: Cover level of resources and procedural guidance for 
conducting assessments in accordance with 
requirements, principle and standards f good practice  
Best practice’ standards: This can be undertaken with professionalism, 
objectivity and credibility, as identified by ‘best 
practice’ in impact science, public consultation and 
process administration 
Efficient predictable implementation To be applied in a timely manner that fosters 
certainty, minimises delay and avoids unnecessary 
burdens on proponents  
Decision oriented: Provide sound, tested practical information that is 
readily usable in planning and decision-making 
Related to condition setting: It is explicitly linked to approvals and, as necessary, 
to specified terms and conditions    
Follow-up and feedback in-built 
mechanisms:  
Measures must be on ground for checking on 
compliance with conditions, monitoring effects, 
managing impacts and auditing and evaluating 
performance  
Cost-effective outcomes This is achieved by promoting actions that ensure 
environmental protection at least cost to society   
 
 
Source: Fuller, 1999, p. 57 
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Table 2.4: The principles for effective EIA practice 
 
EIA should be 
applied:   
 As a primary instrument for environmental management  to ensure 
that impacts of projects are minimised 
 So that scope of review is consistent with the nature of the project 
and commensurate with likely issues and impacts 
 On the basis of well-defined responsibilities for key actors   
EIA should be 
undertaken: 
 Throughout the project cycle, beginning as early as feasible in the 
concept design phase 
 With clear reference to the requirements for project authorisation and 
follow-up, including impact management 
 Consistent with the application of ’best practicable’ science and 
mitigation technology 
 In accordance with established procedures and project specific terms 
of reference, including timelines 
 To provide appropriate opportunities  for public involvement, groups 
and parties directly affected by or with an interest in the project 
and/or its environmental impacts      
EIA should 
address, 
wherever 
necessary or 
appropriate: 
 Other related and relevant factors, including social and health risk 
and impact 
 Design, locational and technological alternatives to the proposal 
being accessed 
 Sustainability considerations including resources productivity, 
assimilative capacity and biological diversity  
EIA should 
result in:  
 Accurate and appropriate information as to nature, likely magnitude 
and significance of potential effects, risks and consequences of a 
propose undertaking and alternatives 
 The preparation of impact statement or report presents in a clear, 
understandable manner 
 The EIS identifying the confidence limits that can be placed on the 
predictions and clarifying areas of agreement among the parties 
involved in the process    
EIA should 
provide basis 
for: 
 Environmentally sound decision-making in which terms and 
conditions are clearly specified and enforced 
 The design and planning of acceptable projects that meet 
environmental standards and management objectives 
 An appropriate follow-up process with requirements for monitoring, 
management, audit and evaluation 
 Follow-up requirements that are based on significance of potential 
effects and on the uncertainties associated with prediction and 
mitigation  
 Learning from experience with a view to making future 
improvements to design of projects or the application of the 
environmental assessment process  
Source: Fuller, 1999, p. 58  
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2.2.1. EIA around the world: ‘Best practice’ examples from the U.S and the UK  
 
 
The United States Government institutionalised NEPA and established the country’s 
Environmental Protection Agency to implement the various steps as contained in the EIA 
process (Wood, 2003a, 1995). The agency determines the scope of EIA, including 
examination of proposal and preliminary environmental analysis in order to identify the 
related impacts to be addressed through mitigation measures as contained in the 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) (Bass and Herson, 1999). EIS is not issued if a 
particular project would not result in significant environmental effects; rather a ‘no 
significant environmental effects document’ is issued (Bass and Herson, 1999). Clark and 
Richards (1999) reported that about 500 EISs are issued annually in the U.S., despite the 
large numbers of Environmental Assessment conducted (that is about 50,000).  
 
The U.S. adopted additional regulations to complement its EIA system, including the 
guidance for the assessment of cumulative effects to determine the scope of any assessment 
(Cooper and Sheate, 2002), and the Deep Water Royalty Relief Act to ensure effective 
environmental management (Pinders, 2001). It is on this note that Chasek (2007) concluded 
that the U.S is positioned to achieve sustainable development. In many countries, permit and 
licence systems are indefinite or for the life of the project, this is not the case in the U.S., as 
most energy or water related projects in particular are required to pass through an 
environmental review under the supervision of Federal Energy Regulation Commission 
(FERC) before new license can be issued (Russo, 1999). However, Wood (1999, 2003a) 
argues that the U.S. EIA system requires improvement in public participation, agency 
consultation, decision-making, mitigation, monitoring, and suggests that the country’s EIA 
process should be shorter and more accessible.  
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In the UK, both public and private sector projects are subjected to EIA prior to development 
(Wilson and Piper, 2010). This system has been incorporated into the town and country 
planning decision process in England and Wales, and Scotland, and Northern Ireland 
(Ogunba, 2004; Glasson, 1999; Wood, 1995). The EIA system in the UK reflects best 
practice, as it focuses on the consideration of alternatives, screening, scoping, EIA report 
preparation, review, decision-making, and monitoring, among others (Wood, 2003a, 1999, 
1995). Apart from the fact that Local Planning Authorities (LPA) in the UK play a key role in 
decision-making, the licensing system is also structured to ensure that the approved 
development is operated purposely to minimise environmental impacts (Glasson and 
Salvador, 2000; Petts and Eduljee, 1994). In the UK, over 3000 EISs have been issued with 
350 per annum since the implementation of EC directive (Glasson and Salvador, 2000).  
 
However, the EIA system in the UK has been criticised for not giving adequate consideration 
to scoping, early participation, right to further information, true centrality of EIA decision, 
and monitoring provisions (Wood, 2003a, 1999). For example, ‘the voluntary nature of the 
UK scoping provision enables EIA practice to be strongly determined by developers, their 
consultants and the decision-making body’; as it is evidenced by Regulation 10 of 1999’ (a 
scoping opinion) (Snell and Cowell, 2006: 365). Pediaditi et al. (2010) observe that 
provisions of monitoring system have not been fully implemented in the UK and European 
Union in general, though significant improvement has been recorded in the public hearing 
around the EU and the UK in particular (Barker and Wood, 1999), with statutory bodies 
(Environmental Group) playing a vital role in the UK EIA process (Glasson and Salvador, 
2000). I have summarised in Table 2.5, EIA evaluation research that has been previously 
carried out around other developed world and within the European Union in particular. 
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Table 2.5: Previous EIA research around the European Union 
 
 
Author Topic Brief description of key activities 
Androulidakis, 
Karakassis 
(2006: 242-256) 
Evaluation of the EIA 
system performance in 
Greece, using quality 
indicators 
This paper explores EIA practice in Greece and 
focus on the extent to which the system is 
conformed in practice. The author evaluation 
method is likened to using legal assessment. 
Barker, and 
Wood (1999: 
387-404) 
An evaluation of EIA 
system performance in 
eight EU countries 
Reviewed EIA in 8 EU countries and reported 
an average of 60% satisfactory performance, in 
spite of several forced modifications. 
Bellinger,  Lee, 
George and 
Paduret (eds.) 
(2000) 
Environmental assessment 
in countries in transition 
Described EA systems in 19 Eastern-Bloc 
countries. Used Cost-Benefits Analysis and 
concluded that there is still considerable scope 
for further improvement. 
Braniš, and 
Christopoulos 
(2005: 227-238) 
10 years of EIA in 
Austria. A Good Reason 
for an EIA Evaluation 
Evaluated Austria’s EIA 10 years after its 
introduction. The theoretical framework used 
multi-disciplinary approach to reach its 
conclusion and ultimately led to the 
development of new theories. 
Cashmore et al.  
(2004: 295-310) 
The interminable issue of 
effectiveness: substantive 
purposes, outcomes and 
research challenges in the 
advancement of 
environmental impact 
assessment theory 
Reviewed EIA literatures/studies and 
concluded that integration-linked problems 
have otherwise hampered its success. It 
advocated further theory-based research in 
diverse processes. 
Chaytor, (1995: 
507-515) 
The potential of EIA 
procedures to enhance 
public participation in 
trade decision-making 
Highlighted the importance of EIA for public 
sector projects/activities. 
Christensen et 
al. (2003a) 
The advantages of EIA—
Evaluation of EIA in 
Denmark, main report 
Examined the Danish EIA system by reviewing 
over 90 projects at various stages of approvals 
and concluded that they have benefited the 
public as a whole. 
Christensen et 
al. (2003b) 
The Outcome of EIA in 
Danish 
Reviewed Danish EIA within the broader 
European context. It concluded that 
improvements resulted to a larger extent from 
concerted traditional mitigating measures. 
Christensen et 
al. (2005: 393-
412) 
EIA as regulation: does it 
work? in Danish 
Also reviewed the effects of the Danish EIA 
and concluded that EIA generate significant 
positive changes to projects. 
 
Dipper et al. 
(1998) 
Monitoring and Post-
Auditing in Environmental 
Impact Assessment: A 
Review 
This is a post-EIA audit which examined both 
pre-decision as well as post-decision 
monitoring. It concluded that several benefits 
were not harnessed due to poor and ineffective 
implementation. 
European 
Commission 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment in Europe - A 
Examined the Cost Benefit Analysis of EIA 
implementation within the EU split into Project 
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(1996) study on costs and benefits EIA and SIA. Also concluded that generally the 
positive impacts of EIA justified the effort 
involved. 
Figge, and 
Hahn (2004: 
921) 
 
Value-oriented impact 
assessment: the economics 
of a new approach to 
impact assessment 
Highlighted the importance of EIA to public 
and private economic activities. Criticised most 
of the existing approaches for their lop-sided 
nature and proposed value-oriented approach. 
 
Haldorsson, and 
Sigurdardottir 
(2006) 
EIA in Iceland 1994-2005 
- The Impact of the 
Introduction of the 
Scoping Process 
Reviewed EIA in Iceland following its 
adoption of the EU directive 85/337/EEC. It 
adopted different methods, identified reasons 
for major changes between 2000 and 2005 as 
well as suggested a down-scaling of the 
administrative costs of EIS. 
Hanssen, (2006) Norwegian EIA Research A bridged EIA researches in Norway over a 25-
year period. Identified wide-spread non-
implementation of EU-directives and Espoo 
conventions in the early years.  
Hokkanen, et al. 
(2005) 
 
 
Effectiveness of 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment in Finland – 
Examined the Finnish EIA legislation and 
highlighted gaps which weakened 
implementation. The acclaimed objectives 
never materialized in the context proposed, 
thus further policy instruments needs to be 
applied to reduce deviations. The import of 
multidisciplinary teams was also 
recommended. 
Kempenaar, 
Christa (2005) 
Quality in control? An 
evaluation of the quality, 
costs and time of Dutch 
EIA-studies for road 
projects. 
This case study which examined a Dutch road 
project concluded that EIA studies are costly, 
lengthy. An overhaul of the process has now 
been formulated and rolled out to ensure that 
henceforth EIA are not only fit-for-purpose but 
most importantly cost effective. 
 
 
Sources: Oosterhuis 2007: 33-80 (Institute of Environmental Studies) 
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2.2.2. Social Impact Assessment as a component of EIA 
Social Impact Assessment has remained an integral component of EIA in theory to correct 
social lapses, as it is connected to public participation within the EIA procedures (Pisani and 
Sandham, 2006; Weaver and Caldwell, 1999), thus further described as a wider focus of EIA 
(Wilson and Piper, 2010). Similarly, SIA focuses on processes rather than technical means 
(Schirmer, 2011) and is as old as EIA itself (Webler and Lord, 2010; Momtaz, 2005). The 
aspect of participation is central to SIA and the ‘combination of a participative approach with 
expert judgement is often regarded as strength of SIA’ (Ahmadvand et al., 2009, p. 406). The 
issue of SIA was contained in the U.S. original EIA legislation, but it has not been fully 
integrated in practice because of political consequences of making explicit social implications 
of a project (Webler and Lord, 2010; Pisani and Sandham, 2006; Burdge et al., 1995). 
Although social issues came to force since 1973 following the established impacts of Alaskan 
Pipeline from Prudoe Bay on the Arctic Sea to Valdez on Prince William Sound on people 
(Vanclay, 2006). It is argued that a project that is socially sound is likely to be 
environmentally and economically sound (Barrow, 1997), and SIA helps in managing 
environmental and natural resources conflicts (Barrow, 2010).  
    
The purpose of SIA is to examine whether a proposed project affects quality of life of people 
within a specific area (Barrow, 2010; Glasson, 2009; Ahmadvand et al., 2009; Vanclay, 
2006; Lockie, 2001; Burdge et al., 1995). SIA is defined as the ‘process of analysing, 
monitoring and managing social consequences’ (Barrow, 2010, p. 293). In 2003, international 
principles for SIA were published to address some of the lapses under national SIA 
guidelines. This is because most national SIA guidelines do not fully consider democratic, 
participatory and constructivist issues (Vanclay, 2006). The international principles that relate 
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to a sound SIA practice is in Table 2.6 and stakeholders’ expectation of EIA process in Table 
2.7, as public for example deserves the right to know, to be informed and to be heard. 
 
Table 2.6: The international principles for SIA 
 
 
Equity considerations should be a fundamental element of impact assessment and of 
development planning 
Many of the social impacts of planned interventions can be predicted 
Planned interventions can be modified to reduce their negative social impacts and enhance 
their positive impacts 
SIA should be an integral part of the development process, involved in all stages from 
inception to follow-up audit 
There should be focused on socially sustainable development, with SIA contributing to the 
determination of the best development alternative(s) – SIA (and EIA) have more to offer than 
just being an arbiter between economic benefit and social cost 
In all planned interventions and assessments, avenue should be developed to build the social 
and human capital of local communities and to strengthen democratic processes  
In all planed interventions, but especially where there are unavoidable impacts, ways to turn 
impacted people into beneficiaries should be investigated 
The SIA must give due consideration to alternatives of any planned intervention, but 
especially in cases when there are likely to be unavoidable impacts 
Full consideration should be given to the potential mitigation measures of social and 
environmental impacts, even where impacted communities may approve the planned 
intervention and where they may be regarded as beneficiaries 
Local knowledge and experience and acknowledgement of different local cultural values 
should be incorporated in any assessment 
There should no use of violence, harassment, intimidation or undue force in connection with 
the assessment or implementation of a planned intervention 
Developmental processes that infringe the human rights of any section of society should not 
be accepted 
 
Source Vanclay, 2006, p. 12     
 
 
Table 2.7: Key stakeholders’ expectations from the EIA Process 
 
Stakeholder Key Expectations 
Proponents Certainty of outcome, cost effectiveness, minimising of delays and 
adherence to time lines 
Public Right to know, right to be informed, right to be heard and right to object 
Decision makers Minimisation of delays and adherence to time lines,  provisions of 
information appropriate to decision-making, avoidance of unnecessary 
information and succinct manageable documentation 
 
Source Fuller, 1999, p. 56  
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2.2.3. Monitoring systems as a component of EIA 
 
Understanding the components that constitute monitoring within the EIA procedure is 
essential to enable the relevant bodies to monitor the effects of implemented actions (Wood, 
1995). Monitoring is designed to ensure that the recommendations of mitigation measures are 
implemented, and this is a continuous process (Thrievel and Morris, 2009; Brookes, 1999; 
Bass and Herson, 1999; E&P Forum/UNEP, 1997; Petts and Edulje, 1994). Monitoring can 
be categorised into two groups: baseline monitoring (monitoring before the commencement 
of project/development) and compliance - or ‘post development’ – monitoring (Barrow, 
1997). In Bolivia and Brazil, compliance monitoring of oil and gas related projects have been 
reported to be effective, because of the wide involvement of the stakeholders (Russo, 1999). 
Therefore, a key condition for an effective monitoring system is that the baseline data must 
be good enough to detect residual impacts, and there should be funding to carry out 
monitoring survey work to enable modifications to mitigation to be made (Therivel and 
Morris, 2009).  
 
In practice, monitoring systems appear as the only form of EIA follow-up, and more 
importantly, all EIA processes are relevant to this EIA follow-up (Arts and Nooteboom, 
1999). For example, the Canadian EIA system supports this type of monitoring in line with 
its legal provisions (Wood, 1995), even though  its Country Act ‘did not contain any means 
of ensuring that monitoring is implemented, rather it aids good decision-making and therefore 
not intended as a regulatory tool’ (p. 206). Some countries have embraced effective 
monitoring mechanisms, as contained in their regulatory systems (Arts and Nooteboom, 
1999). For example, in California, if the monitoring reveals that mitigation measures are 
ignored or not completed; sanctions will be imposed (Arts and Nooteboom, 1999). Barrow 
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(1997) maintains that monitoring will improve as long as better research and practice are 
available together with better measuring instruments.  
 
However, monitoring was not contained in NEPA – the original conception of EIA – and thus 
is not required in the US system (Wood, 1995). It is not also a statutory requirement in the 
UK (Therivel and Morris, 2009). But ‘best practice’ countries like the U.S, UK, Hong Kong, 
and Australia, among others, have been applying monitoring systems, enabling them to gain 
improved experience towards achieving effective implementation (Arts and Nooteboom, 
1999).  
 
2.3. Practical challenges related to EIA implementation and its components  
 
Pollution mitigation tools and EIA in particular have been institutionalised in over 100 
countries (Weaver et al., 2008; Glasson and Salvador, 2000; Petts, 1999a). However, it 
appears that certain factors influence the effective implementation of EIA. Equally, EIA 
procedures can be rendered ineffective if certain basic requirements are not in place (Barrow, 
1997). These include, inter alia, a supportive legislature, broader environmental protection, 
effective procedures, accurate and sufficient data, adequate financing for the assessment and 
a clear indication of what is to be the subject of impact assessment, competent impact 
assessors, monitoring mechanisms, and public participation (Barrow, 1997). Lawler (2005) 
identifies both economic and logistical constraints as the major challenges against effective 
EIA implementation particularly in the water related sector.  
 
Consequently, the effectiveness of EIA differs from one region to another, as well as from 
one project to another. In particular, the situation in developing countries is not directly 
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aligned with that in developed countries (Wood, 2003b), because of different in origins, 
legislature and environment (Ogunba, 2004). More generally, the challenges against EIA 
implementation in the developing world include a lack of implementation capacity 
(Aishuwaikhat, 2005); dearth of political will (Briffett, 1999) and flaws in legislative, 
administrative, institutional and procedural frameworks (Ebisemiju, 1993). The examples of 
Venezuela, Chile, Ghana, Pakistan, Taiwan and Bangladesh are considered to explore the 
extent to which these six developing countries have been hindered from translating into 
practice the contents of EIA, as all other environmental management systems are connected 
with EIA. 
 
In Venezuela, only projects related to industrial plants require a complete EIA report 
(Sebastiani et al., 2001). However, the Venezuelan’s EIA system has often been criticised, 
with major problems cited including, inter alia, poor documentation, lack of technical 
support for environmental control, poor communication between departments of the 
industrial facility, poor communication with local communities and lack of management 
commitment (Sebastiani et al., 2001). In Chile, despite the spread of environmental legal 
provisions across different Ministries, environmental and social problems remain enormous 
(Brito and Verocai, 1999). Moreover, the inability of Chilean’s environmental agencies to 
implement the content of EIA in particular is exacerbated because of lack of penalties in 
cases of violation, and mitigation measures not being cost effective among other problems 
(Brito and Verocai, 1999). Ofori (2005) and Appiah-Opoku (2001) highlighted seven reasons 
why Ghanaian EIA has not been fully translated into practice, despite the fact that the 
country’s EIA has been institutionalised since 1994. These include the lack of organised 
baseline data, little environmental awareness, shortage of local experts, and the lack of public 
involvement, inadequate monitoring, financial resources and institutional constraints.  
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In 1997, EIA was enacted in Pakistan, with the aims to describe project and related 
environmental consequences, the procedure commences with screening, which is followed by 
scoping (by identifying issues that are likely to be most important) and emphasises the need 
for monitoring, public participation and EIA review (Saeed et al., 2012). The purpose of EIA 
review for example is to ensure that the EIA report contains quality information and to 
examine how the identified impacts will be mitigated. However, the EIA procedures in 
Pakistan have not been effective, given that no independent review commission exists in the 
country as stipulated in its EIA legislation, public participation in the country is alleged of 
being manipulated coupled with insufficient resources (Saeed et al., 2012).  
 
In 1994, Taiwan EIA came into existence; the country’s EIA focuses on general principles, 
assessment, review, and supervision procedures for EIA itself, where developers are expected 
to submit Environmental Impact Statement as well as making them available to the public; 
and enforcing penalties for non-compliance (Jou and Liaw, 2006). In the same manner with 
other developing countries, EIA in Taiwan has not been translated into practice mainly 
because they were completed by environmental consultants employed by the developers and 
also environmental data were inadequate and public participation lacks transparency (Jou and 
Liaw, 2006).           
 
The EIA procedures in Bangladesh seems to be reactive rather than proactive, the country’s 
EIA came into existence due to social and environmental impact of Kaptai Dam (hydraulic 
Power Station) (Ahammed and Harvey, 2004). Subsequently, the country established 
Ministry of Environment in 1989 and EIA Act in 1995 under (Environment Conservation 
Act) (Ahammed and Harvey, 2004). Like other EIA procedures around the developing world, 
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the country’s EIA emphasises the need for screening, scoping, monitoring and public 
participation among others EIA stages, yet these EIA procedures remain ineffective in 
Bangladesh due to lack of coordination as one of the major hindrances (Ahammed and 
Harvey, 2004).  
 
Even though most of these developing countries have established EIA since early and mid 
1990s, they are still struggling with the EIA processes and procedures in practice. It appears 
that in some developing countries, EIA legislation has not been institutionalised; these 
include Lesotho (Kakonge, 1997), Comoros (Kakonge, 1999) and Cameroon (Alemagi et al., 
2007; Kakonge, 1999). However, Koornneef et al. (2008) maintain that it will be difficult to 
apply EIA regulations when a country’s legal status is unclear. Jah et al. (2007) therefore 
suggest that EIA should be given a strong and clear regulatory backing.  
 
Particular aspects of EIA implementation process have been hindered: these include Social 
Impact Assessment and monitoring systems. Often SIA related projects require more time 
and funds (Barrow, 1997), and they have been reportedly underfunded and ‘neglected mainly 
in the mining sector’ (Yaylaci, 2005, p. 637). Other challenges related to SIA include 
difficulties in applying social science to SIA; problems with the procedure for applying SIA; 
and a prevailing anti-social impact assessment mentality or an existing societal mentality 
(Vanclay, 2006, 1999; Barrow, 1997; Petts and Eduljee, 1994).  
 
Likewise, it appears that challenges related to EIA monitoring systems are more noticeable, 
because they pertain to a more practical approach, and require continued moderate to high 
levels of funding over years (Therivel and Morris, 2009; Arts and Nooteboom, 1999). Other 
challenges related to monitoring systems include uncertainty and limited information, 
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deficiencies in EIS, and lack of guidance (Arts and Nooteboom, 1999). Furthermore, the lack 
of legal actions to ensure effective monitoring process has remained a major challenge 
(Wood, 1995, 2003a & b). For example, under Annex 1 of the International Convention for 
the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ship (MARPOL): ships are still permitted to 
discharge small amounts of oil waste into the sea (IMO, 2010, 2009; Camphuysen and 
Heubeck, 2001). The fact that this small amount might affect sea fauna and flora (as 
mentioned in section 2.1; also see O’Hara and Moradin 2010), is part of the reason why Bond 
and Wathern (1999) concluded that EIA monitoring provisions are proving ineffective in 
practice. 
 
2.4 Evaluating EIA practices: a critical summary of the literature 
 
In this chapter I have reviewed the extent to which offshore oil and gas sector operations 
affect marine fauna and flora, and cause associated negative environmental effects on the 
atmosphere and on human health. Based on the identified environmental impacts, mitigation 
tools and EIA are mainly considered as a way of assessing environmental pollution before it 
occurs. This is because neither the response to marine environmental pollution after it occurs 
(for example oil spillage, see Kirby and Law, 2010) nor the use of alternative sources of 
energy such as biodiesel have proven effective (Cavalett and Ortega, 2010). It appears that it 
is better to develop means by which environmental pollution can be mitigated rather than 
finding a way of solving the problem after pollution has happened. The most important 
mitigation tool and strategy emphasised in this thesis is EIA. 
 
The application of EIA seems to be difficult in practice even in the developed world 
(Drexhage and Murphy, 2010; Wood, 2003a & b, 1999). However, the situation in this regard 
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is still better than conditions in developing countries (Wood, 2003b). This is because of 
differences in levels of technology, civil society development, political support, standards of 
living, attitudes towards the environment, and value for social amenities, among other factors 
(Marara et al., 2011; Wood, 2003b). 
 
While the basic tenets of the literature reviewed in this chapter can form the basis for many 
parts of my analysis – particularly in terms of identifying aspects of good practice – the 
evaluation frameworks adopted by previous researchers do not enable an adequate 
explanation of EIA implementation in a developing country context. This is because they are 
too blunt for understanding national policy settings, particularly in situations where unclear 
and contradictory EIA systems exist. By focusing on procedural and technical issues, these 
evaluative frameworks are insufficient to understand national policy contexts or address 
social, economic, and political nuances. 
 
Indeed, it has been argued that ‘EIA literatures are guided by assumptions and models that 
have been implicitly assumed rather than explicitly and systematically explored, formulated 
or articulated’ (Wood, 2003a, p. 3). Abaza and Baranzini (2002, p. 2) state that ‘the basis of 
disagreement related to policy issues … is societal rather than technical’. This contradicts the 
orthodox view that ‘achieving sustainability through EIA implementation … is a technical 
issue...’ (Mansfield, 2009, p. 37). At the same time, it has been established that there is ‘no 
universally agreed framework or criteria for...evaluation of mitigation tools and it is proposed 
that...evaluation should be designed to reflect the local context specific understandings and 
requirements for such mitigation tools’ (Retief, 2007, p. 465). 
Howlett (1995, p. 68) has noted that theory should be developed and applied to ‘reflect the 
empirical situations’ that a researcher faces. Therefore, it is necessary to cast a critical eye on 
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the frameworks that have been applied in evaluating EIA so as to explore their limitations 
and utility to the present research. In doing this, I am motivated by the existence of 
contradictory EIA matrices in my study area (that is NMOGS), as well as the finding that 
existing frameworks lack the means to analyse national policy contexts, which is a crucial 
determinant of EIA implementation.  
 
As noted previously, the criteria framework used by Wood (1999; 2003b) in assessing EIA 
implementation for developed and developing countries focus on 14 questions. These 
questions are not sufficient to explain the present research goals and objectives. For example, 
a criteria-based framework cannot be used in understanding the political background and 
fine-grained detail involved in producing the components of conflicts in the EIA 
implementation process. In addition, the criteria framework mainly addresses technical 
issues, despite the fact that environmental problems cannot be solved by technical means 
alone; they require interrelated changes in human ethics, values, perceptions and culture 
(Bartlett, 1997). 
 
As for Gibson’s (2002) stages of evolution model, I would argue that it is not adequate to 
assess the extent to which EIA aim has been achieved in practice and cannot be applied 
towards the elucidation of national policy contexts. Furthermore, extending the assumptions 
as originally proposed by Hanf and Underdal (see Christiansen and Kellow, 2002: 26) – that 
issues determine politics and politics determine policy – cannot in itself be used to explain 
and understand national policy contexts for EIA implementation. Even though the national 
policy issues are tied to politics, issues around institutional, economic and social factors 
cannot be undermined. Simon (2010, p. 121) maintains that ‘there is a need for a more 
- 49 - 
 
sophisticated approach to politics and preferably identifying how problem can be solved 
through social action’. 
 
Other researchers have suggested transferring frameworks that have been applied elsewhere 
to explain EIA practices (Bailey and Dixon, 1999). But this present research should require 
more than the use of locally-contextualised adaptation: the process of evaluating 
environmental policy should entail reporting what might have transpired between policy 
actors within and outside implementing agencies, a phenomenon titled ‘information 
relationships’ (Simon, 2010). It might be difficult to rely on adaptation in the context of 
transferring ideas from developed nations to developing countries, because of differences in 
culture, political systems, and social values among other factors. It appears that policy 
implementation needs a model that will ‘help characterise the process of problem solving in a 
collective setting where the sovereignty of a range of actors...is pooled’ (Richardson, 1996, 
p.19). In addition, the act of using statutory compliance alone in carrying out an evaluation is 
not particularly helpful in itself. This is because the process may overlook difficulties related 
to identifying the effectiveness of policy implementation, and such assertion is not 
completely applicable in reality (Simon, 2010). 
 
It is evident that the research focus of this thesis cannot be satisfactorily addressed using 
traditional EIA evaluation frameworks. Their attention is overly focused on technical 
problems rather than institutional, political, economic and social factors. Indeed, Bartlett 
(1997) argues that environmental problems cannot be resolved by technical means alone, as 
they require interrelated changes in human ethics, perceptions and culture. In the same vein, 
most EIA literatures are criticised for a lack of theoretical rigour in analysing the values and 
judgements that underpin contested issues (Cashmore, 2004). According to Dahler-Larsen 
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(2006, p. 155) ‘criteria or checklist frameworks are used in introductions to evaluation in 
order to make life easier for beginners’.  
 
Speaking more broadly, I would argue that EIA formulation and implementation itself takes 
place in an explicitly political context (Wood, 2003a). In order to get beyond simplistic EIA 
evaluations, a more sophisticated theoretical understanding of national policy context is 
required. Consequently, in the next chapter I move to policy implementation theories, in 
order to develop a more elaborate framework for understanding the procedural issues 
associated with EIA implementation in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER 3 
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION THEORIES 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
‘There is a need to place EIA within a theoretical context in order to both fully 
inform practice of its goals and aims and to ensure that newly developing EIA 
systems are located within a general policy theories and decision-making 
framework for example’ (Weston, 2000, p. 185).  
 
 
This chapter outlines a range of policy implementation theories that can be used to interrogate 
national EIA systems. In the previous chapter, I considered the main mitigation tools that can 
be used to assess environmental impacts, focusing on EIA in particular. In light of the 
identified shortcomings in the academic literature and policy praxis, I now contend that a 
more sophisticated approach needs to be developed in order to understand EIA 
implementation. To do so, I advocate the application of policy implementation theories to 
understand national policy contexts. In the chapter, I first assess the relationship between 
evaluation research and policy implementation theories; this includes an outline of the main 
components of policy implementation failure and success. I then examine the need for 
applying policy implementation theories and discuss the work of Richard Matland in 
particular, focusing on ambiguity and conflict in policy implementation.  
 
3.2 Evaluation research and its relationships with policy theories       
 
The use of programme or policy theory in evaluation practice has a long history (Donaldson 
and Lipsey, 2006). The origins of evaluation research can be traced back to the process of 
developing evidence-based action in educational research and social policies during the 
1960s (McKie, 2002). Evaluation seeks to address practical problems and it is further viewed 
as the act of identifying or judging the worth, value of policy or program (Rogers and 
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Williams, 2006; Schwandt and Burgon, 2006; McKie, 2002; Hall and Hall, 1996; House, 
1993). Patton (1987, p. 145) views evaluation as ‘systematic collection, analysis and 
interpretation of information about activities and outcomes of actual programmes or policies 
in order for interested persons to make judgements...’. Therefore, evaluation is not only 
positioned to fulfil judgement but also to provide information that is required to take refine 
and adjust public policy (Vestman and Conner, 2006).  
  
Evaluation approaches include, inter alia: empowerment evaluation, inquiry evaluation, 
systemic evaluation, success case methods, evidence-based practice, performance monitoring 
and programme theory and theory-based evaluation or theory-driven evaluation (Rogers and 
Williams, 2006). Theory-based approaches are favoured by many researchers because they 
allow evaluation to be tested, thus providing ‘information about the...assumptions underlying 
programme under evaluation...this broad idea is further elaborated, contextualised, and 
operationalised...’ (Dahler-Larsen, 2006, p. 152).        
  
Evaluation is not only a theory-testing activity (Dahler-Larsen, 2006; Leeuw, 1995), as it 
works well within social and political contexts (Mark et al., 2006; Simons, 2006) and also 
remains as a ‘potential political influences’ (Greene, 2006, p. 119). It serves as ‘constructed 
apparatus by which humans make sense of their world and initiatives’ (Dahler-Larsen, 2006, 
p. 151), and thus acts as ‘human enterprise’ (Stevenson and Thomas, 2006, p. 201). In 
practice, evaluation is not only a human activity, but also ‘a multidisciplinary activity’ 
(Clarke, 2006, p. 577). Evaluation aims to improve decision-making, helping resource 
allocation, enhance accountability and encourage organisational learning (Walker and 
Duncan, 2007). The role of evaluation research is ‘to deliver factual and objective 
knowledge’ (Rist, 1995, p. xvi), and evaluators should therefore be concerned more with 
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producing local knowledge rather than generalisable knowledge (Donaldson and Lipsey, 
2006).  
 
It is worth noting that information required to achieve effective implementation of policy 
varies. (Rist, 1995). Policy informational components include policy problems, futures, 
actions, outcomes and performance (Dunn, 2003, 1994). During the evaluation of policy 
process, public opinions should attract more attention (Walker and Duncan, 2007; and Powell 
and Maynard, 2007; McCool, 1995). 
 
It has been argued that ‘knowing the theory on which a policy is based will strengthen the 
evaluation effort, and such theory can be compared with research evidence to determine how 
well founded a policy is and what are the chances of its success’ (Leeuw, 1995, p. 20). This 
suggests that policy evaluation research requires policy theories, with a priority on the 
implementation process (although policy formulation and refinement are also essential parts 
of the policy process). A good theory should be in form of a management tool: valid, 
economical, testable, understandable, providing causal explanation, predictive, useful, 
reliable, and heuristic (induce further research) among others (Birkland, 2005; McCool, 
1995). It should also be practicable and socially sound (Donaldson and Lipsey, 2006; Abma, 
2006; Stevenson and Thomas, 2006).  
   
The remainder of this chapter discusses the components of policy implementation failure and 
success. This is because the objectives of evaluation research include determining ‘success or 
failure’ and developing ‘policy alternatives’ (Nakamura, 1980, p. 23). Similarly, most 
implementation research focuses on highlighting the factors that are responsible for either 
policy success or failure. But there is no absolute guarantee that any policy implementation 
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will be successful. According to McCool (1995) and Anderson (1975) inadequate resources, 
undervaluation of social aspects, lack of monitoring, uncertainty over policy goals and diffuse 
policy impacts might be responsible for policy implementation failure. Although policy 
prepositions that recognise social evidence in particular might not fail (Leeuw, 1995; and 
McCool, 1995; Newson, 1992). Leeuw (1995) further clarified that policy could fail if the 
implicit assumptions were in error. In addition, ‘policy will fail when the relationships 
between the actors are not taken into account...’ (Birkland, 2005: 191). Birkland (2005) 
maintains that the choice of ineffective tools, political boundaries between states, and 
problems inherent in policy implementation might result in policy failure.      
 
Still, ‘successful policy implementation can be achieved when there are committed and 
skilful people to manage the implementation and when the nature of cooperation that is 
required is not lacking...’ (Weimer and Vining, 2005, p. 275). Therefore, one of the key 
factors that guarantee implementation success is by considering how policy works and 
focusing on the state of its conformity and coordination (Spicker, 2006), including sufficient 
resources and simplify implementation chain (Jordan et al., 1998). In a more pragmatic 
manner, six factors have been identified as influencing the possibility of implementation 
success. These are statutory compliance; bureaucratic accountability; statutory goals 
accomplished; local goals accomplished; political climate improvement; and learning as an 
important factor, because ‘learning is central to making things even better’ (Simon, 2010, pp. 
102-103).      
 
Most importantly, policy implementation generally (whether failure or success) should focus 
on three main approaches: (a) theory on how the organisation works (b) identifying series 
stage within the process of implementation and (c) examining implementation as system 
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(Spicker, 2006). According to McCool (1995) the problem is not absence of policy 
implementation theories but the comprehensiveness of those theories, which requires the 
identification of a leading theory. This is discussed in the next section, where the leading 
theory is identified ‘in effort to incite integrative analysis’ (McCool, 1995, pp. 8 & 394). 
Through the next section I emphasise the need for application of policy implementation 
theories to understanding EIA in order to understand national policy context.   
 
3.3 A multi-theoretical approach to EIA implementation processes  
 
This section discusses policy implementation theories that are needed for a better 
understanding of the policy process in a national context. I have reviewed several literatures 
that centre on policy theories, concepts, and models within the field of social and political 
sciences. This is because it has been established from the onset of this research that almost all 
environmental problems require understanding wider social, economic, institutional, and 
political issues. This section therefore not only considers the importance of social, economic, 
institutional/organisational and political issues in solving environmental problems, but also 
contributes to the manner in which contradictory regulatory systems might be conceptualised 
and understood theoretically. More importantly, applying policy implementation theories and 
specifically Richard Matland’s Ambiguity-Conflict Model (ACM) in particular as a leading 
theory enables us to move beyond the simplistic evaluation methods examined in the 
previous chapter.      
  
Applying such policy theories to implementation of environmental policies is a novel way of 
understanding the level of interactions that might have existed among the major policy actors, 
given that implementation itself is an administrative function (Simon, 2010). There are 
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several examples of previous EIA literatures that have embraced the use of policy theories 
(Cashmore, 2004; Weston, 2000). However, most of them have concentrated on decision-
making theory and the need for developing theories in general (ibid), and none have been 
applied to the Nigerian context.  
 
Generally, ‘theory is viewed as an advantage for thinking that gives support to ideas, also as 
nothing more than a tool, a strategic device to increase understanding how to carry out proper 
evaluation’ (McCool, 1995, p. 20). The main purpose of policy theory is to enhance the 
quality of social life, understand how the political and economy aspects of society work, 
identifying how basic underlying causal relationship fit together (Cochran and Malone, 2005; 
McCool, 1995) and guiding the evaluation process (Alkin et al., 2006). Notwithstanding 
Mischen’s comments that  ‘implementation theory and research have outgrown the search for 
a single theory of implementation...an effort that got mired in a top-down, bottom-up debate 
and have entered a new era that recognise multiple theories appropriate to various 
implementation research...’ (Mischen, 2007, p. 1).  
 
Even though this work at the beginning focused on thirteen policy implementation theories, 
they are further subdivided into four by putting together those that are related and discarding 
those that are less relevant to the thesis. My main activity at this point includes outlining the 
thirteen policy implementation theories, the ones that are discarded among them and the 
reasons why they cannot be used and finally showing those that are related to one another 
leading to the four basic policy implementation theories applied in this research.  
 
The thirteen policy implementation theories considered are: (1) stages model, (2) public 
choice theory, (3) institutional theory, (4) neo/new institutional theory, (5) rational 
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comprehensive decision-making model, (6) system theory, (7) advocacy coalition framework, 
(8) synthesis model of policy implementation, (9) causal theory, (10) bounded rationality 
model, (11) top-down approach, (12) bottom-up approach, and (13) ambiguity conflict 
model. Of these thirteen policy implementation theories, some are discarded basically 
because they are less important to this thesis. For example, functional theory or stages model 
that is supposed to be used in explaining the NMOGS’s EIA implementation cannot be 
comprehensively applied, because stages model is a linear process. Similarly, bounded 
rationality model is discarded; because it does not explain the situation in the NMOGS rather 
it is directly opposite. As bounded rationality model describes ‘how decision-makers seek to 
act as rationally as possible within certain bound or limit; these include limited information, 
ability to recognise every feature and pattern of every problem’ (Birkland, 2005, p. 216).  
 
Now that some policy implementation theories that are not relevant to this thesis have been 
discarded as exemplified above, the need for the remaining policy implementation theories 
and their relevance to the thesis is further revealed, and they have been compressed into four 
by putting into consideration those that are related to one another. For example, top - down 
and bottom-up are joined together, and also institutional, neo-institutional, rational 
comprehensive decision-making are categorised as one under implementation as a process of 
multi-level bargaining (See Clark and Jones, 2001; Jordan et al., 1998).            
 
In view of this, I discuss policy implementation theories from four different angles: 
implementation from the top-down and bottom-up; implementation as learning; 
implementation as a process of multi-level bargaining and implementation using a 
contingency concept as leading theory (that is ambiguity conflict model). These are necessary 
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to understand the national policy context as well as the sources, components of, and reasons 
for conflicts and ambiguities.  
 
3.3.1 Implementation as seen by top-down and bottom-up approaches 
  
The implementation process can be understood using, inter alia, top-down and bottom-up 
thinking (deLeon and deLeon, 2002; deLeon, 1999; Jordan et al., 1998; Matland, 1995). The 
top-down approach to implementation is based on a set of important assumptions and three 
main variables and these are tractability of the problem, ability of statute to structure 
implementation and non-statutory variables affecting implementation (Matland, 1995). In the 
top-down model, the capacity of policy objectives are clearly defined; policy tool(s) should 
be in place; policy is characterised by the existence of a single programme to be 
implemented; and good knowledge of the capacity and commitment of the implementers 
must be recognised (Spicker, 2006; Birkland, 2005; Weimer and Vining, 2005; Matland, 
1995).  
 
Top-down implementation is about setting conditions and creating compliance, and is not 
viewed as a political process (Simon, 2010; Jordan et al., 1998), and the ‘local-level 
complaints about policy implementation are seen as barriers that must be overcome’ (Simon, 
2010, p. 104). Basically, ‘the top-down emphasises command, control, and uniformity and 
fails to take into account the diversity inherent in much implementation that occurs’ 
(Matland, 1995, p. 167). Birkland (2005) concludes that the top-down approach has failed to 
define what programme goals are, and as such it is difficult to set a bench mark for program 
success or failure. In the same vein, this paradigm has been criticised for taking 
implementation as a mainly administrative process, and trying to ignore or eliminate the 
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political aspect (Matland, 1995), and thus the coordination problem is evident (Joaquin, 
2009).  
   
The bottom-up approach is otherwise called ‘backward mapping’ (Birkland, 2005). It 
encourages participation and involves lowest level implementers or local level administrators, 
and the people in this category are described as street level bureaucrats (Simon, 2010; 
Birkland, 2005). The bottom-up approach recognises that ‘goals are ambiguous rather than 
explicit and conflict not only with other goals in the same policy arena, but also with norms 
and motivations of the street level bureaucrats, and over emphasised the ability of lowest 
level implementers’ (Birkland, 2005, p. 185). It assumes that lowest level implementers are 
active participants in the implementation process. Matland (1995, p. 149) maintains that 
‘program success depends in large part on the skills of individuals in the local 
implementation structure who can adapt policy to local conditions; it depends only to a 
limited degree on central activities’. Similarly, it has been established that ‘good 
implementation comes from mutual adaptation and learning at the grassroots’ (Mischen and 
Sinclair, 2007, p. 154). 
     
Birkland (2005) argues that the difference between the bottom-up and top-down approaches 
is that the former values understanding how conflict can be alleviated by bargaining or 
compromise, while the latter is concerned with compliance. Matland (1995, p. 149) views 
that ‘top-downers have a strong desire to present prescriptive advice; bottom-uppers have 
placed more emphasis on describing what factors have caused difficulty in reaching the stated 
goals’. Jordan et al. (1998) maintain that bottom-up approach helps in understanding what 
influences action on ground rather than assessing the outcome of a particular policy. 
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However, the major challenge is that ‘neither the top-down nor bottom-up models appear 
entirely appropriate in describing the implementation process when there is substantial 
conflict and an ambiguous policy’ (Matland, 1995, p. 170; Davies, 1980, p. 233), as both 
models are normatively biased (Hupe, 2011). According to deLeon (1999, p. 326) ‘neither 
top-down nor bottom-up has a special claim on a democratic perspective...’. In the same 
context, deLeon (1999) and Jordan et al. (1998) have established that most policy 
implementation theories are not problem free to a larger extent. For example, the lapses in the 
first generation policy theories (in form of definitions) has led to top-down theory and the 
limitations in top-down has led to bottom-up theory (second generation) and the limitations in 
bottom up has led to contingency concept (third generation) (deLeon, 1999).  
 
It appears that the complexity related to policy implementation processes – particularly in 
top-down and bottom-up approaches – has prompted some researchers to develop a problem 
free theory or use no theory at all (USAID, 2009). Still, moving away from theory completely 
is not desirable. As there are several ways of handling the complexity that is related to theory, 
for example, some helpful proposals for a synthetic perspective have been suggested (Ewalt, 
2001; John, 1998). Mark et al. (2006) comment that ‘...flexibility may not be adequate, 
something is needed to guide effort to choose which approaches might best apply under 
different circumstances...’.  
 
3.3.2 Implementation as social learning 
 
The concept of social learning was first introduced following Albert Bandura’s work (Bull et 
al., 2008; Illeris, 2002; Bandura, 1977; Bandura and Walters 1963). In principle, it seeks to 
explain ‘deviant’ behaviour in terms of classes of event (Walker, 1984; Bandura, 1977; 
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Bandura and Walters, 1963) and mutual interaction (Illeri, 2002; Davey, 1989). Moreover, 
social learning is broad (Illeris, 2002; Bandura, 1977), and is positioned to solve social 
problems (Donaldson and Lipsey, 2006; Abma, 2006; Simons, 2006). The aspect that relates 
to practice is emphasised in this research because it concerns ‘mutual engagement in action’ 
(Illeris, 2002: 142), although identity should be part of ‘fundamental issues, as it emphasises 
social location’ (Calhoun, 2003, p. 14).  
 
It has been argued that social learning occurs in participatory systems (Bull et al., 2008; 
Illeris, 2002), and ‘operates in a tension field between creativity, power and responsibility 
(Illeris, 2002). The social learning takes place around four axes characterised as action, 
reflection, communication and negotiation’ (p. 135). Emphatically, social learning in a 
practical form is not limited to participation (identity) alone but also deliberation (mutual 
engagement in action) (Schwandt and Burgon, 2006). As participation gives room to a way of 
doing things, deliberation focuses on ideal response to a particular problem (Schwandt and 
Burgon, 2006).  
 
According to Jordan et al. (1998, p. 1393) ‘marginal changes in policy are made as different 
groups of actors with similar belief (advocacy coalition) operating in a particular policy 
sphere vie for advantage by trying to outlearn one another so as to make better sense of the 
changing world around them, and experimenting with new instruments and tools to realise 
their belief’. The Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) exemplified here as part of social 
learning theories, entails two or four coalition forms, and is designed for understanding the 
interactions of the groups and coalition of groups called advocacy group (Birkland, 2005). It 
tends to balance national or transnational interest (Richardson, 1996). Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith (1993, p. 212) comment that ‘an advocacy coalition consists of actors from a variety of 
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governmental and private organisations at different levels of government who share a set of 
policy beliefs and seek to realise them by influencing the behaviour of multiple governmental 
institutions over time’.  
Furthermore, ACF encompasses relatively stable parameters such as: the basic attributes of 
the problem, distribution of natural resource, fundamental socio-cultural values, and the basic 
constitutional structure together with relevant changes within the system (Birkland, 2005; 
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 1993). ACF has been viewed as a set of policy networks, 
where policies are formulated and implemented among the interested citizens, pressure 
groups, and administrators (Simon, 2010). Obviously, ACF might enable the researchers to 
understand the ‘true magnitude of policy disputes’ but it is not clear whether ACF can be 
used alone (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 226).       
 
3.3.3 Implementation as a process of multilevel bargaining  
 
The core assumption in the multi-level approach is that organisations operate in a 
multifaceted system of relationships (Moliterno and Mahony, 2010; Fischer, 2004; Mazey, 
1996), which gives recognition to bargaining (Van de Brande et al., 2011; Cram, 1996). 
Jordan et al. (1998, p. 1393) have viewed ‘...implementation as an ongoing process of 
bargaining between policymakers and implementers, both of whom have their own agendas, 
resources and sources of legitimacy’. Moreover, national policy networks might provide 
institutional ground where policy implementation occurs (Jordan et al., 1998). The 
combination of policy networks approaches and institutionalist might be suitable to assess 
multilevel policy process (Clark and Jones, 2001). The multi-level approach draws heavily 
upon institutional theory in the political sciences, by seeking to examine the legal aspects of 
governmental institutions, their formal organisation, legal power, procedure rules, functions, 
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how policy was made, and the actors, including formal relationship with other institutions 
(Ostrom, 1999; McCool, 1995; Anderson 1975). The neo-institutionalism or new institutional 
theory was introduced to address less formal norms, beliefs and codes because of lapses in 
institutional theory, and has taken on a wide variety of meanings and usages (Jaffee, 2001).  
 
Thus new institutional theory effectively synthesises many of the previous theoretical models, 
as it focuses on the development of public choice, game theory (that is market bargaining for 
personal benefit), and rational comprehensive decision-making model (RCD) (Simon, 2010). 
According to Clark and Jones (2001, pp. 2049 & 2051) new institutional theory can be used 
to explain ‘political strategies of policy elites...flows of knowledge, territorial representation, 
and power between multi-scalar policy elites’. This approach therefore offers a potent means 
for understanding of how different statutory and private agencies have been working towards 
achieving effective policy implementation. Nevertheless, the RCD model is employed to help 
in identifying problems, measuring the impact on the problems, elucidating solutions, and the 
implementation of best solutions (Simon, 2010). According to Fischer (2004) even though the 
multilevel approach focuses on organisational relationship, there is little integration of both 
organisational and socio-cultural variables. Similarly, Richardson (1996, p. 21) argues that 
the traditional concept of policy networks might react to ‘exogenous change’, and thus 
coalition advocacy is suggested as part of social learning theory (Jordan et al., 1998).   
 
However, deLeon (1999, p. 319) argues that both ‘game theory and rational choice or RCD in 
particular do not offer any clear predictions, but do indicate few key insights...actual 
implementation networks contain complications that modelling can neither ignore or fully 
address’. It is not enough to apply a synthesis/contingency concept without ensuring that 
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‘implementation research...tied to a specific policy rather than to all actions in policy field’ 
(Matland, 1995, p. 152).  
          
3.3.4 Implementation as a contingency concept 
 
It is widely argued that the models of policy implementation outlined above should be 
combined to address the multiple contingencies of policy implementation (Oosterwaal and 
Torenvlied, 2011; Mischen and Sinclair, 2007; Birkland, 2005; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 
1999; deLeon, 1999; Matland, 1995). It is vital to note that when collating them, the 
relationships between the different approaches must be put into consideration with a set of 
limited variables (Hupe, 2011; Matland, 1995). The bottom line is that ‘integration of theory 
constitutes a major way that evaluation contributes to social betterment by way of knowledge 
development’ (Donaldson and Lipsey, 2006, p. 66). Thus, a study by deLeon (1999, p. 318) 
has indicated that many researchers have proposed towards ‘contingency concepts, in which 
different implementation scenarios can determine their own research and operational 
strategies’.  
 
Even though the Ambiguity-Conflict Model (ACM) revolves around four individual 
conditions, I would first choose to focus on the characteristics and attributes of policy 
ambiguity and policy conflict, as they can be used to elucidate the reasons for crosscutting 
dimensions in policy implementation (Simon, 2010; Matland, 1995). According to Matland 
(1995) policy ambiguity arises from several angles and can be divided into two groups: 
ambiguity of goals (leading to misunderstanding and in turn policy implementation failure) 
and ambiguity of means (for example, where the resources required reaching a policy’s goals 
do not exist). Matland (1995: 158) comments that ‘policy means are ambiguous when there 
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are uncertainties about what roles various organisations are to play in the implementation 
process, or when a complex environment makes it difficult to know which tools to use, how 
to use them, and what the effect of their use will be’. Therefore, ‘the degree of ambiguity 
inherent in policy directly affects the implementation processes in significant ways...it 
influences the ability of superiors for example to monitor activities, the likelihood that the 
policy is uniformly understood across the many implementation sites...’ (Matland, 1995: 
159). 
 
In the same context, there are certain conditions that encourage policy conflict to exist. This 
includes situations when there are basic differences in policy objectives, as well as negative 
interactions among policy actors (Matland, 1995), which allows policy conflicts to persist. 
This is what Matland has described as ‘intensity of conflict, which increases with an increase 
in incompatibility of concerns’ (Matland, 1995 p. 157). Importantly, ‘policy implementation 
conflict will exist when more than one organisation sees a policy as directly relevant to its 
interests and when the organisations have incongruous views’ (Matland, 1995 p. 156). 
Therefore, whenever conflict exists, two basic things happen. First, policy actors’ actions will 
change and second, policy actors will resort to bargaining mechanisms, for example by 
encouraging oversight to reach agreement and hold a coalition together (Matland, 1995).            
 
The term policy conflict appears to be easily comprehended; the policy ambiguity seems to 
be complex though it can be of ambiguity of goals (statutory) or means (resources) (Simon, 
2010; Matland, 1995). This policy ambiguity of means is otherwise referred to as a role 
ambiguity (Eatough et al., 2011). Pandey and Wright (2006, p. 517) define ambiguity of 
means as ‘unpredictability of behavioural outcomes...also a lack of clarity about what kinds 
of behaviours are appropriate and functional’. Zahariadis (2003, p. 168) contends that 
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ambiguity of means or goals ‘require analysts to have a lot of information...this might make 
the process more comprehensible, but without resolving the nature of policy ambiguity’.  
According to Simon (2010); Clark and Jones (2001); and Matland (1995) among many other 
analysts, the Ambiguity-Conflict Model comprises four conditional relationships: 
 
First, administrative implementation (AI) is a condition under low policy ambiguity and low 
policy conflict. The unique feature under AI is that resources determine outcomes and policy 
under this situation has been described as concise and clear policy (Simon, 2010; Clark and 
Jones, 2001; Matland, 1995). This is because low ambiguity always attracts clearly defined 
policies in terms of processes and goals. While low levels of conflict connotes that policies 
under such situations are less vaguely written, and the level of compromise is reduced, this 
does not connote that policy under this condition is problem free (Clark and Jones, 2001; 
Matland, 1995). 
 
Second is political implementation (PI), where low policy ambiguity and high policy conflict 
is evident. Matland (1995, p. 163) points out that ‘the central principle in political 
implementation is that implementation outcomes are decided by power’. According to Clark 
and Jones, 2001, p. 2055) the ‘...central principle for analysing political implementation is to 
study power relations between actors, using a methodology akin to a top-down approach’. 
The important issue to note is that politics in this context is described as ‘the basis by which 
choices are articulated and power becomes definitive factor in shaping prioritisation’ (Simon 
2010, p. 105). It is true that policy ambiguity is low under PI, but what has remained 
unchanged is the fact that resources are controlled by politician (policy actors outside the 
implementing agencies). 
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Third, experimental implementation (EI) exists under conditions of high policy ambiguity 
and low policy conflict. Policy outcomes depend on resources, also which actors are actives 
and most involved, and this is rather viewed as a contextual issues (Matland, 1995). Clark 
and Jones (2001, p. 2054) argue that ‘experimental implementation can lead to the 
development of entirely new capabilities…lead to the creation of min-fiefdoms with leaders 
pursuing their own interest’. The process is associated with high policy ambiguity, which 
implies that statutory compliance will be unclear, and possibly because of lack of adequate 
understanding of its process, as it has not been applied before (Simon, 2010; Matland, 1995).  
 
Fourth is symbolic implementation (SI), where high policy ambiguity and high policy 
conflict is evident. Matland (1995, p. 168) states that ‘the central principle is that local level 
coalitional strength determines the policy outcome...the policy course is determined by the 
coalition of actors at the local level who control the available resources’. SI helps to reaffirm 
values and policy goals, this value is described to be varied and it depends on the locality, 
and local goal fulfilment is of great importance (Simon, 2010). Although both policy 
ambiguity and conflict are high, and groups have to compete in defending their interest. The 
most important thing to note is that actors see their interest bound to a specific policy 
definition (Matland, 1995). Both local policy goals and coalition strength are paramount and 
shape value impacts on outcomes (Simon, 2010; Matland, 1995). It has been argued that 
‘symbolic implementation is working well in top-down and bottom- up policy approaches’ 
(Simon, 2010, p. 106). I have summarised the above illustration in a tabular form for the 
purpose of simplicity and clarity in Figure 3.1.  
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                             Conflict 
                                        Low                                    Policy                                    High  
 
                       Low  
 
 
 
 
     Ambiguity Policy 
 
 
 
 
                         High     
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Matland’s ambiguity-conflict matrix 
 
Source: Matland 1995 p. 160  
 
 
Matland’s model affords significant advantages over the other policy theories that have been 
considered here. For example, it can be used to examine the contradictory, conflictual and 
ambiguous regulatory systems inherent in different countries. As evidenced above, it is a 
more sophisticated theoretical approach towards understanding of national policy context. 
Nevertheless ‘...there is no single best implementation strategy, the appropriate strategy is 
very much contextual in terms of what are the contingencies surrounding the policy issues 
and how they can be addressed in terms of implementation’ (deLeon and deLeon, 2002, p. 
472). Mark et al. (2006, p. 8) argue that ‘...any attempt to classify alternative approaches to 
evaluation will necessary have shortcoming...’. Part of the shortcomings of ACM is that 
arguably it does not give enough consideration to democratic issues (deLeon and deLeon, 
2002; Jaffee, 2001; deLeon 1999).  
 
Thus, according to Greene (2006, p. 119) ‘democratically oriented tradition in evaluation is 
essential and they have their foundation in Barry MacDonald’s original formulation of 
Administrative implementation  
Resources 
 
Political implementation 
Power 
 Experimental implementation 
Contextual conditions 
Symbolic implementation 
Coalition strength 
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democratic evaluation since 1976...and Ernest House’s long standing commitment to social 
justice for evaluation...’. In fact, social justice/democratic issues are among the most 
important values we should hope to secure in the implementation studies’ (Greene, 1994, p. 
540). Experimental implementation is an example of ACM matrix that does not fully consider 
democratic issues, though it has the tendency of developing new capabilities with little 
connection to public interest. However, deLeon and deLeon (2002, p. 488) argue that 
‘...implementation should follow democratic procedures, unless prior analysis demonstrates 
that another model e.g. top-down is superior’, as claimed by Matland’s model.  
 
Furthermore, deLeon (1999) has noted that ACM emphasises more on the process rather than 
outcome of implementation. Therefore, ‘...a qualitative methodology can be better adapted 
to...quantification, such as high or low measure of conflict or information and to capture a 
more complete picture of the contextual conditions’ (deLeon, 1999, pp. 229- 330). Mark and 
Henry (2006, p. 334) have emphasised that ‘...evaluative evidence through qualitative 
methods often is important to the extent that it can...support or undermine claims about the 
importance of social problem...or validate a potential remedy for a problem’.  
 
In the same manner, both administrative and political implementations are not free from 
criticisms. For example, the latter applies a top-down approach to study power relations 
between actors and the resultant high level of conflict, while it appears that ‘democratic 
methods might well produce better, less contentious decision...a democratic orientation would 
want to avoid simple coercion whenever possible’ (deLeon and deLeon, 2002, p. 486). Clark 
and Jones (2001, p. 2055) comment that ‘...a rational choice institutional approach allied with 
thorough scrutiny of elite activities in multi-scalar policy networks would be suitable for 
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analytical purposes’. The need for this rational choice institutional approach has been 
prioritised by various researchers (Simon, 2010; Birkland, 2005).    
          
It also appears that Matland’s model has not fully provided strategies or ways of resolving the 
organisational conflicts and ambiguities; just in the same manner top-down approach has not 
fully contributed to making things better (Jordan et al., 1998). The identified criticisms about 
Matland’s model serve as part of the evidence that there is no perfect theory, and that room 
for improvement still remains. I have used a range of insights from other policy theories to 
build on Matland’s model and to understand other contextual issues.   
 
In summary, I have not ruled out the importance of other theories under the review but this 
research has identified Matland’s model as a leading theory in order to understand national 
policy context, while some of the shortcomings identified that cannot fully be explained 
through Matland’s model are addressed using the remaining policy theories and qualitative 
methods to understand contextual issues. The available data addresses the strategies or 
interventions adopted in ameliorating organisational conflicts, and other policy theories as 
earlier mentioned are used as part of explanatory frameworks to fine-tune areas not 
extensively covered by Matland’s model e.g. the relationship among the government 
implementation agencies and social issues.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
What emerges from this chapter is that to get beyond the simplistic previous evaluation 
frameworks of policy implementation, a more sophisticated theoretical understanding of 
national policy contexts is required. A variety of policy implementation theories have been 
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discussed in order to provide novel insights into EIA procedures. In particular, Richard 
Matland’s model on policy ambiguity and policy conflict has been identified to interrogate 
the use of contradictory, conflictual and ambiguous regulatory systems.  
 
It is clear that ambiguity and conflict revolves around social values, the level of compliance, 
as well as political and administrative implementation. Thus, it can be used to examine the 
procedural issues surrounding EIA implementation in the Nigerian national context, as it 
includes both informational relationships between policy actors, and the connection between 
environmental policy and political, social, economic, and institutional factors. Meanwhile, 
the other policy theories reviewed in this chapter provide a robust means for examining 
selected aspects of EIA implementation, as they offer a holistic matrix for situating policy 
actor activities. I return to the analysis of the gathered empirical material with the aid of these 
approaches in Chapter 5, having outlined (in the next chapter) the manner in which primary 
and secondary data were generated, including a discussion of challenges encountered during 
fieldwork and the manner in which they were addressed.   
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Persson and Nilsson (2007, p. 491) noted that ‘there is evidence of post decision 
impasse in the world of environmental assessment’, and ‘there are many shades of 
grey that are valued, politically informed and policy relevant’ (Pollard et al., 
2000, p. 247). But, ‘as the policy tide turns our way, geographers’ should leave 
the race for the minister’s ear and jump in – the water’s warm!’ (Banks and 
MacKiant, 2000, p. 249). This is because ‘disengagement is neither desirable nor 
justifiable; then, geographers’ must engage critically and actively with the policy 
process itself’ (Peck, 2000, p. 257). 
 
  
The previous chapter demonstrated the necessity for grounding the analysis on the application 
of policy implementation theories and Matland’s ambiguity-conflict model in particular 
rather than the existing previous simplistic frameworks applied to evaluating EIA. In light of 
choice, this chapter presents the data gathering and analysis methods adopted and consider 
the issues encountered in this process, and the strategies I used to deal with them. The chapter 
forms the basis for the empirical chapters that follow and provides insights into the contextual 
issues that are not extensively covered in the policy implementation theories.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections.  Section 4.1 describes the Nigerian case study areas, 
outlining the regions that were selected for in depth case study work. Section 4.2 then 
describes the secondary sources that were used in order to contextualise primary research, 
while explaining how they were combined with the theoretical basis of the thesis in creating a 
research design. Section 4.3 outlines the qualitative research methods used for obtaining 
primary data, providing a justification for, and description of, their application. Section 4.4 
then discusses the methods adopted in analysing data. Lastly, section 4.5 elucidates my 
positionality with respect to the research topic and section 4.6 concludes the chapter.                                      
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4.1. Description of the case study areas 
 
Nigeria shares land borders with the Benin Republic in the West, the Republic of Cameroon 
in the East, and the Republic of Niger and Chad in the North (Iledare and Suberu, 2010; 
Metz, 1991 and see Figure 4.1), with the continental shelf of 200m depth (Adeyinka, et al., 
2005).   
 
 
 
 
Figure: 4.1 Map of Nigeria 
 
Source: Iledare and Suberu, 2010 p. 7  
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Geographically, Nigeria has a total area of about 923 768 square kilometres (World 
Development Report, 2009; Adeyinka et al., 2005; Metz, 1991), with abundant natural 
resources. The Nigerian economy is largely dependent on the oil sector, which supplies most 
of its foreign exchange earnings. For example, oil and gas accounts for 90-95% of export 
revenues, over 90% of foreign exchange earnings and about 80% of government revenue 
(Luqman and Lawal, 2011; Iledare and Suberu, 2010; Mbendi, 2010; NDRDMP, 2006). 
Nigeria was administratively divided into the Northern and Southern province and the Lagos 
colony in 1914. After gaining independence from Great Britain in 1960, the country 
contained three regions: Northern, Eastern, and Western. In 1963, Nigeria became a Federal 
Republic under a new constitution and established a fourth region named Mid-West.  
 
1966 marked the beginning of military rule in Nigeria with two coup d’états in one year, the 
Aguyi Ironsi’s coup in January and the Yakubu Gowon’s coup in July (Metz, 1991). The 
military ruled Nigeria from 1966 to 1979 before handing over to a Civilian Government in 
1979, with a new constitution and 19 States. In 1984, the military junta again took over the 
leadership of the country and was in power till 1999, when a democratic government came on 
board. There is no doubt that the military’s long stay in power from the time of independence 
affected the country negatively (Nigeria was under military rule effectively for 28 years). 
Most of the vital decisions related to political, social, economical and environmental 
developments were taken during the military regime, confirming Morrison’s (2004:43) 
observation that ‘Nigeria remains dangerously on the edge of disorder, emerging from the 
year of misrule’ by the military regimes. Since 1999, the country has been enjoying 
democratically elected government to date, the 29
th
 May of this year made it thirteen years of 
the civilian government in power without military coup d’états or intervention and year 2007 
marked the first time, where power is transferred from civil to another civil government in the 
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history of Nigeria. Presently, the country is not only governed by the democratically elected 
Government officials, but also encourages the officials at all levels of government to embrace 
true federalism (en-compassing representation at all levels). Nigeria being a federal entity 
implies that states government just like federal government have an equal right to make their 
own legislation and laws (Nwafor, 2006). 
 
This study was carried out in Nigeria at the sub-national scale, focusing upon two states: 
Rivers and Lagos States. I used a purposive sampling method in selecting these two states 
though there are no guidelines for determining the size of a purposive sample (Holloway, 
1997; Hall and Hall, 1996; Patton, 1987). These states were deemed particularly appropriate 
for conducting the detailed empirical research needed for case studies for the following 
reasons. Rivers State was chosen because oil development (exploration and production) in 
Nigeria started in the old Rivers State and serves as a useful representation of other states 
within the Nigeria’s southern region, where oil wells and reserves are situated. Lagos State, 
the country’s commercial capital is where bulk transportation of crude and refined oil takes 
place within territorial waters. In addition, Lagos State is the most industrialised state in 
Nigeria and the headquarters of all multinational oil companies are situated there. 
 
I have described the location, population and economy among other activities of both states 
respectively to show the major features in the study areas. On the one hand, Rivers State was 
formerly under the then eastern Region of Nigeria, and was created in 1967 under Decree No 
19 with Port Harcourt as the capital. The state is located on longitude 6
0 50’ E and latitude 40 
45’ N in the present’s day South-South (Niger-Delta) region of Nigeria (Rivers State 
Website, 2011). The State shares a boundary with the Atlantic Ocean to the South. It shares 
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borders with Anambra, Imo and Abia States to the North, Bayelsa and Delta States to the 
West, and Awka-Ibom State to the East.  
 
Rivers State population was estimated in 2005 to be about 6.7 million, with the population 
density of 468 persons per square kilometer and the state is divided into twenty-three Local 
Government Authorities (LGAs) (See Figure 4.2.).  
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Figure: 4.2 Map of Rivers State, Nigeria                                                                                                                                     
 
Source: www.riversstate.gov.ng accessed on 9/7/2010 
 
Rivers State 
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The people of Rivers State are predominately engaged in agriculture and fisheries. Two major 
refineries are situated in Rivers State, which were constructed in 1965 and 1989 
(Okunroumu, 2004) respectively. These include the operational stations of the multinational 
oil companies. However, exploitation of and exploration for oil has led to a decline in the 
state’s original agricultural practices (Edema et al., 2011). In Rivers State, environmental 
related problems are handled by the Rivers State Ministry of Environment under the 
supervision of Federal Ministry of Environment.  
 
Lagos State is located on longitude 3
0 24’ E and latitude 60 27’ N in the South-West of the 
present’s day Nigeria (Lagos State Website, 2011). In 1967, Lagos State was created under 
the Decree No 14 with Ikeja as the capital, though the state has remained as the capital of 
Nigeria from the colonial era (1914) until when the country’s capital was relocated to Abuja 
in 1991 (Lagos State Website, 2011). The state population is estimated to be about 17.5 
million in 2006 and projected to about 23 million in 2015, with population density of about 
4900 persons per square kilometer as at 2006 (Lagos Bureau of Statistics, 2010; Olori, 2007). 
Lagos State made up of 20 Local Government Authorities (Lagos Bureau of Statistics, 2010 
and see Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3 Map of Lagos State, Nigeria                                                                                                                              
 
Source:  www.lagosstate.gov.ng  accessed on 9/7/2010 
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There are two major ports in Lagos State: Tincan Island and Apapa. They have enhanced the 
export and import of goods and services through sea routes. The strategic location of the state 
together with port facilities has encouraged transportation of crude oil, thus, making 
environmental pollution to be noticeable. In Lagos State, environment-related problems are 
handled by the Lagos State Ministry of Environment and its enforcement arm (that is Lagos 
State Environmental Protection Agency) under the supervision of Federal Ministry of 
Environment. Unlike other states in Nigeria, only Lagos State has an enforcement arm for 
this institution.     
 
4.2 Data from secondary sources, and theoretical grounding of the primary research 
 
While qualitative methods are critically important to case study research (Flick, 2002; Patton, 
2002; House, 1993), a wide range of secondary sources were used in this study to verify and 
corroborate my primary sources. These include environmental policy documents and 
previous EIA reports. Green and Thorogood (2009, p. 176) argue that ‘secondary data is 
needed to address the background context on the setting...’ My research also benefited from 
secondary sources such as edited books, author books, journals and other forms of published 
literatures on EIA procedure and practice. These secondary materials were obtained at the 
University of Birmingham; Maritime University Malmo, Sweden; and the International 
Maritime Organisation in London. A range of source were also obtained in Nigeria, including 
documents from the Federal Ministry Environment; National Environmental Standards 
Regulations and Enforcement Agency (NESREA); University of Nigeria; Basel Convention 
Coordinating Centre in University of Ibadan; Nigeria Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, Ibadan; and Environmental Rights Action, Lagos and Rivers States.       
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I used materials from the secondary sources to review the EIA implementation processes and 
issues around environmental management systems within international and national contexts. 
The international context concentrates on: 
 The environmental impacts of oil and gas operations; 
 The role of EIA and its components; and 
 Challenges related to EIA and its components for example Social Impact Assessment 
 
Meanwhile, within the national context I have reviewed the following issues:- 
 The historical development of oil operations;  
 The environmental impacts of oil and gas operations; and  
 Structure of the sector’s EIA systems and the role of GIAs. 
 
Apart from materials obtained from the libraries, policy documents and previous EIA reports 
were also relied on extensively. These include: the Policy on Environment; National Oil Spill 
Contingency Plan; Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in 
Nigeria, and six EIA reports on national and multinational oil company projects. Such data 
was obtained through direct contact during the preliminary and the main fieldwork within the 
required establishments in Nigeria (see Appendix 1). Meanwhile some materials were 
collected via the Internet, particularly the Nigerian newspaper publications. Furthermore, 
maps were used where applicable, and photographs were used on two occasions (with 
permission). Peil (1982) has described maps as models of geographic space, representing a 
set of spatial relations in convenient form. Photographs can be used to illustrate findings in 
practice (Flick, 2007, 2002; Harper, 1998, 1994), but it appears that much has not been done 
regarding quality photographic representation (Harper, 2008).   
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The findings from the review of secondary sources combined with the theoretical insights 
reviewed in chapters 2 and 3 contribute to the framing of my interview questions. For 
example, I was prompted to explore challenges related to EIA implementation in the 
NMOGS’s EIA system, so as to identify whether there are particular reasons for EIA 
implementation ‘failures’ in the sector, apart from the presumed conflict and ambiguity 
issues. I also became interested in the reasons why EIAs are not translated into practice, 
especially once it transpired that Nigeria has an institutionalised and contradictory system of 
dual EIA frameworks, with several implementing agencies in place. This led me to ask how 
previous EIA work has impacted the operation of the maritime oil and gas sector.  
 
As mentioned earlier, there are several implementing agencies in the sector coupled with the 
differing EIA systems. An additional set of interview questions emerged from this finding, 
focusing on the level of institutional co-operation among the different EIA systems. This 
aligns with Matland’s observation regarding the impacts of intensive and active participation 
in policy implementation. Similarly, new institutional theories also prompted me to query 
how different government agencies have been working towards achieving effective policy 
implementation. 
 
Further findings from the review of secondary evidence showed that standard EIA 
procedures, and the international acceptable requirements leading to ‘best practice’, already 
exist on the ground. When coupled with the theoretical framework, this raised questions 
about the role of international organisations and conventions in the drafting and 
implementation of EIAs. I administered these identified interview questions during the 
fieldwork process, knowing that ‘both spoken and written word always has a residue of 
ambiguity, no matter how carefully we word the questions...but interviewing is still one of the 
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most common and powerful ways in which we try to understand our fellow humans’ (Fontana 
and Frey, 2008 p. 118).  
 
4.3 Semi-structured interviews 
 
Qualitative methods are vital to the conduct of in-depth implementation and evaluation 
research (House, 2008; Alkin et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2006; Mark and Henry, 2006; Patton, 
2002; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, 1994; Rist, 1998, 1994). In contrast to previous 
implementation and evaluation studies, the purpose of qualitative methods in my research is 
not simply to substantiate evidence from the secondary data, but also to understand how 
government, private and voluntary sector organisations and individuals have worked towards 
achieving effective implementation of the EIA process. This is necessary to understand how 
EIA practice might be transformed to achieve a preferred policy goal, rather than to simply 
expose malpractice (Miller et al., 2006). Moreover, as Denzin and Lincoln (1998) argue, 
qualitative methods can morally empower citizens and shape government’s policies through 
findings.  
 
Qualitative methods are aimed at exploring the participants’ experiences through different 
means; semi-structured interviews were mainly used in this research. They are the most 
common manner to understand participants and to obtain data about the social world (Miller 
and Glassner, 2006; Bloor, 2006; Fontana and Frey, 1998, 1994; Holloway, 1997). Similarly, 
the approach can grant new perspective to the researcher, and a clearer picture of the research 
focus (Green and Thorogood, 2009; Flick, 2002; Peil, 1982), providing the participants 
understand issues surrounding the specific research topic. Furthermore, qualitative methods 
emphasise the socially constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the 
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researcher and what is to be studied and the situational constraints that shape inquiry (Gibbs, 
2007; Walkerdine, et al., 2002; Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, 1994). Another benefit of 
qualitative methods and semi- structured face-to-face interviews in particular is that they help 
the interviewer to direct the discussion towards particular goals or end points, and to see 
beyond anecdotal evidence and guarantee objectivity in this way (Flick, 2002; Golden-Biddle 
and Locke, 1997).  
 
The semi-structured face-to-face interview appears to be one of the most appropriate forms of 
qualitative methods, as it encourages what has been described as ‘conversation with a 
purpose’ (Bull et al., 2008, p. 706). It is also capable of enhancing a broader level of 
interactions between interviewees and interviewer (Green and Thorogood, 2009; Mason, 
2002; Fontana and Frey, 1998, 1994). The semi-structured interview also enables the 
researcher to ask all the participants’ broadly similar questions in relation to specific topics 
(Flick, 2002). In this research, several questions were designed for the participants under six 
broad topics, with additional follow-up questions depending on interviewees’ responses to the 
original question.  
 
These key six topics are: 
 
1. Does the EIA process in the maritime oil and gas sector help improve the state of the 
environment in Nigeria? Yes or no, and why? 
2. In what way have the previous EIAs impacted the operation of the maritime oil and 
gas sector? 
3. In your own view how would you evaluate the level of institutional cooperation 
among the different EIA systems? 
4. What is it that prevents EIA from being translated into practice? 
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5. Do you think that the resources and skills available for implementation are sufficient? 
Yes or no, and what resources are missing? 
6. How would you evaluate the role of international organisations and conventions in the 
drafting and implementation of EIAs?  I have earlier outlined how these six broad 
topics reflect the theoretical grounding of the thesis.     
 
In gathering primary data, I first undertook preliminary fieldwork in order to identify an 
insider at each of the proposed interviewees’ establishments, so as to obtain information on 
‘who does what’ and not to rely on my own knowledge of the way establishments generally 
operate in Nigeria. Based on this, 70 participants were initially identified as my potential 
interviewees, but only 50 were approached and interviewed based on their outstanding 
experience over others (only participants with minimum of 5 years of experience were 
selected). As years of experience remained an important issue in selecting my participants, I 
became more inquisitive in knowing those that have contributed to institutionalisation of EIA 
in Nigeria. In this way, additional six participants were identified, making the entire 
interviewees to be 56 altogether. These 56 participants’ years of experience ranges from 5 to 
28 years and only 9 (16%) of them were women and this reflects the percentage of women in 
the NMOGS. For example, only one woman was available at National Environmental 
Standards Regulations and Enforcement Agency among the experienced staff. Incidentally 
she could not be selected for the interview because of her busy schedule as the Director-
General of the named agency. This was the similar situation at Federal Ministry of 
Environment and National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency. Surprisingly, there was 
no woman at all with the required years of experience at NGOs such as Environmental Rights 
Action and Social Environmental Rights Action.  
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Even though the preliminary fieldwork was an informal visit, I was able to familiarise myself 
with the system and gained access to the interviewees directly. They were then officially 
approached during the main fieldwork at a different time and location, and the interviews 
lasted for almost 3 months (from August 10
th
 to October 28
th
). Due to the official transfer and 
relocation of about 12 of the interviewees’ from their original locations (Lagos and Rivers 
States), I had to interview them at their new locations (Abuja, Oyo and Enugu States). Even 
though I had an alternative to interview them through telephone, I had to travel to these new 
locations because of network problems coupled with power (electricity supply) shortages in 
Nigeria. I conducted 36 interviews in Lagos State; about 7 interviews were conducted in 
Rivers State, 9 officials were interviewed in Abuja, and 2 officials were interviewed in Oyo 
State and only one interview was conducted in Enugu State (See Figure 4.4).              
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Interview locations and the number of the interviewees  
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2010 
 
 
0% 
10% 
20% 
30% 
40% 
50% 
60% 
70% 
Lagos State Rivers State Federal Capital 
Territory Abuja 
Oyo State Enugu State 
- 87 - 
 
In line with the theoretical grounding of the thesis, the interviewees were divided into two 
sampling categories: the control and programme groups. The participants in the control group 
were academics, environmental local practitioners and officials in NGOs. The participants in 
the programme group were drawn from high level policy and corporate officials within the 
Federal Ministry of Environment, Department of Petroleum Resources, National 
Environmental Standards Regulations and Enforcement Agency, National Oil Spill Detection 
and Response Agency, and Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency. Other 
members in the programme group included officials of the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs; 
Nigerian Port Authority; Lagos State Ministry of Environment; Lagos State Environmental 
Protection Agency; and Rivers State Ministry of Environment. The remaining participants in 
the programme group included the Nigerian maritime oil and gas sector’s consultants. 
Importantly, they are certified by the responsible government agencies and also they 
represent the oil and gas companies on issues related to EIA, because in the NMOGS, oil 
companies are not permitted to write EIA. In Figure 4.5 I show the number of participants 
interviewed by their professions. I interviewed 21 (38%) Federal government agencies, 13 
(23%) State government agencies, 6 (11%) NGOs, 5 (9%) academics, 4 (7%) environmental 
related-associations, 4 (7%) NMOGS’s consultants and 3 (5%) environmental legal 
practitioners.    
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Figure 4.5 Participant interviewed by professions 
 
Source Fieldwork, 2010 
 
 
It is important to mention that the participants in the programme group except the NMOGS’s 
EIA consultants are policy custodians and implementers, while the participants in the control 
group monitored the activities of the implementers.  
 
The activities of participants were described in more detail (see Appendix 2a & 2b), though 
their identities have been made anonymous as earlier mentioned to ensure their 
confidentiality. The study sample therefore comprised of fifty-six participants, four of whom 
participated in the pilot interviews. These pilot interviews provided me with a deeper 
understanding of my research problem (Moch and Gates, 2000), and gave me a valuable 
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interviews with average of 1- 4 per day, lasting for 13 minutes to 1 hour 10 minutes and 59 
seconds and in some cases interviews were rescheduled because of strike action. I resolved 
this by visiting the participants at their private offices or homes as the case may be. Only two 
participants were affected by the industrial strike and importantly, I got permission from the 
HOD, Director-General, Commissioners and Permanent Secretary as the case may be before 
interviewing all that were not affected by industrial strike.     
 
One of the challenges encountered during the fieldwork was that out of the entire 56 
participants interviewed, 4 participants from the DPR did not agree with the use of a voice 
recorder. The problem was resolved through note taking by focusing on relevant information 
only (Hall and Hall, 1996). Interestingly, the remaining 52 participants were happy with the 
use of Voice Recorder, as indicated in the letter of intent. Peil (1982) has described a letter of 
intent as a simple document that states what a research project is all about, as the starting 
point and what follow is informed consent. Green and Thorogood (2009) have argued that 
‘informed’ implies all pertinent aspects of what will happen are disclosed to the participants, 
while ‘consent’ implies that the participants are capable of making a rational judgement about 
whether to participate or not.  
 
All the participants in the study were happy to participate in the interview process as ethical 
issues had been resolved through informed consent, including the right to privacy or 
confidentiality (Creswell, 2007; Simons, 2006; Thorne, 2004; Fontana and Frey, 1998), and 
moral standards (Holloway, 1997). This does not imply that my activities during fieldwork 
were problem-free throughout – as earlier mentioned industrial strikes, for example, often 
hindered access to the participants. Nevertheless, I managed to resolve these issues on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account Fontana and Frey (2008, pp. 151-152) recommendation 
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that ‘...researchers must be aware of the implications, pitfalls, and problems...’ associated 
with in-depth empirically rich research.  
 
Having shown how primary and secondary data were gathered I now move on to describe 
how data were analysed in order to meaningfully address the research aim and objectives. 
 
4.4 Data analysis 
 
Data analysis is often more inductive than deductive to start with, because induction is the act 
of selecting patterns, themes and categories in data set, while deduction involves analysing 
data in relation to an existing framework (Patton, 2002). Analysing, narrating or reporting 
qualitative data in more general terms takes several forms: linear analytical structure, 
comparative structure, chronological structure, case studies analysis structure, and theory 
building structure among others (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008; Creswell, 2007; Burns, 2000; 
Miller, 1997). Holloway (1997, p. 43) maintains that data analysis is the ‘means of breaking 
down the data and searching for codes and categories which are then reassembled...’ 
According to Gibbs (2007, p. 3), the process of analysing qualitative data is centred on two 
main factors: 
1 Developing an awareness of the kinds of data that are to be examined, and how they can 
be described and explained; 
2 A number of practical activities that assist with organising and analysing large amounts of 
data, seen as practicalities of qualitative analysis.    
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I have analysed the entire available data using the descriptive statistics method and they are 
summarised in appendix 2c, but the starting point of my analysis was the transcription of 
semi-structured interviews, which were then coded manually to ensure data reliability (See 
Bull et al., 2008; Creswell, 2007). I used several colours to differentiate between the key 
issues/topics related to EIA implementation in the NMOGS as earlier proposed. For example 
yellow represented the state of the environment, green represented the impacts of previous 
EIA in the sector, brown represented levels of cooperation among the government 
implementing agencies, red represented the effectiveness of EIA, purple represented the 
sufficiency of resources and pink represented the role of international organisations towards 
effective EIA implementation in NMOGS (See appendix 3 for the samples). As Silverman 
(2006, p. 362) notes, ‘analysing long-well-transcribed data extracts, helps both reliability and 
likely validity of data analyses’. Coding helped me in the translation of data into categories, 
so that they could be analysed (Gibbs, 2007; Peil, 1982), as it obliged me to focus on 
essential features (Burns, 2000) and for examples see appendix 3. As Guba and Lincoln 
(2004) reflect, qualitative data are not only process-oriented and holistic, they are also 
interpretative. 
 
Based on the maxim that ‘quality representation cannot be achieved without accurate 
interpretation’ (Stake and Schwandt, 2006, p. 414), I used narrative analysis, telling the 
stories, relationships, feelings and experiences of the policy actors in the programme and 
control groups (Yanow, 1996). The main aim of my interpretative approach was to 
understand ‘the world from the point of view of participants...rather than deriving an 
explanation of the world’ (Green and Thorogood, 2009, p. 14).  
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Furthermore, I employed my case studies and secondary evidence to strengthen the findings. 
Previous EIA reports were used to measure the extent to which multinational and national oil 
company projects had been fully translated into practice, particularly in solving 
environmental challenges in the study areas. I analysed both offshore projects – for example 
the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) – and land-based projects including the Tank Farm 
project, which takes as its starting point a sub-sea pipeline installation. The former is operated 
by the multinational oil companies and the latter is managed by a Nigerian company. 
According to deLeon and deLeon (2002, p. 475) ‘most implementation scholars agree on the 
importance of programme/project evaluation as key to good implementation...viewing 
evaluation as a way of assessing executed programmes/projects and make suggestion as how 
it can be improved’. 
 
Apart from the fact that the case studies through a specific project helps in strengthening the 
findings, they also assist in showing the real picture of the activities on the ground and 
‘provide rich and deep understanding of a highly complex phenomena’ (Cousins and Shulha, 
2006, p. 280). In the same vein, case studies may ‘refute a universal generalisation...can 
represent a significant contribution to theory building and assist in refocusing the direction of 
future investigation in the area of research’ (Burns, 2000, p. 461). Meanwhile, quantitative 
data on the number of projects that have been subjected to EIA were analysed using graphs, 
as one of the components of descriptive statistics to identify whether the sector’s EIA systems 
have recorded achievements.       
  
In summary, both case studies and responses from semi-structured interviews were used to 
furnish a basis for analysis in this research. Crucially my research did not simply focus on 
evaluation alone, but also upon a theoretically-informed interpretation of data (Holloway, 
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1997; Patton, 1987). The final section discusses my positionality in relation to the research 
topic.  
4.5 Positionality of the researcher 
 
‘Researchers’ reflections on their actions and observation in the field, their 
impression, irritation, feelings and so on, become data in their own right, forming 
part of the interpretation, and are documented in research diaries or context 
protocol’ (Flick, 2002, p. 6).     
 
The researcher’s experience is viewed as the starting point and key term for the conduct of all 
social inquiry, which implies that the researcher should reflect on his/her experience in 
interpreting collected data (Clandinin and Connelly, 1998). Acknowledging the researcher’s 
experience is required during data gathering (Gibbs, 2007), and in ensuring valid and reliable 
analysis and interpretation. Moch and Gates (2000, p. 3) have maintained that the 
‘researcher’s experience is not just a peripheral to the research, and should thus have a place 
in the reporting of the research’. Furthermore, acknowledging their personal experience 
‘helps researchers to understand how their data and its interpretation may be intertwined with 
their own value and beliefs’ (Elsbach, 2000, p. 70). 
 
I am Nigerian and was born in Lagos State, where I undertook my primary and secondary 
education. I did my undergraduate and postgraduate studies in the Eastern part of the country. 
I started my professional career as a lecturer at Maritime Academy of Nigeria, and I also 
became a qualified ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation) lead auditor in the 
same organisation in the Southern part of the country, where Rivers State is located. In view 
of this, the study areas (Lagos and Rivers States) are particularly interesting to me, because 
important issues around my research have many personal associations (social, political, 
economic, and environmental). My previous experience qualified me as an insider and also 
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enabled me to understand the interpretation of the collected data better. In order to remain as 
objective in undertaking this research, I acted as an outsider throughout the interviews, except 
on one occasion, where two of the DPR officials refused to respond positively to the 
interview questions, because they felt I wanted to expose their malpractices. In this case, I 
had to present myself as an insider, and someone who had lectured in the country’s Maritime 
Institution for six years as well as an experienced lead auditor interested in assessing the 
process and not as an individual. In this way, I brought my intention into the open, which was 
to interrogate organisational process, procedure and practice not an individual after which 
they cooperated. But with the rest of the interviewees I maintained my position as an 
outsider, as the Government and Non-Government officials were willing to share information 
with me considering my positionality as a PhD research student who wanted necessary data.    
 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has considered the wide range of primary and secondary data sources used to 
gather information on the study area, including the case studies, experts’ evidence, and policy 
documents. I have described the ways by which materials from the secondary and primary 
sources were applied and analysed by concentrating on what would constitute ‘credible 
evidence’ (Donaldson and Lipsey 2006). The next chapter sets out the Nigerian national 
context and national systems of EIA. It explores the development of oil and gas operations, 
including an assessment of oil and gas activities resulting to environmental impacts.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE NIGERIAN NATIONAL CONTEXT AND NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF EIA 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction                                          
 
This chapter focuses on the Nigerian national context and the evolution of the distinctive 
national system of EIA. I discuss the historical development of oil and gas in the country, 
including the assessment of impacts of oil and gas operations on the environment, so as to 
understand why and how the sector’s EIA was enacted. The chapter then reviews the 
NMOGS’s EIA legal frameworks to identify what has been put in place, what these 
frameworks seek to achieve, and their relative policy effectiveness.  
 
The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 5.1 briefly introduces the chapter and section 
5.2 discusses the historical development of oil and gas in Nigeria. Section 5.3 describes the 
environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas activities nationally, focusing on its impacts on 
maritime fauna and flora, atmosphere and human-health and well-beings. Section 5.4 then 
reviews the NMOGS’s EIA systems, focusing on the structural issues. Section 5.5 elucidates 
the role of key implementing agencies within the oil and gas sector as the custodians of the 
country’s environmental resources. Finally in section 5.6, the concludes the chapter by 
outlining the main policy styles (Jordan et al., 2003a; Richardson et al., 1982) operating in 
the sector, so as to lay the groundwork for the more detailed analyses that follow in chapters 
6, 7 and 8. 
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5.2 Historical development of oil and gas in Nigeria 
 
Foreign involvement in the Nigerian oil and gas sector can be traced back to the early 
twentieth century, when European state authorities began to recognise oil as a valuable 
energy source (Obasi, 2003). The first person to prospect for oil in Nigeria was a British 
citizen named John Simon Bergheim, who operated through his Bitumen Corporation 
Company (BCC), which before his death had sunk fifteen wells in Southern Nigeria without 
any success (Fleay, 1998). Fleay (1998) maintains that an Anglo Dutch consortium, Shell 
D’Arcy followed BCC to Nigeria, carrying out further exploratory drillings between 1937 
and 1939 that again recorded no success. It was only in 1951 that the first productive well 
was sunk at IHUO-1 near Owerri, with an additional thirteen wells established between 1953 
and 1955 (Anthony, 2005; Obasi, 2003). Shell D’Arcy eventually struck its first successful 
commercial well in 1956 at Oloibiri, in what is now Bayelsa State, with shipment of crude oil 
from Nigeria beginning in 1958 (Obasi, 2003). In the same year, more oil was found at Afam 
in Rivers State. Subsequently, the construction of pipeline from Oloibiri to Port Harcourt was 
undertaken to facilitate international oil export (Obasi, 2003). 
 
It appears that Shell’s achievement in oil prospecting and exploitation encouraged other 
multinational oil companies to join in exploration activities in Nigeria. Thus, during 1960-
1965, the number of multinational oil companies increased to five in the country, with 
Chevron, Mobil, Texaco and Elf setting up operations in Nigeria, and the first offshore 
licenses were released around the same period (Anthony, 2005). The multinational oil 
companies’ involvement in the Nigerian oil business has helped the developed world to meet 
its basic oil demands. Thus, for example Nigeria’s so-called ‘light sweet oil’ source is critical 
for the U.S. refining needs (Brodman, 2004; Salih, 1992). The country’s offshore oil 
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exploration and production began in 1993 (Obasi, 2003). By September 1999, Nigeria began 
to develop its gas resources with the inauguration of a $ 3.8 billion Liquefied Natural Gas 
facility on Bonny Island in Rivers State (Hagel, 2004). For the purpose of simplicity, I have 
summarised the NMOGS historical development in Table 5.1.     
 
 
Table 5.1: Historical development of the Nigerian oil and gas sector from 1908-1999 
 
Date  Events 
1908 Nigerian Bitumen Company British Colonial Petroleum commenced oil operation  
1938 Shell D’Arcy granted exploration license to prospect for oil throughout Nigeria 
1951 The first exploration well drilled 
1956 Shell D’Arcy made first commercial discovery of oil at Oloibiri oil field in 
Nigeria 
1958 First shipment of oil from Nigeria 
1960- 65 Four additional foreign oil companies (Mobil, Chevron, Texaco and Elf) started 
operation in Nigeria. During this period, Nigerian Government was playing a 
passive role by collecting royalty.     
1971 Nigeria joined the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
1971 The Nigerian National Oil Company was established 
1973 Marked the first participation agreement, with Nigeria Government 35% shares in 
the oil companies  
1974 Witnessed the second participation agreement, with Nigerian Government equity 
increased to 55% 
1975 Ministry of Petroleum Resources was established with regulatory roles  
1977 The Nigerian National Oil Company  and Ministry of Petroleum Resources were 
merged as Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation by Decree 33 
1979 Witnessed the third participation agreement, with Nigerian Government equity 
increased to 60% and later on in the same increased to 80% through the fourth 
participation agreement   
1984 Agreement consolidating the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and Shell 
joint venture was signed 
1989 Witnessed the fifth agreement, with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation 
60%, Shell 30%, Elf 5% and Agip 5%.   
1993 Marked the sixth participation agreement, with the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation 55%, Shell 30%, Elf 10% and Agip 5%. 
1993 Offshore operation commenced 
1999  NLNG’s (Nigerian Liquefied & Natural Gas) first shipment of gas out Bonny 
terminal  
 
Source: www.nnpcgroupBusinessinformation/OilandGasinNigeria/industryhistoryaspx  
accessed on 10/10/2010; Anthony, 2005 pp. 3-4   
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Nigeria is divided into 6 regions excluding the Federal Capital (Abuja): the North-East, the 
North-West, the North-Central, the South-East, the South-West and the South-South, with 
highest oil products (premium motor spirit, automotive gas oil and house hold kerosene) 
distribution to South-West and South-South in million litres (mltrs) (See Figure 5.1). Most of 
the country’s oil and gas is found in the South-South region which hosts the Niger Delta 
(NDRDMP, 2006), a region richly endowed in natural resources and with wetland (Petters, 
2009). Nigeria’s oil reserves are estimated at 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil and equivalent 
(BOE) as of 2011, and the country has an estimated 187 trillion cubic feet of proven natural 
gas reserves as of 2010 (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2011). Its average daily oil 
production rate has risen from 5100 barrels in 1958 to 2.5 million barrels in 2012 (Alike and 
Okafor, 2012; Okubenji, 2012). The country’s gas production rates stand at average of 4 
billion standard cubic feet per day (Alike and Okafor, 2012).    
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The Nigerian’s regions and oil consumption rates  
 
Source: Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), 2008 p. 47  
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There are 606 oil fields in Nigeria, of which 355 are onshore, and 251 offshore (NDRDMP, 
2006; Orubu et al., 2004). The main offshore oil and gas fields in Nigeria include Agbami 
(owned by Chevron), Shell’s Bonga Main, Shell’s Bonga South West, and Erha, owned by 
Exxon Mobil (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2011; NDRDMP, 2006; Orubu et al., 2004). 
The Bonga field for example, has the capacity to produce more than 200 000 barrels of oil 
and 150 million cubic feet of gas every working day (Shell Nigeria, 2011). The location of 
offshore and onshore oil and gas fields is shown in Figure 5.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Location of Nigerian Offshore Oil and Gas Fields 
 
Source:  www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/nigeria_p1193.jpg accessed on 5/5/2010 
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The country’s pipelines are instrumental in transporting oil and gas from one region to 
another within Nigeria. The start and end point of these pipelines are identified in Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Nigeria’s oil and gas pipelines location, including the cross border pipelines  
 
Pipelines start Point Pipelines End Point   Length(km) 
Escravos in Delta  State (South-South)  Kaduna (North Central) 674 
Kwale in Delta state  Brass in Bayelsa State (South-South) 206 
Ramuekpe in Rivers State (South-
South) 
Bonny in Rivers States   134 
Warri in Delta State  Ramuekpe in Rivers State  - 
Banga Field in Rivers State  Bonny Terminal in Rivers State  268 
Escravos in Delta State Lagos (South-West) 340 
Oben in Edo State (South-South)   Ajaokuta in Kogi State (North-
Central) 
294 
Ugheli in Delta State Warri in Delta State  - 
Enugu (South-East) Auchi in Edo State  - 
Kaduna   Gasau in Zamfara State (North-West)   356 
Kaduna  Maiduguri (North-East)  1050 
Kaduna  Warri in Delta State  - 
Lagos  Ilorin in Kwara State (North-West)  259 
Port Harcourt in Rivers State  Yola in Adamawa (North-East) 333 
Warri in Delta State  Lagos 312 
Lagos (Nigeria)  Takoradi (Ghana) (International) e.g. 
West Africa Pipeline Project 
1033 (also 
see 
Goodland, 
2005) 
 
Source: www.theodora.com/pipelines/nigeria_oil_gasandproducts_pipelines_map.html  
 
accessed on 4/3/2009 
 
 
Nigeria has four refineries: one in Kaduna (built in 1980), two in Port-Harcourt (built in 1965 
and 1989) and another one in Warri (built in 1978) (Oil and Gas Press, 2009; OECD/IEA, 
2008; Metz, 1991). Ideally, these refineries should have the capacity to refine 100,000, 
210,000, and 125,000 barrels per day (Okunroumu, 2004), but that is not the case due to poor 
management, lack of maintenance and sabotage (Oil and Gas Press, 2009).  Presently, the 
government has recognised the need to address the challenges related to the country’s 
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refineries, as Nigerians’ consume more oil than all other forms of energy combined (Alike, 
2010; Buhari, 2010).  
 
Nigeria joined the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971 (U.S. 
Energy Information Agency, 2011). The country still strives to meet with the OPEC oil 
production quota, in the face of numerous internal challenges, which often results in reduced 
oil production. Considerable domestic unrest took place following Ken Saro-Wiwa’s 
execution in 1995 (Saro-Wiwa was the leader of a group called Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People) for resisting oil and gas operations causing pollution in the Niger Delta. It 
has been widely argued since that environmental degradation is capable of igniting violent 
conflict nationally (OECD, 2006; Payne, 2001; Goldstone, 2001; Lomborg, 2001). Various 
forms of resistance to the state continue, and some armed groups have taken the advantage of 
this situation to destabilise the country. 
 
5.3 The environmental impacts of offshore oil and gas operations    
 
As discussed in the previous section, Nigeria has a relatively long history of oil prospecting 
and exploitation. However, it was not until 1987 that public awareness of environmental 
issues became widespread, triggered by the dumping at Koko port in Nigerian territorial 
waters by an Italian ship (Echefu and Akpofure, 2007; Ogunba, 2004) of about 4000 tons of 
toxic and hazardous waste (Nwafor, 2006). This resulted in the establishment of Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency in 1988 and Natural Resources Conservation Council in 
1989, and Nigerian Government also embraced international development by adopting 
several international conventions among them was climate change, and they participated in 
Earth Summit in 1992 for example. In this way, the Nigerian Government was able to detach 
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away from the inherited colonial environmental management legacy that focused on public 
health, town planning, forestry and wildlife (Steyn, 2003), coupled with the government itself 
over concentrating on economic matters since 1970 (beginning of oil boom in the country) to 
the detriment of environmental related issues. With respect to the Koko incident and its 
resultant development, the Nigerian Government is now aware that addressing the maritime 
offshore oil and gas environmental problems requires substantial efforts.    
 
Offshore oil and gas activities in Nigeria range from exploration to production (UNEP, 2011, 
E&P Forum/UNEP, 1997). The most noticeable environmental pollution in the NMOGS 
arises from oil drilling and production, resulting in oil spills, rig blow outs, improper disposal 
of drilling mud and burning of fossil fuel from gas flaring (UNEP, 2011; Steiner, 2008; 
Bassey, 2007; Adeyinka et al., 2005; Orubu et al., 2004). The volume of gas flared in Nigeria 
reportedly was the highest in the world in 2000 (See Table 5.3) in 2005 (Bassey, 2010, 2007; 
Haruna, 2007; Environmental Rights Action, 2005) and the second highest in 2010 (U.S. 
Energy Information Agency, 2011). Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (2012) reported that even 
though 40 bcm of crude oil associated gas is produced in the country per annum, 80% of it is 
being flared yearly. About 1.1 billion cubic feet of gas is flared per day in Rivers State alone 
(Goodland, 2005), with virtually 2.5 billion cubic feet of gas associated with crude oil is 
flared daily nationally (U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2011; ERA, 2005). Gas flaring has 
negative effects on the immediate environment (Orubu et al., 2004), as well as on human life. 
This is because some of the greenhouse gases such as methane and carbon dioxide emitted 
from gas flares are major contributors to global warming (Song et al., 2011; Paltsev et al., 
2011; Demayo et al., 1998). Some commentators have alleged that the effects are already 
noticed in rising sea-levels of Rivers and Lagos States in particular (Bassey, 2007; Haruna, 
2007; Ihedioha, 2007). 
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Table 5.3: Best Estimate of Gas Flaring Trend in selected Countries in 2000 
 
  
Country Flared Gas in Billion 
Cubic Metres (BCM)  
Share of World Total 
in Percentage (%) 
Algeria 6.8 6 
Angola 4.3 4 
China 3.2 3 
Egypt 0.9 1 
Indonesia 4.5 4 
Iran 10.5 10 
Nigeria 17.2 16 
Mexico 5.6 5 
North Sea
(c)
 2.7 3 
Russia 11.5 11 
Venezuela 4.5 4 
United States 2.8 3 
Other countries 33 30 
World 107.5 100 
 
 
Source: Environmental Rights Action, 2005, p. 12 
 
In Nigeria, the lack of infrastructure and technology is among the main reasons for gas flaring 
(U.S. Energy Information Agency, 2011; Bassey, 2007; Borasin et al., 2002). It was the 
considerable adverse environmental effect of gas flaring that prompted the World Bank and 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) to propose the reduction of gas flaring in the Nigerian 
oil producing states (Orubu et al., 2004). This resulted in the WAGP project in 2003 (WAGP, 
2004; Goodland, 2005), which is the focus of the next chapter. 
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Apart from gas flaring, oil spills in the country are frequent and highly damaging 
environmentally (Steiner, 2008), with an average of four spills per week (Goodland, 2005). 
According to Borasin et al. (2002) Shell Nigeria recorded 130 spills in 1997 and about 2 300 
cubic meters of oil are spilled annually in the country’s oil producing states. The U.S. 
Information Energy Agency reported that more than 4000 oil spillage incidents have occurred 
in Nigeria (Kloff and Wicks, 2004). Major oil spillage events within the Nigerian coastal 
zones have been reported (Luiselli et al., 2006 and see Table 5.4). The major reasons for oil 
spills in Nigeria are partly due to wear and tear of pipelines and largely high levels of 
vandalism and sabotage (NNPC, 2011, 2008).       
 
 
Table 5.4: Major oil spillage events in the coastal zone of the Nigerian oil producing states 
between 1978- 2001 
 
  
Location of spill             Date Barrels of oil lost  
Gocon’s Escravos 
spill 
            1978        300,000 Chevron 
Forcados Terminal 
tank failure 
            1978        500,000 Shell Petroleum 
Development 
Company (SPDC) 
Apoi 20 blow-out             1980             - Texaco 
Funiwa 5 blow-out             1980        400,000 Texaco 
Abudu Pipeline spill             1982          18,818 SPDC 
Jesse fire incidence                
            1998 
 
         40,000 
 
NNPC 
Idoho off-shore 
platform 
        
            1998 
 
         40,000 
 
Exxon Mobil 
Yorla 10 blow-out             2001          35,000 SPDC 
 
Source: Luiselli et al., 2006, p. 3753  
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In contrast to land-based oil spills, a major concern is that the amount of oil lost through 
spillage into the marine environment is far greater as it is largely understandable (Steiner, 
2008). Oil loss to the marine environment poses widespread negative threats to the 
environment, disrupting ecosystems, fauna and flora as well as polluting water (UNEP, 2011; 
Steiner, 2008; International Relation, 2006; Adeyinka et al., 2005; Orubu et al., 2004) by 
direct toxicity (Onwurah et al., 2007).  
 
A study by UNEP (2011) showed that oil and gas activities have also disrupted the Ogoni’s 
land (in Rivers State) marine environment by destroying the plankton, algae, fish eggs and 
gills. The affected fish gills might in turn cause damage to human health, as most of the local 
communities in Ogoni land depend upon fish for subsistence (Borasin et al., 2002). In 
Nigeria, the impacts of oil and gas activities are exacerbated, because response to spillage is 
very low (UNEP, 2011; Bassey, 2010; Borasin et al., 2002). The level of this type of impact 
therefore depends on the types of hydrocarbon involved, quantity spilled, the temperature and 
season at the time of the incident (UNEP, 2011).   
 
The environmental impacts of oil exploration and production in Nigeria are summarised in 
Table 5.5. In order to show how these impacts are connected to social, economic and political 
issues, I now focus on the role of oil operators, government and local people, so as to reveals 
the complexities and peculiarities of environmental impacts in the NMOGS.         
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Table 5.5: Summary of the environmental impacts of oil exploration and production 
 
Exploration and production 
activity 
Physical activity Impacts  
 
Seismic activity 
 
Setting up base camp 
 
 
 
 
 
Cutting lines 
 
 
Seismic operation 
 
Hydrological changes 
Sewage 
Light and noise pollution 
Introduction of alien and invasive 
species 
 
Removal of vegetation 
 
 
Vibration 
Noise  
Drilling operations Setting up base camp 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Setting up drilling pads 
 
Drilling operations 
Abstraction of water 
Hydrological changes 
Sewage 
Light and noise pollution 
Introduction of alien and invasive 
species 
 
 
Hydrological changes 
 
Noise can cause harm to fauna  
Drill cutting and drilling wastes 
Spills and leaks 
Light and noise pollution 
Nuisance odours 
Production operations 
 
Facility installation 
 
 
 
 
Pipeline installation 
 
 
 
 
 
Facility operation 
Access creation 
Hydrological changes 
Introduction of alien and invasive 
species 
 
Hydrological changes 
Spillages and leaks 
Fires 
Nuisance odours 
Pigging wastes  
 
Noise  
Discharge of water 
Waste, e.g. from tank bottoms 
Spillages and leaks 
Fires 
Nuisance odours 
 
Source: UNEP, 2011, p. 42 
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Environmental challenges arising from oil and gas exploitation have resulted in a wide 
variety of political, economic and social problems. Oil and gas operators have been criticised 
for not responding immediately to environmental challenges and not doing enough in terms 
of provision of social facilities to commensurate the level of damages they have caused to the 
environment, thus intensify environmental impacts (UNEP, 2011; Bassey, 2007; Haruna, 
2007). Apart from oil companies’ social responsibilities, operators are generally closer to 
local communities than the government agencies. Moreover, oil companies’ commercial 
activities often target these communities for additional profit. The social problem is briefly 
considered here because any project that is socially sustainable will contribute to 
environmental sustainability to an extent (Tanaka, 2009; Barrow, 1997).        
  
In this context, one of the biggest issues in Nigeria (and in the country’s oil producing states 
in particular) is the lack of basic infrastructure such as portable water (drinkable water), 
electricity and improved road networks, among others (International Relations, 2006). There 
is now an extensive body of evidence showing that most of the basic infrastructures in 
Nigeria are in poor condition (Oyeka, 2002; Omobitan, 2002; Ilori, 2002; Ukwu, 2002; 
Malifiya, 2002; Ajakaye, 2002), and do not adequately meet public needs (Oyeranti, 2002). 
Oyeka (2002) maintains that these basic infrastructures are interwoven and interrelated, for 
example, until the country’s water supply is improved, sanitation and health infrastructures 
will remain under-developed.   
 
According to Omobitan (2002) high population densities and land use pressures from 
industrial and commercial activities are also responsible for these inadequate infrastructure 
facilities. Yet there would be substantial socio-economic benefits to the country through 
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greater state investment in infrastructures including electricity, water supply, and improved 
sea, road or rail networks (Ilori, 2002; Oyeranti, 2002).  
 
Even though oil and gas are undoubtedly the most valuable natural resources available in 
Nigeria, the people of oil producing states do not reap the full benefit from them. Only a 
small percentage (about 3%) of oil revenue is dedicated to the country’s oil producing states 
(NDRDMP, 2006). This appears to be part of the reasons why the amnesty is not fully 
working. Notably, past governments approaches and actions towards oil pollution have 
resulted in serious social problems in Nigeria. Thus, in 1998, the then president, General 
Abdulsalami Abubakar despatched military officers to Bayelsa State to stop widespread 
youth demonstrations over oil spills in Ijaw province. This resulted in hundreds of deaths 
(Okonta, 2000). In 1999, the then President Olusegun Obasanjo instructed the army to raze 
Odi town in Balyesa State (part of oil producing states), with several hundred people killed in 
street fighting (Okonta, 2000). In May 2009, the late president Yar’ adua directed the army to 
destroy the palace of the Pere of Gbaramatu and properties owned by the suspected militants 
in that kingdom (Ehiremen, 2010; Amazie, 2009; Osarogiagbon, 2009; Ogbu, 2009). Such 
military actions have provoked a backlash which has annoyed local communities- the oil 
producing states particularly. 
 
There have been instances of attacks and out-right destruction of oil production facilities, 
which ironically has further intensified the levels of environmental pollution in the country. 
In the Niger Delta for example militants set fire to the Forcados loading platform, which is 
located about 20 kilometres offshore (International Relations, 2006). Similarly, in March 
2010, Kokori oil field was largely destroyed by Niger Delta’s militants (Julius and Alike, 
2010). Recently, in February 2012, a facility that belongs to the Nigerian Agip Oil Company 
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(now ENI) was set on fire by militants (Alamutu and Nwafor, 2012; Ogundele and Idowu, 
2012) and significantly the group ‘vowed to reduce Nigeria’s oil production to zero’ (Olaniyi, 
2012, p. 1). According to Okubenji (2012), Ugwuanyi (2012), and Alike and Okafor (2012) 
attacks on oil facilities especially pipelines causes further pollution, and in some cases these 
militants have engaged in oil theft under the subterfuge that they are somehow ‘protecting’ 
the environment. A study by UNEP (2011) indicated that even criminal damage has increased 
the rates of environmental pollution in Nigeria. It seems that the bulk of the reasons for this 
type of attacks on oil facilities stems from the fact that local communities are bitter over the 
growing environmental pollution threat across the country. But they have only succeeded in 
exacerbating the problem by putting greater strain on the country’s battered infrastructure.  
 
For example, the National Commission for Refugees has reported that ‘oil related crises have 
driven more than 3 million Nigerians from their homes’ (International Relations, 2006, p. 
59). Similarly, economic loss is also evident in the country. According to Alike and Ezigbo 
(2010), the country has lost over 174.57 Billion Naira in the last ten years to vandalism, with 
three major pipelines attacked at different times. In the same vein, about 150,000 barrels of 
oil, valued at 2.6 billion Naira are lost daily to crude oil theft in Nigeria (Okubenji, 2012). 
The Nigerian Minister of Finance reveals that oil theft has led to ‘a 17 percent fall in official 
sales of oil in April for example or about 400 000 b/d...and the country has loss 1.2 Billion 
Dollars in just a month’ (Wallis, 2012, p. 1). This does not imply that the total annual oil 
spillages are lesser than oil theft, which is a recent development and oil theft became popular 
just in 2007 as Shell Nigeria (2012 a & b) put it. However, it implies that any opportunity or 
challenge that affects crude oil nationally will equally have effects on the country’s 
development (Akpofure and Ojile, 2007), considering the fact that the economy is largely 
dependent on the oil sector (NDRDMP, 2006). 
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Such challenges confirm that the ‘oil producing Niger Delta remains politically volatile, with 
intermittent communal violence and bunkering, or stealing crude oil from pipelines as a 
major concern’ (Hagel, 2004, p. 5). This is fostered by the government’s lack of control over 
its maritime environment (Morrison, 2004). The problem becomes visible with falls in the 
country’s crude oil production and quantities available for export and local consumption and 
coupled with damages to flora and fauna in particular as earlier mentioned. Then, the 
question is- how did Nigeria respond to Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and in 
terms of compliance?  
 
Nigeria signed into CBD in 1992 and ratified the same convention in 1994 under Federal 
Ministry of Environment not Institute of Oceanography (Fourth National Biodiversity Report 
(FNBR), 2010), considering its endowment with rich diverse flora and fauna (NDRDMP, 
2006). Even though the country’s Institute of Oceanography is not directly involved in the 
issues related to flora and fauna biodiversity mainly because it is under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, it has been contributing immensely to the nation by engaging in carrying out 
related research and also consulting for the oil and gas operators (Ajayi and Tobor, 1991). In 
Nigeria, there are many NGOs that promote conservation of flora and fauna, among them are: 
Nigerian Environmental Action Study Team and Centre for Environmental Renewable 
Natural Resources Management Research and Development (FNBR, 2010).  
 
In 1997, the country developed its National Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (NBSAP) 
not only to promote awareness on biodiversity related issues but also to ensure that 
sustainable development is achieved and an end comes to destruction of sea creatures mainly 
(FNBR, 2010). Despite the fact that the country has put in place NBSAP, it has failed to meet 
CBD 2010 target, particularly in conserving its rich endowed flora and fauna (UNEP, 2010; 
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FNBR, 2010). FNBR (2010) reported that apart from natural and man-made threat for 
example oil spill, other challenges related to conserving biodiversity in Nigeria’s offshore in 
particular are lack of skilled man-power, inappropriate technology and inadequate funds to 
implement several biodiversity programmes. However, these problems of lack of compliance 
with the content of CBD in Nigeria might be ameliorated through international cooperation 
(FNBR, 2010), and effective communication (UNEP, 2010).       
 
In summary, this section has emphasised that the environmental impacts of offshore oil and 
gas operations have not just resulted in pollution. It has also caused economic and social 
problems, with the oil producing states bearing the brunt of them, despite the fact that oil 
revenue is realised from them. The negative impacts of offshore oil and gas operations on the 
environment and local communities in the country’s oil producing states have raised the 
concerns for the reviews of the NMOGS’s EIA legislation that have been established since 
the early 1990s. This is treated through the subsequent section, mainly to identify what they 
seek to achieve.  
 
5.4 The structure of the NMOGS’s EIA systems 
 
As already discussed in chapter 2, EIA is an important means by which potentially adverse 
environmental impacts can be mitigated. Crucially, however, its structure varies from country 
to country. Consequently in the following section I review the Nigerian EIA system, focusing 
on its policy characteristics, which was one of the main reasons why the use of policy 
implementation theories was proposed in chapter 3. In this first section, I address the basic 
ideas and the sets of actions that have officially been taken towards achieving effective EIA 
practice in the NMOGS. The section discusses the structure of EIA systems in the sector, 
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focusing on the DPR and FMENV EIA systems through their legal frameworks and 
guidelines. One of the benefits of these EIA guidelines is to assist the selection of projects 
that are related to the sector (Wood, 2003a).     
 
EIA has been embraced in over 100 countries (Weaver, et al., 2008; Petts, 1999a, Barker and 
Wood, 1999) including Nigeria. The aim of EIA in Nigeria and the NMOGS is to enhance 
sustainable development (Nwafor, 2006). Nonetheless, I would argue that the main goal of 
the NMOGS EIA should be to mitigate the sector’s undoubted environmental impacts. A 
critically important feature of Nigerian implementation is the existence of multiple systems of 
EIA at a national scale. The country’s EIA is operated under three independent systems: the 
DPR Petroleum Act (1969), the FMENV EIA Decree 86 (1992), and the Town and Country 
Planning’s Decree 88 (1992) (Ogunba, 2004). However, only two systems are relevant to the 
NMOGS, the DPR EIA system (considered in section 5.4.1) and FMENV EIA system 
(examined in section 5.4.2), as the Town and Country planning EIA system relates only to 
land and housing development (Ogunba, 2004). I have summarised the entire development 
that gave birth to the two EIA systems in the NMOGS below (See Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.6: Developments that led to EIA systems in the NMOGS 
 
Years Developments 
1950 Nigeria Government establishes Hydrocarbon section of the Ministry of Lagos 
Affairs (now DPR)   
1969 Federal Government enacts Petroleum Act   
1970 Federal Government establishes Department of Petroleum Resources 
 
1972 Nigeria participates in the Stockholm Conference on Human-Environment  
1975 Based on the country participation in the Stockholm Conference, the Federal  
Government establishes Division of Urban Development and Environment 
1979-
1983 
Federal Government establishes Federal Ministry of Economic Development 
April 
1982 
Nigeria hosts the 69
th
 Inter-Parliamentary Union Spring meeting on the ‘state of 
environment’ that was 10 years after Stockholm Conference 
May 
1982 
Nigeria participates in the 10
th
 Anniversary of the Stockholm Conference 
1981-
1986 
Federal Government introduces environmental policy into National Development    
Plans without provision for a formalised environmental legislation   
1987 Italian Government dumped toxic waste on Nigerian territorial water at Koko Port  
 
1988 Federal Government establishes Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) 
 
1989 Federal Government publishes National Policy on Environment 
 
1991 DPR releases Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry   
 in Nigeria (EGASPIN)   
1992 Nigeria attends the Rio Earth Summit and subsequently plan to enact its EIA Act  
1992 FEPA (now FEMNV) enacts the country’s EIA Act 
1995 The first oil and gas project was subjected to EIA in the sector 
1999 Federal Government establishes FMENV with additional responsibilities 
 
2002 DPR reviews EGASPIN 
2010 FMENV reviews EIA Act 
 
Source: DPR, 2009; Ameyan, 2008; Nwafor, 2006; Adeyinka et al., 2005; Adomokai and 
Sheate, 2004; Ogunba, 2004; Olokesusi, 2000, 1998, 1997; FEPA, 1992  
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5.4.1 The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) EIA system: Principles and 
procedures 
 
The introduction of environmental management consideration in the oil and gas sector was 
begun by the Department of Petroleum Resources (Osuno, 1981). DPR is directly responsible 
to the Federal Ministry of Petroleum rather than the Federal Ministry of Environment. The 
DPR Petroleum Act was established in 1969 to ensure effective management of the sector. 
However, environmental issues began to gain prominence in Nigeria in 1970, because of the 
country’s oil boom. 
 
The DPR EIA system is based on the Petroleum Act 1969 in which under section 8 (1) b (iii) 
the Minister of Petroleum Resources is able to make regulations to curb pollution from 
petroleum industries into watercourses and the atmosphere. It is on this basis that the DPR 
developed Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria 
(EGASPIN) in 1991.  
 
The Guidelines set out the wide-ranging nature of the EIA process, as follows: ‘the adoption 
of EIA as a project implementation tool, which emphasises that all actions that will result in 
physical, chemical, biological, cultural, economic, and social changes from the new project 
must be assessed’ (DPR, 2002 p. 132). The procedure for preparing the DPR EIA is outlined 
in Figure 5.3. In essence, the procedure requires the operators through the NMOGS certified 
EIA consultant to forward a letter of intention to the DPR, stating the need for the proposed 
oil and gas related project. The procedure emphasises scoping, mitigation and design and 
post-EIA monitoring, but without consideration for public participation. Apart from EIA, the 
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DPR also uses Environmental Evaluation Report (EER) to assess already polluted or 
impacted environment in order to decide and design strategies for restoration (DPR, 2002).          
 
            
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The DPR EIA Procedures 
Source: DPR 2002: 132-143; Udotong, 2003: 410    
                  Initiator 
       Initial Assessment 
DPR & Initiator screens  
 Significant Impacts 
Panel to scope EIA 
DPR reviews draft EIA 
Mitigation and Design 
 Draft EIA Approved 
Initiator submits final EIA 
Post-EIA Monitoring    
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Regarding the oil and gas sector in Nigeria, the guidelines set out main projects that require 
EIA as follows:   
i) Seismic operations; 
ii) Oil and gas field developments for onshore, near-shore, offshore and deep 
offshore development (well drilling, construction of crude oil production, tank 
farms and terminal facilities including floating production, storage and 
offloading vessels;   
iii) Laying of crude oil and gas delivery lines, flow lines, and pipelines in 
cumulative excess of 20 km in length and/or as determined by the Director of 
Department of Petroleum Resources; 
iv) Hydrocarbon processing facilities such as oil refineries and petrochemicals, 
liquefied natural gas, blending plants, and product filling stations (combined 
capacity above 20 000 litres); 
v) Construction of product depots with combined capacity;  
vi) Construction of waste treatment and/or disposal facilities (waste water 
treatment plant, incineration process above 300 kg/hr, and engineered sanitary 
land filling); and 
vii)  Dredging activities greater than 500 m3 
 
DPR, 2002, p. 133 
 
As stated in the above, it is obvious that the DPR EIA system is designed for oil and gas 
related projects alone. This would suggest that the DPR should be more effective in practice 
than the FMENV EIA system, which is generalised and focused on the entire national 
environmental related developments. However, previous researchers noted some 
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shortcomings such as DPR EIA overlaps with the FMENV EIA system (Ameyan, 2008; 
Nwafor, 2006, Ogunba, 2004; Olokesusi, 1998), ineffective scoping (Ogunba, 2004; 
Olokesusi, 1998), and the system being too centralised (Ogunba, 2004). I have improved on 
the issues related to overlapping for example by examining the impacts of the overlapping, 
the reasons for the problem and why the problem persists through chapter 7.   
 
5.4.2 The Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) EIA system: Principles and 
procedures 
 
The process of introducing the Federal Environment Ministry’s EIA procedure can be traced 
back to 1975, with the establishment of a Division of Urban Development and Environment 
(DUDE) within the Federal Ministry of Economic Development (Nwafor, 2006). DUDE was 
moved to the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing in 1979, and later became a Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) in 1988. Consequently, environmental policy was 
introduced to the National Development Plan (1981-1985) for the first time in Nigeria 
(Olokesusi, 1998).  
 
FEPA was reconstituted as FMENV in 1999 to address the country’s environmental and 
ecological problems more comprehensively. The Ministry published the National Policy on 
Environment in 1989, and enacted the EIA Act in 1992. The FMENV EIA system is based on 
the EIA Act 1992, and the FEPA Decree No. 58 1988 has been described as the development 
that gave birth to the FMENV EIA system (Adomokai and Sheate, 2004; Olokesusi, 1998; 
FEPA, 1992). This is because section 5 of the FEPA Decree gives the Ministry the 
responsibilities of 
(i) Environmental protection and management; 
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(ii) Setting environmental guidelines and standards; and 
(iii) Monitoring and enforcing compliance with environmental measures (Olokesusi, 
1998, p. 160).  
  
FMENV’s EIA procedure covers all sectors of the Nigerian economy, and its procedure is 
outlined in Figure 5.4. In summary, the procedure is as follows: proponents have to declare 
intention to embark on a project, this is followed by screening to ascertain whether the 
proposed project requires EIA or not. In this way, the checklist for categorisation become 
relevant, as all projects in category one automatically requires EIA (See Table 5.7). Once it is 
confirmed that EIA is required, the next activity is scoping, with the rest of activities (for 
example, public hearing). This procedure has been designed to raise standards of EIA writing 
and reporting in order to reflect international best practice with the penalties for non-
compliance set out under section 62 of the EIA Act (Nwafor, 2006).  
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Figure 5.4: FMENV EIA procedures 
Source: Udotong, 2003: 409; Olokesusi, 1998: 167; FEPA, 1995 
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Table 5.7 Project in category 1 (projects that require EIA under FMENV system) 
 
 
Type of Development Minimum Size 
or Capacity 
1. Petroleum  
 Oil and gas field development  
 Construction of offshore pipelines 
 Construction of oil and gas separation, processing, handling and 
storage facilities  
 Construction of refineries 
 Production depots for storing petrol, gas or diesel    
 
 
 
 
500 kilometres 
 
60, 000 barrels 
2. Mining 
 Mining of materials in new areas 
 Processing of ore, aluminium, copper, gold or tantalum 
 Sand dredging 
 
 
250 hectares 
50 hectares 
3. Ports 
 Construction of ports 
 Expansion of ports by 50% capacity 
 
All  
4. Power generation and transmission  
 Steam generation power stations 
 Dams and hydroelectric  power schemes: 
(i) Dams over 15 metres high  
(ii) Reservoirs with a surface area 
 Constructions of combined cycle power stations 
 
 
 
10 megawatts 
40 hectares 
400 hectares 
5. Quarries 
 Quarrying aggregate of limestone, silica, granite, and other 
minerals near residential, commercial, and industrial 
development  
 
 
All  
6. Transportation  
 Construction of rapid transport projects 
 
All  
7. Railways 
 Construction of new routes, and branch lines 
 
All 
8. Infrastructure 
 Hospital with facilities 
 Industrial estate for medium heavy industries 
 Construction of expressways, highways, and new township  
 
 
50 hectares  
 
All  
 
9. Waste treatment and disposal  
 Incineration plants, sanitary landfills, and waste water treatment 
plants  
 
All  
10. Water supply  
- 121 - 
 
 Construction of dams, impounding reservoirs 
 Ground water development for industrial agricultural or urban 
water supply 
 
All  
11. Agriculture  
 Land conversion from forest to agricultural production 
 Resettlement of families  
 Development of agricultural estates 
 
500 hectares 
100 families 
500 hectares 
12. Airport 
 Construction of airports 
 Airstrip in state and national park 
 
2 500 metres 
All  
13. Drainage and irrigation  
 Surface areas of dams, man-made lakes 
 Virgin forest drainage and wet land drainage 
 Irrigation schemes 
 
200 hectares 
100 hectares 
5 000 hectares  
14. Land reclamation  
 Costal reclamation 
 
50 hectares 
15. Fisheries  
 Fishing harbours 
 Harbour expansion leading to 50% increase in fish landing 
 Clearing of mangrove swamp forest s 
 
 
 
All  
 
50 hectares 
 
16. Forestry  
 Conversion of hill forest to other land uses and conversion of 
mangrove swamps for industrial, housing or agricultural use 
 Logging of forest land in water reservoirs or catchment areas 
 Clearing of mangrove swamps on islands near national parks 
 
 
50 hectares 
 
All  
 
17. Industry  
 Chemical plant production  
 
All  
18. Housing  
 Housing development 
 
50 hectares 
19. Resort and recreational development 
 Coastal resort facilities, hill station resort, tourist of recreational 
facilities on island and national park  
 
All  
 
 
Source: Olokesusi, 1998: 163-165 
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In Summary, the FMENV EIA applies to the following sectoral projects: 
1. Petroleum and petrochemicals, dredging, oil and gas exploration and production 
offshore and onshore, pipeline construction, and petroleum refining;  
2. Manufacturing, chemicals, and allied industries; 
3. Agricultural and rural development, agricultural land management, drainage and 
irrigation, flood management, dams and reservoirs; 
4. Infrastructure, roads and highways, urban development, and coastal development and; 
5. Solid mineral mining and development, and extraction (Olokesusi, 1998, pp. 167-168; 
FEPA, 1995, pp. 3-4).   
 
The Nigerian EIA and FMENV system in particular is almost related to the World Bank 
guidelines except for its inability to integrate SEA, which is one of the main components of 
World Bank EIA guidelines (See Mediterranean Environmental Technical Assistance, 2000, 
World Bank, 1999, 1993). It is obvious that none of the sectors’ EIA systems has integrated 
SEA. This is similar to most countries around the world (Sadler and Jurkeviciute, 2011; Ashe 
and Marsden, 2011; Wilson and Ward, 2011; Audouin et al., 2011; Clark et al., 2011; 
Hayashi, 2011; Powell, 2005; Memon, 2005). Particularly, in the developing countries, SEA 
has not been integrated to EIA system, for example in Pakistan, Ghana, Taiwan, Sri Lanka, 
Brazil and Bangladesh (See Saeed et al., 2012; Samarokoon and Rowan, 2008; Jou and Liaw, 
2006, Glasson and Salvador, 2000). About 35 countries have institutionalised SEA (Sadler, 
2011a & b) compared with EIA that has been institutionalised in over 100 countries as earlier 
mentioned (Weaver et al., 2008; Glasson and Salvador, 2000). 
 
The FMENV, for example, has not only established the EIA Act, but it has put in place a 
system that recognises mitigation compliance monitoring and public participation among 
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other EIA key stages. This is evident from its EIA procedures. As evidenced from the above, 
both the DPR and FMENV EIA systems that are directly relevant to the NMOGS have been 
designed for different purposes. The DPR system is strictly for oil and gas-related projects 
within the NMOGS, while the FMENV EIA system covers all the ministries/agencies 
projects that require EIA in the Nigeria, including oil and gas-related projects. Importantly, it 
is compulsory for proponents to comply with the two EIA procedures, and the NMOGS’s 
EIA consultants are fully aware of this. At this point, the knotty questions are: why FMENV 
EIA procedure has not replaced DPR EIA procedure? What the international oil development 
industry through their consultants think of a country with two, possibly conflicting, EIA 
procedures. Priority is given to these two questions and they are unpacked in the empirical 
chapter focusing on inter-agency context (chapter 7).  
 
Even though the FMENV EIA has put in place a system that gives recognition to public 
participation in theory, Nwafor (2006) noted low level of cooperation between State and 
Federal Ministries. I have taken this further by exploring the FMENV EIA implementation 
styles and why the State Ministries are demanding for their own EIA system for example in 
chapter 8 under the intra-agency context. The next section discusses the role of key 
government implementing agencies within the sector, as the custodians of the country’s 
environmental legislation and key policy actors.      
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5.5. The role of Government actors in designing and implementing EIA 
 
Clearly, the right interpretation of legislation guarantees the effective application of 
environmental policies through EIA (Wood, 2003b). It is in this respect that the role of GIAs 
that execute and interpret the country EIA legislation becomes relevant. The section therefore 
considers the roles of key national agencies within the NMOGS, as custodians of EIA. The 
agencies considered are the Department of Petroleum Resources, Federal Ministry of 
Environment, and Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency.  
 
5.5.1 The role of the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) 
 
DPR has been at the forefront of addressing environmental issues in the NMOGS. The 
Department began life in the 1950s as the Hydrocarbon section of the Ministry of Lagos 
Affairs, becoming DPR in 1970 (DPR, 2009). DPR operates within the content of the 
country’s legislations and Petroleum Act 1969 in particular. Other main regulations used by 
the DPR include: Regulation 25 and 36 of the Petroleum (Drilling and Production); 
Regulation 43 (3) of the Petroleum Refining 1974 Regulation; Regulation 17(3) of the Oil 
Pipeline Ordinance Cap 145 of 1956 as amended by Oil Pipeline’s Act 1965) (DPR, 2002, p. 
133).  
 
In 1979, DPR organised an international seminar held in Rivers State on reducing the impact 
of oil pollution, entitled ‘The Oil Industry and the Niger Delta environment’ (Osuno, 1981 p. 
25). The seminar was attended by representatives of multinational oil companies, national 
agencies, non-governmental organisations and related international organisations. It also 
recorded tangible progress, with recommendations as follows: enactment of relevant 
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legislations with attendant penalties and establishment of internationally standard oil field 
practices to minimise oil spillage; setting aside a fraction of oil revenue for funding oil and 
gas related research; and upgrading the Environmental Division of Federal Ministry of 
Housing and Environment among others (Osuno, 1981). The effects of these 
recommendations include the enactment of Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the 
Petroleum Industry in Nigeria in 1991; a fully-fledged Ministry of Environment in 1999 and 
the establishment of Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF) in 2000 to develop 
manpower in the Nigerian oil and gas sector.   
  
On the basis of these initial activities as earlier mentioned, DPR developed the Environmental 
Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria in 1991. These were 
originally set out in sections 8, 25, and 36 of the Petroleum Act 1969. Subsequently, the 
guideline was released in 1991, updated in 1999 and reformulated in 2002 (DPR, 2002) with 
objectives to: 
 Ensure environmental quality control, and taking into account existing local 
conditions, and the planned monitoring programme; 
 Provide a comprehensive integrated document on pollution abatement technology, 
guidelines, and standards for the NMOGS; 
 Standardise the environmental pollution abatement and monitoring procedures, 
including, the analytical methods for various parameters (DPR, 2002, p. 1). 
  
In effect, therefore, DPR was responsible for putting in place the first national system of 
environmental guidelines for monitoring, revocation of licences and leases, sanctions, 
compensation, and issuance of some interim guidelines on waste discharge to underpin 
effective EIA in practice (DPR, 2002). 
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5.5.2 The role of the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMENV) 
 
The Federal Environmental Protection Agency, established under Decree No. 58 (1988) 
(Nwafor, 2006; Ogunba, 2004; Udotong, 2003), became FEMNV in 1999 (Adeyinka et al., 
2005). FMENV has responsibility for the formulation and implementation of environmental 
regulations (for example EIA) in Nigeria in line with section 60 of the EIA Act (Makinde and 
Adegoke, 2008; Nwafor, 2006; Oil Spill Response of the National Action Co-ordinating 
Committee Report, 2000). The FEMNV carries out oil and gas related EIA through its 
Department of Environmental Assessment, Oil and Gas Division.  
 
FMENV has two subsidiary executive agencies, National Environmental Standards 
Regulations and Enforcement Agency (NESREA established in 2007) and National Oil Spill 
Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA set up in 2006). NESREA is responsible for the 
enforcement of environmental laws, guidelines, policies, standards and regulations nationally. 
NOSDRA has put in place different measures towards achieving effective EIA in the oil 
industry. These include generating environmental sensitivity index maps, emergency 
response services, and national oil spill planning among other activities (NOSDRA Gazette, 
2006). State-level Ministries and local authorities operate under FMENV (Lagos State 
Gazette, 1997).  
 
Beyond EIA procedure, FMENV works towards achieving the goals of the National Policy 
on Environment (NPE). The NPE aims to achieve sustainable development through specific 
environmental principles. These include the precautionary, polluter pays, intergenerational, 
and intra-generational equity principles (FEPA, 1998 p. 1-2). Furthermore, the NPE 
emphasises the need for public participation (Nwafor, 2006). In theory, the scope of NPE was 
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broadened through the Environmental Renewal and Development Initiative in 1999, designed 
to take full account of the country’s natural resource base, including examination of 
mitigation strategies designed to proffer a solution through mitigation measures to the 
country’s environmental degradation (Nwafor, 2006). 
 
Secondary goals of the NPE are to:    
 Secure a clean environment through which health and well-being are made available 
to all Nigerians; 
 Conserve the environment and natural resources for the benefit of present and future 
generations; 
 Raise public awareness and promote the need for essential linkage between 
environment and development; 
 Encourage community participation on environmental-related issues; and 
 Enhance co-operation with other countries and international agencies, to achieve 
effective prevention of environmental pollution (Nwafor, 2006, p. 573; Udotong, 
2003, p. 402; FEPA, 1998, p. 2). 
 
NPE also provides provision for the establishment of a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan 
(NOSCP), which is written in compliance with the International Convention on Oil Pollution 
Preparedness Response and Cooperation (OPRC) 1990. The NOSCP acknowledged three 
levels of planning: Tier 1, 2 and 3 (Oil Spill Response of the Nation Action Co-ordinating 
Committee Report, 2000). Tier 1 concerns response to minor incidents (1 to less than 7 
tonnes), with responses carried out by the responsible polluter. Tier 2 covers large incidents 
(up to 700 tonnes), and the plan (cooperative plan) is carried out by the polluter responsible 
and others; for example, bodies such as the Clean Nigeria Association has been very effective 
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in this regard. Lastly, Tier 3 addresses major incidents (disastrous oil spills greater than 700 
tonnes), with action taken by the government and other related bodies; collective effort is 
required.   
 
5.5.3 The role of the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency 
 
NIMASA, formerly Nigeria Maritime Authority (NMA) was established under a separate Act 
of Parliament in 2007. As its name implies, NIMASA is the national agency responsible for 
maritime pollution incidents and implementation of related international conventions in the 
sector. The agency is presently under the Ministry of Transport, and is charged with a variety 
of policy roles and functions including: 
(i) Control and prevent maritime or marine pollution;  
(ii) Port and maritime flag state duties;  
(iii) Provision of maritime security;  
(iv) Development of shipping legislation and regulatory matters relating to merchant 
shipping and seafarers; and  
(v) Procedures for the implementations of International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
conventions among other functions (NIMASA, 2010).  
 
NIMASA liaises with relevant international organisations including the IMO and ratified 
international conventions such as Oil Pollution Preparedness Response and Cooperation 
(OPRC) 1990 and the international convention for Civil Liability on Oil Pollution (CLC) 
1996. The agency enforces marine pollution laws under domestic legislation and international 
conventions for the prevention of pollution from ships (MARPOL 73/78).  
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The Agency’s duties are now discharged through two departments: the Marine Pollution 
Prevention and the Marine Pollution Control. The Nigerian Government has recently 
provided the agency with additional facilities (Archibong, 2009), to ensure that it is fully 
prepared for any environmental problems.  
 
I have further reviewed the Egyptian EIA system to identify the similarities and differences 
between the country and the Nigerian EIA, considering the fact that Egypt is seen as a nation 
where civilisation began and also they have long history of oil exploitation just like Nigeria. 
For the purpose of clarity I describe the similarities and differences between the two countries 
in tabular form (See Table 5.8) relying on literatures and predominantly the work of Badr 
(2009); Ameyan (2008); Ogunba (2004) and Olokesusi (1998) works mainly. In comparing 
the two countries’ EIA system, I focus on legal aspects including the type of sanction in 
place, administrative issues, and procedural frameworks among other issues following 
Marara et al. (2011) suggestion.   
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Table 5.8 Similarities and Differences between the NMOGS’s EIA and the Egyptian EIA 
systems   
Components Nigeria Egypt  
Legal FMENV EIA was 
institutionalised in 1992, 
which became operational in 
1995. While the DPR EIA was 
established in 1991, in this 
way, the country operate dual 
EIA systems 
EIA was established in 1994 
and it entered into force in 
1995. The country operates 
single EIA system.   
Amendment of law The FMENV EIA system was 
reviewed and amended in 
2010, and the DPR EIA 
system was reviewed in 2002 
The Egyptian EIA was 
reviewed and amended in 
2005 
Sanction Projects that are carried out 
without EIA pays fine 
Projects without EIA are 
stopped until EIA is 
conducted on such project. 
Review process and period 
of grace for participation 
21 days  Formerly 60 days but now it 
has been reduced to 30 days 
Decision-making process  Even though the country 
encourages voting, the system 
still remain undemocratic as 
agency representation is 
unequally distributed       
Equal representation from 
each related agency that is one 
representative from each 
agency  
Accreditation of 
Consultants 
Both FEMNV and DPR 
certified consultants  
Only the EIA central 
Department certified 
consultants in Egypt.  
EIA time frame Even though there is no 
licensing system in place in 
Nigeria, but delay is 
evidenced because binary EIA 
systems exist  
The Egyptian EIA system also 
witnessed delay mainly 
because licensing system was 
in place. 
Provision for SEA No provision for SEA No provision for SEA 
 
Source: Badr, 2009; Ameyan, 2008; Nwafor, 2006; Ogunba, 2004; Olokesusi, 2000, 1998 
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5.6. Conclusion 
 
It appears that successive Nigerian governments and the oil industry’s failure to address 
environmental management over oil extraction have become one of the primary sources of 
domestic insecurity in the country. This is because of the resulting negative impacts on the 
environment and the health and well-being of people in particular, stemming from negligence 
of oil companies in addressing issues of environmental pollution.  
 
In light of the pronounced environmental problems in the sector as discussed in section 5.3, I 
have outlined the two forms of EIA systems in the NMOGS, together with the role of 
government implementation agencies, what they seek to achieve and how they intend to 
achieve effective implementation. The chapter has demonstrated that the NMOGS’s EIA 
style seems to be reactive and conflictual as evidenced in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2. More 
generally, policy style can be categorised into reactive versus proactive and consensual 
versus conflictual styles (Jordan et al., 2003a; Richardson et al., 1982; Dyson, 1982; Putten, 
1982). Moreover, on one hand, the sector’s EIA style is reactive in nature, because there 
might be no EIA in the sector but for a succession of large-scale oil pollution incidents. On 
the other hand, the sector’s EIA style appears conflictual because of the ‘twin track’ EIA 
systems that exist, which potentially can result in conflict if not properly managed. It is in this 
context that policy implementation theories are applied in the next 3 chapters to interrogate 
the NMOGS’s EIA systems. This is in line with Richardson (1996, p. 20) argument that 
because of ‘the complexity...of the policy process we must learn to live with multiple models 
and learn to utilise concepts from a range of models in order to at least accurately describe 
the policy process’. 
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Though mitigation compliance monitoring and public participation among other EIA 
implementation stages have been embraced by the FMENV mainly to achieve effective EIA 
implementation, it has not yet been ascertained whether they are coherent and integrated in 
their approach to environmental challenges. Subsequently, the next chapter assesses the 
NMOGS’s EIA implementation processes through key stages: mitigation compliance 
monitoring and public participation, including an examination of their effectiveness via 
political, social and economic factors. This is necessary to explore whether and how the 
national EIA system is coherent and integrated in its approach to the mitigation of negative 
environmental effects.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ASSESSING THE NMOGS’s EIA IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH KEY STAGES 
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
In order to attend to the first main objective of this thesis, the chapter explores the extent to 
which the NMOGS’s EIA has been translated into practice through key implementation 
stages: mitigation compliance monitoring and public participation. This is necessary because 
EIA in theory provides for mitigation of negative environmental effects of development, and 
direct public engagement. The empirical basis for this chapter is constituted by published EIA 
reports for the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) and Tank Farm projects (by multinational 
and national oil companies respectively).    
 
The chapter aims to address the key research question of the thesis (‘to what extent has the 
NMOGS’s EIA been translated into practice through public participation’ and ‘which 
mitigation measures have been implemented as result of previous EIA practice’). These 
questions are in line with Petts (1999d: 6) suggestion regarding the need for researchers to 
investigate ‘whether EIA is fulfilling potential or wasting opportunity’. Implementation is 
described as one of the essential stages of policy processes (deLeon and deLeon, 2002; 
Davies, 1980) though of course there is no guarantee it will be successful (McCool, 1995). 
Understanding implementation stages is one of the main priorities of policy implementation 
studies (Spicker, 2006). Moreover ‘implementation failure occurs because of technical 
problems... and problems occur because of misunderstanding...or lack of effective monitoring 
strategy to control and sanction deviant behaviour’ (Matland, 1995: 161). 
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The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 6.1 introduces the chapter. Section 6.2 
identifies EIA success stories, including the extent to which oil industry have been 
responding to EIA in practice. Section 6.3 describes the six selected EIA reports used in this 
research, including their mitigation measures in order to identify the main irregularities and 
lack of compliance noted at different periods. Building upon the findings of section 6.3, in 
section 6.4 I examine the EIA failure through mitigation compliance monitoring and public 
participation requirements, using a case study of irregularities in the WAGP and Tank Farm 
projects. This enables me to identify the extent to which EIA implementation has deviated 
from fulfilling its potential focusing on multinational and indigenous oil company projects. 
Section 6.5 then unpacks the reasons for lack of compliance, and section 6.6 concludes the 
entire chapter.    
 
As with other policy instruments and mechanisms, it is widely argued that there are 
compliance gaps in EIA (Alemagi et al., 2007; Wood, 2003; Olokesusi, 1999; Kakonge, 
1999; for other policy tools, see Carley, 2011; Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002; Arts et al., 
2001; Richardson, et al., 1982; Jordan and Richardson, 1982). In particular, in Nigeria ‘in 
practice, EIA is hardly as rational as it ought to be’ (Olokesusi, 1999: 9), a situation which 
also pertains to Cameroon (Alemagi, et al., 2007), with Africa more generally (Kakonge, 
1999), and in other developing countries (Wood, 2003b). Clearly, the EIA process is central 
to EIA practice, and it should be consistent with both requirement and good practice 
standards beyond any theoretical understanding (Lawrence, 2001). It is the ‘real world’ 
application of EIA in the NMOGS that is the empirical focus of this chapter.  
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6.2. EIA successes 
 
This section examines implementation successes and the achievements that have been 
recorded in the sector through the previous EIA reports and practices. As deLeon (1999: 329) 
has suggested, ‘there is no reason to focus most on exceptional failure...but it does seem 
essential to include both sides of the implementation coin in order to observe and learn from 
the variation rather than almost exclusively from failed implementations’. Similarly, a study 
by Jordan et al. (1998: 1403) has indicated that ‘top down view helps us understand why and 
to what extent particular aspect of policies are implemented...seeing the definition of policy 
and implementation as essentially unproblematic and concentrating upon one particular 
policy rather than the wider context within which the whole policy process takes place’.     
 
Most of my interviewees felt that one of the key successes in the sector is that specific 
environmental guidelines are in place so as to act as a template to be followed in practice 
towards achieving effective EIA implementation in the future. According to Matland (1995: 
161) ‘as the actors are stable over time, they develop standard operating procedures to 
expedite their work’. McLauglin (1987) maintains that part of the achievements in policy 
arena is having a guideline in form of status with clear goal.  
 
Another noticeable success in the sector is that the number of oil and gas projects registered 
for the EIA process has increased. This implies that more projects have been subjected to the 
EIA process compared with when the sector’s EIA became operational in 1995. The 
statement from one of the principal officers of the FMENV ‘KV’ confirms the extent to 
which the sector is making positive progress.  
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‘I want to assure you that we have gone a long way since 1995 to date and over 
1000 projects have been subjected to EIA and majority are coming from oil and 
gas’ (Interview with KV FMENV, Programme Group 3rd September 2010). 
 
 
The secondary evidence also confirms that more projects have been registered for EIA in the 
sector. For example, the country has conducted 1009 EIAs (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1) 
There is a significant difference between the numbers of projects subjected to EIA process in 
the country in 1995 (only 8 projects) and in 2009 (180 projects).  
 
Table 6.1 Number of Previously Registered Projects that have received EIA Approval in the 
Country from 1995-2009          
         
Year Number of projects 
registered  
Number of approvals 
 
Number of rejections 
 
1995 8 5 3 
1996 6 6 0 
1997 11 11 0 
1998 24 22 2 
1999 50 28 22 
2000 51 19 32 
2001 66 28 38 
2002 70 31 39 
2003 49 37 12 
2004 66 34 32 
2005 95 73 22 
2006 101 59 42 
2007 141 51 90 
2008 140 47 93 
2009 180 60 120 
Total 1009 511 498 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2010  
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Figure 6.1 Number of Previously Registered Projects that have received EIA Approval in the  
 
Country from 1995-2009 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2010     
 
 
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 not only give a clearer picture of the number of projects registered 
so far, but they also show the number of approvals granted. The sudden increase in the 
number of EIA approvals in 1999 is due mainly to the fact that the country returned to a 
Civilian Government after another long-stay of military rule (1984-1999). This brought about 
freedom of speech, which gave non-governmental organisations (such as Environmental 
Rights Action among others) the ability and confidence to challenge oil industries and 
sensitised local communities on the need for EIA. This is evident from the statement below:-  
‘From 1999 to date we have been enjoying the Civilian Government rule, hence  
the Non-Governmental Organisations like Environmental Rights Action have 
greater freedom to operate in more organised way...sensitising local communities 
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on their right even beyond EIA’ (Interview with PP Environmental Rights Action, 
Control Group 24
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Federal Ministry of Environment was established in 
the same year (1999) with a new mandate to upgrade the country’s National Policy on 
Environment and ensure effective coordination of all environmental matters. FMENV was 
not only prepared to deliver its mandates from that year (1999), but also intended to convince 
Nigerians that the Ministry is up to the task and ready to justify their existence. Importantly, 
the extreme increase in the number of projects rejected in the sector stands as an additional 
achievement, which is pointing towards some levels of efficiency. However, this might not 
guarantee the effectiveness of number of EIAs as approved by the Government Implementing 
Agencies through mitigation compliance monitoring and public participation for examples, 
and this is explored through subsequent sections.                     
 
The main reason why the oil companies have been subjecting their projects to EIA process is 
because of the heightened level of public awareness. However, the Egyptian EIA system still 
requires a more sophisticated environmental awareness (Badr, 2009). According to one of the 
principal officers in the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, ‘the level of awareness from year 
2000 and now the local communities have greatly improved and you cannot go to any 
community and start work without EIA. They will stop you’ (Interview with FO Ministry of 
Niger Delta Affairs, Programme Group 3
rd
 September 2010). This implies that the situation in 
the sector has moved away from ‘a business as usual’ scenario, and demonstrated in the 
following statement:-   
‘There is awareness creation, which is very deep and not just business as 
usual...there is improvement after enactment of EIA in 1992’ (Interview with BE 
Waste Management Society of Nigeria, Control Group 25
th
 August 2010). 
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In addition to the above, many (38) that is 68% interviewees noted that the sector has 
recorded some levels of achievement particularly in the area of identifying appropriate 
mitigation measures for ameliorating specific environmental problems compared with the 
earlier period of neglect. This is evident from the statement below:-  
 
‘...EIA process has helped...because it identifies potential impact that activities 
will do. It also outlines some sets of mitigation measures...and oil industries has 
come to know that mitigation measures is like an agreement signed, which must to 
be implemented (Interview with PL Academic, Control Group 16
th
 September 
2010) 
 
 
However, as Cashmore (2004: 404) maintains ‘EIA achievements appear most favourable 
when compared with past neglects and failings, rather than when measured against 
sustainable development goals’. This is precisely the situation in the NMOGS, where EIA 
implementation has failed against its long-term goal and can only be successful when 
compared with past neglect. Moreover, raising awareness does equate with effective 
implementation. This is evident from the statement below:   
‘EIA has helped in…sensitising oil and gas sector’s operators... though you may 
think about enforcement that is another issue entirely’ (Interview with DG Waste 
Management Society of Nigeria, Control Group 29
th
 August 2010).  
 
In the next section, I describe the multinational and indigenous oil and gas companies’ EIA 
report, a case study of West African Gas Pipeline and tank farm projects in order to place the 
subsequent section (EIA failures) in a proper context.    
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6.3. Description of the selected EIA reports and their findings 
 
 
In Nigeria, EIA reports are written to reflect the content of the country’s EIA procedures and 
guidelines. Even though preparing EIA reports vary from country to country, they are largely 
determined by national legislation and the quality of EIA procedures. EIA reports are written 
generally to provide a clear statement of the potential impacts and their mitigation measures 
(Saeed et al., 2012). Nonetheless, a study by Barker and Wood (1999) has confirmed that 
EIA reports have been hindered due to lapses in the nature of legal requirements, experience 
of the consultants and competent authorities, and the length of the report itself among others. 
My intention at this point is not to expose the challenges related to EIA reports but rather to 
describe the selected EIA reports used in this research in order to examine the effectiveness 
of EIA implementation in this section (general in 6.3.3 and 6.3.4) later on and in the 
subsequent section (that is in 6.4, by using specific case studies). 
 
This section describes the six selected EIA reports used in this research (3 for multinational 
oil companies and 3 for indigenous oil companies), highlighting their mitigation measures in 
order to identify procedural irregularities and lack of compliance that might have occurred at 
different periods. The selected multinational projects are West Africa Gas Pipeline, Oil 
Prospecting Lease 286 Block, and Agbami Oil Prospecting Lease 216 and 217 (all located 
offshore). The selected indigenous projects are Petroleum Tank Farm, Petroleum Delivery 
System and Liquefied Petroleum Gas storage terminal (both offshore and onshore). In order 
for me to focus on the case studies, I describe both the West African Gas Pipeline and Tank 
Farm projects in more detail. Moreover, there are two additional reasons why more emphasis 
is given to both the WAGP and tank farm projects. First, the WAGP is an example of a 
multinational oil and gas project, while the Tank Farm installation is basically carried out by 
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indigenous oil and gas operators. The second is that both projects were widely cited as key 
developments requiring environmental mitigation in Nigeria according to interviewees. Based 
on this, I concentrate on Nigeria’s experience, as WAGP involves other countries such as 
Ghana, Togo and Benin.   
 
6.3.1 Description of the 3 selected multinational oil company projects   
 
(A) West African Gas Pipeline Project 
 
Like any other oil and gas-related project, the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) is owned 
by specific proponents. The main proponent of this project is West African Gas Pipeline 
Company Limited (WAPCo). As part of the plan to achieve effective project performance, in 
2003, WAPCo decided to partner with other multinational oil companies nationally 
(Chevron, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, Shell), and internationally (Societe 
Beninoise De Gaz in Benin, Societe Togolaise de Gaz in Togo, and Volta River Authority in 
Ghana). In this way, WAGP project has the tendency of enhancing cooperation among 
countries involved in the project.         
 
The WAGP project originates in Itoki, Nigeria, where it connects to an existing natural gas 
system at the Alagbado (Nigeria) facility, traverses the Nigeria coastline, and then runs 
offshore to a distribution terminal near Takoradi, Ghana and beyond (Cotonou, Benin; Lome, 
Togo; and Tema, Ghana) (WAGP Report, 2004 and see Figure 6.2). WAGP project is also a 
high-pressure capacity system and built to transport 190 million standards cubic feet per day. 
The WAGP project is designed to transport natural gas from Nigeria to Benin, Ghana, and 
Togo through a constructed 620 kilometres long pipeline. Importantly, in Nigeria, the WAGP 
- 142 - 
 
project aims to bring to an end gas flaring, which will in turn reduce air pollution. Embarking 
on this type of project is in line with the World Bank plan to eliminate flaring of gas 
worldwide through ‘Global Flare Reduction Initiative’.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 West African Gas Pipeline Project Areas    
 
Source: West Africa Gas Pipeline EIA Report, 2004: ES 3 
 
 
One of the main findings of WAGP is that the potential benefits of the project in Nigeria 
outweigh the potential negative impacts. Even though the project is associated with 71 
potential impacts, they can be ameliorated through mitigation measures, as recommended in 
the WAGP EIA report in Appendix 4 (general). However, of these 71 potential impacts, only 
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12 that are closely pertinent to this research are reported alongside their mitigated measures 
(See Table 6.2 showing specific impacts relating to construction and operational stages). 
Saeed et al. (2012) describes mitigation measures that address what is to be done at the 
construction and operation stages as an example of best practice, the quality that most 
developing countries EIA reports do not possess (giving example in Pakistan’s EIA report). 
Furthermore, the WAGP project Environmental Plan describes the connection between 
applicable regulatory requirements and organisational responsibilities and regulatory 
monitoring organisational roles. The proponents and Government agencies in Nigeria are 
then expected to perform the monitoring activities as outlined in Table 6.3. Though 
monitoring is needed to ensure that mitigation measures are implemented, it should be carried 
out at construction, post construction and operation stages according to the WAGP project’s 
EIA report. Importantly, the WAGP project gives recognition to adequate stakeholders’ 
consultation (the opportunity to interact and educate the local communities) on pros and cons 
of natural gas and pipelines. I have shown in Table 6.4 the consultation summary of WAGP 
project with individual stakeholders.  
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Table 6.2 WAGP specific mitigation measures in relation to construction and operation 
stages 
Potential impact Project activity Planned mitigation 
Changes in air quality, 
noise and vibration 
Construction 
/operation 
Train staff in human and environment 
protection. 
Implement appropriate operational 
controls/procedures (such as Air Emissions 
Management, Contractor Management, 
Compliance and Permitting) 
Impacts to wetlands, 
forests, streams, lagoons, 
barrier island, and gulf 
waters habitats 
Construction  Avoid sensitive receptors in site and route 
design. Observe protective perimeters around 
steep and erosion-sensitive gradients, water 
supply basins, and wet areas. 
Avoid deforestation or other vegetation 
losses and/or reinstate vegetation. 
Conserve and reuse topsoil during the burial 
of the pipe, coordinate the work with other 
land users. 
Perform reinstatement and at the end of the 
work – clean and return the elements of the 
environment that were affected to their 
original condition. 
Implement appropriate operational 
controls/procedures such as Compliance and 
Permitting, Turtle Nest Production, Wetland 
Construction Methods, and Prevention of Salt 
Water Intrusion. 
Disruption of community 
activities, impairment of 
maritime traffic, and 
perturbation of fishing 
Construction Disruption of community activities, 
impairment of maritime traffic, and 
perturbation of fishing 
Adverse health risk to 
general population and 
construction workers due 
to hazardous material spill 
in a densely populated 
area or form other mishaps 
associated with 
installation of pipeline 
Construction  Formulate an emergency action plan in 
coordination with the interested authorities in 
the event of an accidental spill during the 
construction and operational phases. 
Train staff in human and environment 
protection. 
Implement appropriate operational 
controls/procedures (such as External 
Communications, Emergency Response, Spill 
Prevention and Control, Loss Prevention 
Design Basis, and Contractor Management). 
Adverse health risk to 
general population and 
construction workers due 
to gas leak from the 
pipeline 
Operation  Same as immediately above. 
 
Source: West African Gas Pipeline, 2004: ES 20- ES22 
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Table 6.3 Regulatory monitoring organisational roles   
 
Aspect to be monitored Frequency  
Sanitary and Other Waste Effluent 
for Vessels and Onshore Facilities 
Upon discharge from holding tank 
Nuisance Noise Levels Monitoring monthly or as needed during 
extremely noisy construction operations 
Salt Water Intrusion Weekly until one month following construction 
Waste Characterization  For each waste item when initially 
encountered during segregation and annually 
thereafter 
Surface Water Uptake and Discharge 
of Untreated Hydro-test Water 
 Before uptake and once per day during 
pipeline filling; before discharge and once per 
day during discharge 
Ambient Air Quality at Compressor 
Station 
 
 
Annually for the first 2 years during normal 
operations for screening purposes and daily 
during a complete station blow-down (flaring) 
Groundwater Usage near 
Compressor Station and R&M 
Stations 
Two times per year (1 each in wet and dry 
seasons) for 5 years; Annually following 5 
years 
Proper burial and support of the  
offshore pipeline (where it is buried) 
Dependant on the burial study results 
Population Build-up or 
Encroachment 
Quarterly 
 
 
Source: West African Gas Pipeline, 2004: (8) 17-(8)21 
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Table 6.4 Summary of WAGP consultation by individual stakeholders 
 
 
Stakeholder Group Stakeholder Name No. of 
Consultations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Communities 
Ajido Community 2 
Baale OF Ewupe Community 1 
Baale of Owode Community 1 
Badagry Community 3 
Baoole Imeke 1 
Communities along ROW 1 
Igbessa Community 3 
Ijoko/Itoki Community 6 
Iworo Arojomo Community 1 
Lagos Community 1 
Ore-Akinde Community 1 
Otta Community 3 
Tori-Lovi Community 1 
Govt Parliaments Federal House of Representatives 2 
Government Agencies 
(Ministries, Local 
Government and so on) 
Ado-Odo Local Government 1 
Department of Petroleum Resources 1 
Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources  1 
Government Officials 1 
Lagos State Fire Service 2 
Trade & Industry Leaders Manufacturers Association of Nigeria (MAN) 2 
 
 
Source: West African Gas Pipeline, 2004: (5)-136 
 
 
 
(B) Oil Prospecting Lease 286 offshore project 
 
 
BG Exploration and Production Nigeria Limited (BGEPNL) is the technical operator of 
offshore block Oil Prospecting Lease (OPL) 286 with Sahara Energy and Production Limited 
and Equinox as co-venture, with BGEPNL owning highest share of the project (66%). One of 
the reasons why EIA was carried on this project was to develop cost effective mitigation 
measures together with plans and procedures for management of environmental issues in all 
phases of the proposed project implementation. This project identified two major drilling 
operation related impacts, including the risk of well blows and disturbance of the entire 
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offshore ecosystem. A range of mitigation measures were proposed based on this; involving 
well drilling profiles designed to minimise blow-outs, and a continuous consultation with key 
stakeholders and local communities to prevent conflict. This explains the use of Sedco 702 (a 
drilling ship with dynamic positioning) to reduce the impacts on seabed perturbation. Finally, 
the proponents mentioned that they will use experienced personnel during the operation. 
      
(C)   Agbami Oil Prospecting Lease 216 and 217 offshore      
 
Star Deep Water Petroleum Limited, Famfa Oil, Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, 
Petrobras, Statoil and Texaco are the proponents of Agbami offshore project. The project is 
located approximately 110 km southwest in Nigeria and covers mobile offshore drilling, 
installation of sub-sea production and an offloading terminal crude oil to tankers (See Figure 
6.3 and 6.4 respectively). Agbami offshore project aims to contribute to Nigeria’s oil reserves 
mainly. The project envisaged oil spills from unplanned events discharged from produced 
water, and air emissions as major impacts, which might have greater consequences on sea 
environment. Then, part of mitigation measures in the case of oil spills is to ensure that 
Floating Production Storage Offloading (FPSO) crude oil storage tanks are located in-board 
of the ballast tank and lifting and handling practices should be embraced to avoid any object 
from dropping. Finally, flare knock-out drums should be used to prevent emissions.            
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Figure 6.3: The Agbami Floating Production Storage Offloading (FPSO) 
 
Source www.offshore-technology.com/project/agbami3.html accessed on 19/5/20012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: The Agbami oil field in OPL 216  
 
Source www.offshore-technology.com/project/agbami2.html accessed on 19/5/2012 
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6.3.2 Description of the 3 selected indigenous oil company projects 
 
 
(A) Petroleum Tank Farm  
 
Lister Oil Limited is the proponent of petroleum tank farm otherwise called oil storage 
facility. Petroleum tanks farm is used to store petroleum products such as premium motor 
spirit and automotive oil. The project is situated at Apapa, which is urban part of Lagos State, 
where several other tank farms are situated (see Figure 6.5). It is designed to help the 
Nigerian Government put an end to scarcity of petroleum products in the country.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Tank Farm in Apapa Lagos State 
 
Source: Fieldwork, 2010  
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It is clear from Figure 6.5 that operational activities of this type of project could generate 
negative impacts: their main features and associated mitigation measures are described in 
Table 6.5. Moreover, like multinational oil company projects, the indigenous oil company 
projects also consider public participation according to Lister Oil tank farm EIA report.    
  
Table 6.5 Potential Impacts and mitigation measures for tank farm 
 
Description of Impacts Mitigation Measures 
Reduction in biodiversity/Loss 
of flora and fauna 
- Site clearing shall commence from developed to 
underdeveloped areas to provide escape routes for 
wildlife 
- Encourage the contractor to re-vegetate land cleared for 
temporary use where feasible 
Reduction in air quality, 
fugitive emissions from 
products storage tanks, 
combustion exhaust from 
machines 
- All flanges and vents shall be properly tightened to 
minimize fugitive emissions 
- All system shall be regularly checked to ensure that 
there are no leakages and losses 
- All machinery, equipment and vehicles for the project 
shall have high efficiency burners to reduce emission of 
noxious gases 
Solid waste generation-impact 
on existing waste disposal 
facility. This might lead to 
contamination of 
solid/groundwater as well as 
Lagoon 
- Put in place waste reduction strategy 
- Runoff from the stockpile of wastes shall be prevented from 
flowing into the Lagoon 
Health & safety- 
injury/fatalities in workforce 
communities 
- Ensure safety awareness training for workforce 
- Emergency response procedures shall be put in place 
and enforced 
- Use of PPE shall be ensured 
Increase in respiratory diseases 
and Communicable  disease 
- Personnel on site shall wear nose masks during (dusty) 
operations 
- Water shall be sprayed on construction site to reduce 
dust levels 
- Assist community based training on the prevention of 
common communicable diseases, water 
protection/purification techniques and basic sanitation 
Increase in noise nuisance - Plan activities such as that Regulatory limits are not to 
be exceeded 
- Control the area situated outside the plant fence to 
prevent permanent settling of people in an area 
especially where limits may be exceeded 
Source: Lister Oil, 2008: 150-155 
(B) Petroleum Delivery System 
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Oando Public Limited Company is the proponent of the Petroleum Delivery System. The 
purpose of this project is to deliver petroleum products from Single Point Mooring (SPM) in 
the open sea to the marketers’ jetties in Apapa Lagos State. The project identified several 
impacts that are related to water resources, air quality, geology, socio-economic noise and 
vibration among others. Petroleum Delivery System EIA report then recommends that noise 
barriers should be erected to minimise noise pollution, and reduction of depletion is 
suggested to reduce wastage and improve socio-economic.        
 
(C) Liquefied Petroleum Gas Project 
 
Linetrale Gas Limited is the proponent of liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) storage terminal, 
with major three components. First is the LPG storage terminal, and second is the product 
transfer sub-sea pipeline and third is the LPG truck loading facility. The project aims to 
provide adequate supply of LPG to Nigerians residing in Lagos State in particular.  Like most 
other storage facilities projects, this project is situated in Apapa Lagos State. Due to the 
strategic location of Nigerian Port Authority in Apapa, most proponents of petroleum storage 
facilities prefer to site their projects in the same locality rather than elsewhere in Nigeria. The 
major impacts related to this project are as follows. Noise emissions, air quality, toxic 
emissions and generation of waste, but they can be mitigated. For example, LPG storage 
terminal EIA report recommends that adequate personnel protective equipment (face mask 
and hearing protection should be provided. The proponent should ensure that the facility 
operate under optimum condition to minimise emissions.  
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6.3.3 Main EIA irregularities identified at different periods 
 
‘...the purpose of EIA is not to stop any project, as there is no project that is not 
good provided you put the necessary mitigation in place’ (Interview with ME 
FMENV, Programme Group 16
th
 August 2010). However, failing to implement 
adequately the...mitigation as set out in the assessment is a generic problem that 
all impact assessment practitioners struggle with daily (Goodland, 2005, p. 6).   
 
Having described the EIA reports in the NMOGS, their findings and how they plan to prevent 
environmental difficulties. At this point, I would identify the main irregularity related to the 
EIA implementation in the NMOGS as being situated at the nexus of mitigation measures, on 
the one hand, and public participation, on the other.  
 
It has been argued that part of the purpose of EIA is to improve effective environmental 
monitoring (Ogbara, 2010). Monitoring should focus not only on formal compliance, but also 
on environmental objectives (Beunen et al., 2009). The purpose of monitoring ‘is to ensure 
that the action stick firmly to the conditions of its approval’ (Wood, 2003a, p. 242). In 
Nigeria and the NMOGS in particular, the objectives of EIA impact mitigation monitoring 
are to: 
 Check that mitigation measures are implemented appropriately. 
 Determine whether environmental changes are as a result of project developments 
and/or natural variation. 
  Monitor emissions and discharges at all stages of project development for 
compliance with regulatory standards. 
 Determine the effectiveness of environmental management plans, environmental 
monitoring plans and act as a feedback mechanism towards improving the EIA 
evaluation and approval process. 
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 Create a data bank for future development of predictive tools (Ameyan, 2008: 9).   
 
However, it appears that EIA has not been fully translated into practice in the NMOGS 
through the content of mitigation measures (the entire participants agree that to this 
statement that is 100% also see appendix 2c under barriers to EIA). This is evident from 
the quote below:   
‘In Nigeria we are not enforcing anything...because mitigation is not put into 
consideration...it was not sustainable and not a developmental issues’ (Interview 
with BE Waste Management Society of Nigeria, Control Group 25
th
 August 
2010). 
 
One of the leading figures in the NGO Environmental Rights Action described the issue of 
non-compliance and the lack of value attached to the environment by oil companies, noting 
that: 
‘...when operators drill in a site and no oil was found...the normal thing is that 
after drilling...is to cap it back...if they cannot find oil...but operators never cap it 
back’ (Interview with MH NGO Environmental Right Action, Control Group 8th 
September 2010).  
 
The consequence of this failure is capping off the well head, resulting in that aquatic life will 
be destroyed in large number, as toxic gases are released from the uncapped well. Another 
form of irregularities in the NMOGS is continuous gas flaring, which is against the content of 
mitigation measures plan, as prescribed by oil companies.  
‘...EIA suppose to help in improving the state of environment in Nigeria if it is 
done right...what you will see in the Niger Delta for example is gas flaring...’ 
(Interview with PP NGO Environmental Right Action, Control Group 24
th
 August 
2010). 
 
This implies that the Nigerian oil companies are still flaring gas, considering the fact 
eliminating gas flaring has many potential benefits (Amanze, 2011; Ogbara, 2010; 
Akiri, 2010a & b; Morris, 2010; Nwachukwu 2010; Friends of the Earth International, 
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2004). Okpanachi (2011) maintains that management of petroleum resources will 
provide economic growth and global cooperation. The inability of Nigerian oil company 
projects to put an end to gas flaring clearly contradicts section 3 of Nigeria’s Associated 
Reinjection Act 1979 that became effective since 1984 (Ogbara, 2010; ERA, 2008; 
Nwafor, 2006; Ojo and Gaskiya, 2003). Having discussed the main irregularities related 
to EIA implementation through content of mitigation measures. I now seek to unpack 
the main irregularities related EIA implementation through public participation.    
 
6.3.4 Main irregularities related to the lack of public participation 
 
‘Winds of political liberalization that swept Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s are blowing dramatically across Africa, as 
state-society linkages are in flux, and policy makers are confronted with new 
demands from previously excluded group to participate in the policy processes’ 
(Brinkerhoff, 2002: 81). 
 
Participation has become a paramount concern in environmental management and its 
governance (Wesselink and Paavola, 2011; Chilvers, 2009; Petts 1999c), and it is recognised 
as a fundamental component of the EIA process (Hartley and Wood, 2005). The objective of 
participation in EIA is ‘to improve the quality of environmental decisions by the 
identification of, assignment of significance to, and mitigation of, impacts and the prevention 
of environmentally unacceptable development’ (Wood, 2003a: 275). More generally, 
participation aims to identify the strengths and weaknesses of different mitigation measures 
in place (Beierle, 1999). Illeris (2002) views participation as the most extensive and general 
form of interaction. 
 
Clearly, public involvement in the policy deliberation processes can bring valuable local 
knowledge to EIA process (Petts, 2008) and can also enhance cooperation (Joss, 2010). There 
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is no doubt that public participation is necessary and appropriate, but what matters most is the 
quality of participatory relationships and how those relationships are interconnected 
(Chilvers, 2009; Moore et al., 2005; Petts, 1999c). Therefore, ‘genuine deliberation is 
achieved when participants are ready to consider one another’s interest and engage in 
reflective dialogue through compromise’ (Jones and Caney, 2003: 7).  
 
It has been argued that ‘unmanaged participation or consultation can impede effective 
translation of EIA into practice’ (Brinkerhoff and Cosby, 2002: 9), thus affecting social goals. 
Beierle (1999) identifies key social goals as follows: educating the public; incorporating 
public values, assumption and preference into decision-making; increasing the substantive 
quality of decisions; fostering trust; reducing conflicts; and making decision-making cost 
effective. Participatory approaches have become a recognised method in environmental 
management, but ‘what happens in the real world of environmental policy will ultimately 
depend on how government agencies perform participation’ (Chilvers, 2009: 412).  
 
In the NMOGS, for example, a pipeline that was constructed by one of the indigenous oil 
companies, a subsidiary of Oando Plc failed to conduct public participation. The project has 
not only failed in conducting public participation but also in observing good practice, as the 
pipelines are laid very close to residential homes. 
‘...in Lagos there was a project that was carried out by Indigenous Oil 
Companies...and we asked people questions on what the pipeline will carry they 
said it will carry water...and the Ministry of Environment said that the pipes will 
carry gas, now imagine the public do not know this...’ (Interview with PP NGO 
Environmental Rights Action, Control Group 24
th
 August 2010). 
 
However, even when the local communities participated in the EIA process, their inputs 
and information appear irrelevant according to one interviewee. The interviewee 
continued: 
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‘...the community representatives went to the laboratory and the result shows high 
level of toxicity...final report was published without any input from the 
community representatives...this is the similar situation with the entire oil and gas 
projects, where NGO’s and communities information are not used’ (Interview 
with EL Social Environmental Rights Action, Control Group Centre 27
th
 August 
2010).   
 
The next section gives a more detailed account of irregularities that are related to EIA 
implementation in the NMOGS, paying special attention to West Africa Gas Pipeline 
and tank farm projects.      
 
6.4 EIA failures: a case study of the West African Gas Pipeline and Tank Farm Projects  
 
As was noted above, the West African Gas Pipeline project covers both offshore and onshore 
environment and is operated by a partnership of multinational oil companies (for example, 
Chevron, NNPC, Shell and Volta River Authority among others) formed in May 2003, 
though the main proponent is the West African Gas Pipeline Company Limited (WAGP 
Report, 2004). Alongside this major international pipeline, Nigerian oil companies managed a 
range of onshore related projects, one of the most significant being Petroleum Tank farm 
Storage Facilities. 
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6.4.1 Case study of the West African Gas Pipeline 
 
The EIA failure related to case of West African Gas Pipeline focused on lack of public 
participation. WAGP project has not fully complied with the content of previous EIA reports 
that requires greater public participation. Thus one interviewee commented: 
‘...we have visited WAGP project at the high sea...there was EIA for this project, 
but the communities were not carried along and that is applicable to most oil 
companies’ projects’ (Interview with EL NGO Social Environmental Rights 
Action Control Group Centre 27
th
 August 2010). 
 
WAGP project is an example of multinational oil companies’ project, and one aspect that I 
considered required urgent attention was why the same multinational would comply in other 
national contexts, but not in Nigeria. I explored this issue with one of the professors of 
Geography in University of Nigeria, who believes that operators have not been complying 
with the content of EIA and public participation in particular, ‘because the situation in the 
NMOGS appear to be business as usual’ (PL Academic University of Lagos, Control Group 
16
th
 September 2010).  
 
However, the same WAGP EIA report is now available on the internet after the local people 
protested. But it would have been better if the oil company had conceded this idea before the 
protest. Even though public participation has not been fully integrated through multinational 
oil companies’ project, it is still better than the situation under national oil companies’ 
project, where people do not know what exactly a particular pipeline is meant for (water or 
gas). 
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Despite the numerous NGOs in the sector, lack of adequate public participation still remains 
a major challenge. Following the opinion of a Professor of Geography in University of 
Nigeria, Nsukka, the participant maintains that:- 
‘...the sector’s EIA lacks ‘competence in Social Impact Assessment methodology, 
what we have seen from experience is confounding public participation...’ 
(Interview with PA Academic University of Nigeria, Control Group 6
th
 September 
2010).  
 
 
This amounts to what Hartley and Wood (2005: 333) describe as ‘poor execution of 
participation methods’. There is one problem common to EIA procedures in the developing 
countries context and Pakistan for example, given that ‘methodology applied to public 
participation is not professional’ (Saeed et al., 2012, p. 1914). It appears that the approach 
adopted to public participation in the NMOGS is more top-down rather than bottom-up. 
Matland (1995: 146) emphasises that ‘top-down theorists see policy designers as the central 
actors and concentrate their attention on factors that can be manipulated at the central level 
while the bottom-up theorists...argue policy really is made at the local level’. Without full 
public participation, the NGOs among other non-state actors will not gain the required public 
mandate to operate effectively (Tang, 2003). Moore et al. (2005: 5) argue that more generally 
‘weak participation might encourage bad result and environmental degradation, as local 
people and NGOs for example were not involved from the project conception, design, 
implementation, or evaluation’. The role of NGOs in policy implementation cannot be 
underestimated (Buzar, 2007). In the U.S.A. for example, NGOs have established a potent 
role as ‘whistle blowers’ by reporting any form of violation to the appropriate authorities 
(Porter et al., 2000).  
 
In the NMOGS, most NGOs and local people have been prevented from participating in the 
EIA process, as evidenced by the statement of one interviewee, a representative of the Waste 
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Management Society of Nigeria. ‘...most NGOs are not even carried along...what the country 
needs to work on is attaching a particular project to a particular NGO for supervision’. This 
interviewee continued:-  
‘...getting the real NGOs involved in the EIA process is always difficult...it will be 
difficult for someone working for the Government to criticise the same 
government and he who pays the piper calls the tune’ (Interview with BE Waste 
Management Society of Nigeria, Control Group 25
th
 August 2010).  
 
 
In Nigeria, both Environmental Rights Action (ERA) and Social and Environmental Rights 
Action Centre (SERAC) have been `putting pressure on WAGP proponents on the need for 
their EIA report to be accessible to encourage public participation. This evidence from the 
below statement: 
‘We did a campaign that WAGP EIA report should be put on internet and they 
have done that...you can now see it on World Bank inspection panel site’ 
(Interview with MH NGO Environmental Rights Action, Control Group 8
th
 
September 2010). 
 
 
Apart from the fact that local communities protested before WAGP EIA report was made 
available via the internet as earlier mentioned, the coalition that was later formed between 
ERA and SERAC also accounts for one of the reasons why the WAGP EIA report remains 
accessible. This confirms Matland’s assertion that ‘…the central principle in implementation 
is that local level coalitional strength determines the outcome…identifying the competing 
factions at local level, along with the micro-level contextual factors that affect strengths of 
the competing factions, is central to accurate explanations of policy outcomes’ (Matland, 
1995: 168 & 170).    
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6.4.2 Case study of the Tank Farm Project 
 
The Tank Farm project is an example of a national oil company project – one of many in 
Apapa Lagos State that is urban area of the state. The purpose of the tank farm is to assist in 
the storage and ease the marketing of refined petroleum products, such as automotive gas oil 
and premium motor spirits (Lister Oil, 2008; OANDO, 2008). Some of the tank farm projects 
take their source from the sea installing sub-sea pipeline to transport products between 
storage terminals and truck loading facilities (Linetrale, 2008). The EIA failure related to 
case study of tank farm is associated with an inability to fulfil the content of mitigation 
measures.   
 
The interviewees confirmed the disproportionate clustering of tank farms in Lagos State. 
They also emphasised that such projects were constructed indiscriminately, with little or no 
regard for the environment and people. One of the Directors in ERA confirmed the manner in 
which tank farms were built in Apapa, Lagos State.  
‘....you will see a lot of tank farms...I am wondering if there is any EIA carried out 
on them...we are just risking our life...it is a very bad story’ (Interview with KN 
NGO Environmental Rights Action Control Group 30
th
 August 2010).  
 
Even though some of the tank farm owners have received approval from the FMENV to 
relocate to new sites, they have ignored such directives. It appears that government agencies 
such as FMENV cannot help in this regard, as some oil companies appear to enjoy political 
backing. This is evident from the statements below: 
‘Some of them now have their EIA for that new location. On the issue of 
relocation I cannot give an answer, but I am aware that they are stopping people 
from further construction of tank farms. One thing I want you to know is that the 
Government is in favour of owners of tank farms’ (Interview with RO FMENV 
Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
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Apart from the fact that FMENV has issued approval for oil companies to relocate their tank 
farms, the Nigerian Government has also constituted an inter-ministerial committee twice (in 
2003 and 2009) to address the problem, yet the problems continue and they are all politics 
according to one interviewee. The interviewee continued:  
‘In 2003, there was an inter-ministerial committee...and another one last year, to 
examine the impact of tank farms...during the meeting I was caution to minimise 
my contributions, because someone closer to the Government among the 
committee members might implicate me...this indicates that we have problem of 
politics and corruption’ (Interview with DG NGO Waste Management Society of 
Nigeria, Control Group 29
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
It is not sufficient to provide answers on how alone, but why implementation fails, this 
should also be explored – the next section deals with this issue. 
    
 
6.5. Reasons for the lack of compliance  
 
 
 ‘...the consultant has highlighted the likely impacts and mitigation measures and 
the problem persists...this is like proverbial statement that says operation was 
successful, but the patient dies...something is wrongs somewhere’ (Interview with 
PD FMENV, Control Group Consultant 18
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
It is not clear why the content of mitigation measures that have been identified in the previous 
EIA reports are yet to be translated into practice. A key reason might be the cost of 
introducing mitigation measures. Matland (1995: 160) emphasises that ‘the desired outcome 
is virtually assured, given that sufficient resources are appropriated for the program’. 
Certainly, it seems that the operators are finding it difficult to implement the content of EIA 
impact mitigation in the sector because of lack of financial investment. As one respondent 
commented (about 75% of the participants’ agree with PL Academic):    
‘Outlining the mitigation measure has cost implication...every operator wants to 
execute their projects with minimum cost. So they see EIA and it embedded 
mitigation measures as additional cost on the execution of the project...in effect 
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economic reason seems to be the major factor that prevents the good which EIA 
ought to provide from being implemented…’ (Interview with PL Academic 
University of Lagos, Control Group 16
th
 September 2010). 
 
 
The situation in the NMOGS is more complicated beyond oil companies trying to minimise 
costs or not being prepared to implement the content of mitigation measures. It is perhaps 
more important to emphasise that regulators themselves seem to attach little understanding 
and value for the natural environment. This is evidenced from one of the respondent’s 
comments and photographic evidence as attached (See Figure 6.6) respectively. 
 ‘...our NGO discovered that most of this EIA report are just paper work dumped 
somewhere and the regulators at the helm of affair do not understand what this 
EIA is all about...’ (Interview with EL NGO Social and Environmental Rights 
Action Centre, Control Group 27
th
 August 2010). 
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Figure 6.6: Storage of EIA reports in the FMENV office, Lagos State 
Source: Fieldwork, 2010   
 
Nonetheless, the entire interviewees returned to one particular issue in accounting for non-
compliance with EIAs by oil majors. Their failure in translating the content of EIA impact 
mitigation monitoring occurred due to dearth of political will. This was typified by my 
interview with an environmental legal practitioner at Aluko and Oyebode Associates, Lagos.  
‘...you can have bodies of laws and then whether there is political will to do 
it....by the time you talk of implementation of EIA you are talking of 
government...my honest view is that there is no political will’ (Interview with AE 
Aluko and Oyebode Legal Practitioner, Control Group 11
th
 August 2010). 
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The lack of political drive to address such issues appears to be a general trend among 
developing countries arising partly because of awareness among oil companies of likely lack 
of follow-up monitoring among other problems (Wood, 2003b; Arts et al., 2001). Clearly, 
without any tangible monitoring it might not be possible to judge the overall effectiveness of 
an EIA (Arts et al., 2001). 
 
It seems that the sector’s mitigation compliance monitoring is further influenced by the poor 
execution of content of relevant national law. Thus, the sanction mechanism of EIA is not 
effective, as the cost of conducting EIA is very often greater than the fines imposed for non-
compliance. Some oil companies have taken advantage of the sector’s inadequate fines to 
circumvent the EIA process and impact mitigation monitoring in particular. This is evident 
from the statement below:-          
‘...like Agip they will deliberately violate, at the end of the day it is not one 
million Naira they will ask for, because EIA process is expensive, and oil 
companies will spend more than that one million Naira...’ (Interview with FO 
Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs, Programme Group 3
rd
 September 2010). 
 
 
In practice, compliance can be required through three mechanisms: normative, coercive, and 
remunerative mechanisms (Matland, 1995). Matland (1995, pp. 161-164) elucidates the 
difference: ‘a coercive mechanism threatens sanctions for failing to comply with a request of 
action…as many actors have independent base of power and can refuse to participate…’. 
This is the situation in the NMOGS where Agip deliberately refuse to subject most of its 
projects to EIA, because it is cheaper to pay the fines as mentioned in the above interview 
with ‘FO’.  
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As evidenced by the above, the content of mitigation measures is not coherent and integrated 
in its approach to environmental challenges. Oil companies seem not to implement EIA 
mitigation because of prohibitive costs, lack of value attached to the maritime environment, a 
lack of political will and weak compliance enforcement. 
 
Having established the lack of compliance in mitigation compliance and monitoring, I now 
turn to the examination of public participation in EIA. This is discussed under several 
different headings: evidence of quasi-participation, oil companies hiring of people to support 
their project, inadequate ways of making EIA reports available to the public and insufficient 
number of days for the public to lodge complains against a particular project. 
 
 
6.5.1 Quasi-participation 
 
 
It has become normal practice in the NMOGS for one of the national littoral states (states 
along the Nigerian territorial waters) to represent other states, and one of the local 
government chairpersons to represent other local government during EIA panel reviews. This 
is particularly common in offshore projects. The essence of this type of quasi-participation is 
to minimise cost, and this is evident from the statement below:- 
‘Although for the deep sea, we have to pick a state from the littoral states to act as 
voice for all the other states...The chairman of the association of local government 
is picked to represent the rest Local Government Authorities…to reduce cost...’ 
(Interview with RO FEMNV, Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
 
 
This quasi-participation can be likened more generally to what Richardson et al. (1982: 2) 
describe as ‘inner circle negotiation, which involves a limited range of groups who matter’ in 
policy implementation. These authors argue that such arrangements might generate conflict 
particularly between normative values and actual practice; a good policy must not lead to 
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confrontation. In more general terms, unequal access to consultative and participatory process 
has remained a monumental challenge in developing countries (Nwosu et al., 2006; 
Aishuwaikat, 2005; Wood, 2003b; Fayiga and Ofunne, 2000; Ebisemiju, 1993). It has been 
suggested that an independent agency should be used to represent the stakeholders or local 
people to do it themselves, and this might help in reducing conflicts (Lawrence, 2001). 
 
6.5.2 Oil companies hiring people to support their project  
 
 
According to one of the participants, another challenge related to effective public 
participation is the use of ‘rented crowds’ (situations where oil companies are engaged in 
hiring people to support their project), which is common with onshore projects. This is 
evident from the statement below:-  
‘To some extent EIA has been endangered by public participation...some of the 
participants are rented crowd...I am saying this with all sincerity because it has 
happened on a number of occasions that you see them fighting’ (Interview with 
OK Academic Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Control 
Group 7
th
 October 2010). 
 
 
In the same context with the situation in Nigeria, public participation in Pakistan is alleged of 
being manipulated (Saeed et al., 2012), while public participation in Taiwan lacks 
transparency (Jou and Liaw, 2006).  
 
 
6.5.3 Inadequate ways of making EIA reports available to the public 
 
 
It seems that public participation has not been fully translated into practice in the sector 
because of the manner in which the EIA reports are disseminated. This is what has been 
otherwise described as poor provision of information (Hartley and Wood, 2005). The 
empirical evidence shows that most EIA reports in the sector are either not displayed or 
- 167 - 
 
displayed inconspicuously. This is because of lack of adequate resources (in terms of 
financial, about 75% of the participants’ agree to this statement). 
‘...where we used to display EIA report...the place was not conspicuous I felt it 
should be and I was using my money to buy cardboard...’ (Interview with DG 
Waste Management Society of Nigeria, Control Group 29
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
6.5.4 Insufficient number of days for public to lodge complains against a particular project  
  
 
Apart from the use of selected people, rented crowds and reports not properly displayed as 
evidenced from the above, another challenge is that only 21 days grace periods have been 
allocated for the local people and NGOs to lodge any complaint towards the commencement 
of any project. However, according to Jou and Liaw (2006) 60 days have been approved in 
Taiwan for the same exercise though with no tangible result. Many interviewees argued that 
21 days’ periods of grace will only be meaningful in the NMOGS when the GIAs are ready to 
do things the way they ‘ought to be from the onset’. For example, the GIAs should be ready 
to move beyond advertising the EIA reports alone to ensuring that the EIA reports are 
available on the internet, displayed accordingly and opinions of local people should be 
respected. Until these are done, it appears that the 21 days’ periods of grace might just be a 
mirage: 
 
‘....what the law says is that EIA should be displayed for 21 days for input to be 
made...what happen is that they keep them in lockers with keys...so that people 
like us will not see the document and fault the document’ (Interview with KN 
NGO Environmental Rights Action, Control Group 30
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
The NMOGS’s public participation practices flout recommendations made at an international 
workshop on best practice in EIA follow-up (Arts et al., 2001). It also contradicts the content 
of the communiqué of the civil society consultation on oil and gas policy review in Nigeria 
(Bassey, 2004). Likewise, the NMOGS’s practices in relation to public participation is 
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against the content of principle 22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
that provides for effective participation through local people, and this is further viewed as a 
means of ‘promoting social responsibility and citizenship’ (Morrison-Saunders and Early, 
2008: 29). It also runs against the content of international public participation set out in the 
Aarhus Convention, which emphasises early public participation, full and complete access to 
documentation, and submission of public opinions into the policy process, among other issues 
(Hartley and Wood, 2005). Similarly, public participation has not been effective in practice in 
most of the developing and less developed countries for example Pakistan (Saeed et al., 
2012), Taiwan (Jou and Liaw, 2006), Ghana (Ofori, 2005; Appiah-Opoku, 2001), Brazil 
(Glasson and Salvador, 2000), and Turkey (Coskun and Turker, 2011).  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
Despite some modest achievements in terms of raising public and corporate awareness, 
institutional problems have prevented the NMOGS’s EIA implementation processes from 
being coherent and integrated in their approaches to environmental challenges and 
difficulties. Thus, the NMOGS’s EIA procedures have not been fully translated into practice. 
These institutional problems arise from deep-seated economic, social and political factors. 
The high financial cost and lack of value attached to public well-being and environment, 
among other reasons, have contributed negatively to the effective implementation of impact 
mitigation monitoring and public participation as evidenced in this chapter.  
 
The implementation of multinational oil company projects exemplified here by WAGP 
appears to be better than that of indigenous oil company projects (tank farm). For example, 
the identified mitigation measures related to multinational oil company EIA reports are more 
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detailed and comprehensive to the extent of outlining what is to be done at each stage of 
development (for example, construction and operation stages). In addition to this, some of the 
challenges related to the EIA implementation of multinational oil company projects have 
been resolved, for example, access to WAGP EIA report is now granted, though after the 
local communities protested and pressure from Environmental Rights Action and Social and 
Environmental Rights Action. However, challenges related to the EIA implementation of 
indigenous oil company projects through mitigation measure remained unresolved, despite 
the Federal Government effort in allocating new site to the tank farm owners.      
 
The situation in the NMOGS is in line with Drexhage and Murphy (2010: 12) who argue that 
‘the world has made little progress in implementing programs and policies to improve the 
lives of the local people, and the integration of the three pillars of economic development, 
social development and environmental improvements remains a challenge... . Nevertheless, it 
appears that the situation in the NMOGS is better than the situation in other developing 
countries. For example, ‘no records of previous EIA reports were kept by the South Africa’s 
Environmental Department’ (Wood, 2003b: 19). Similarly, there was no record of total 
number of previous EIA reports produced in Brazil (Glasson and Salvador, 2000). Although 
values are varied, as they are depended on the locality, and groups have to compete in order 
to accommodate their value set (Simon, 2010). 
 
According to Miller et al. (2006); Birkland (2005) and Matland (1995) it is not enough nor 
sufficient for policy implementation research to expose policy implementation failures alone. 
It should identify and examine how government agencies and policy context have together 
shaped policy outcome. The next chapter does so by unpacking the levels of interaction 
among the responsible government agencies to see how they have been working together, by 
- 170 - 
 
explicitly considering the binary and contradictory EIA systems that exist in the NMOGS. It 
examines the practice of the two EIA systems and recent interventions made by the 
Government to ameliorate the conflicts. The chapter further examines the stakeholders’ views 
regarding the ‘twin-track’ EIA systems and the problem this poses, so as to identify a more 
robust alternative approach.  
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CHAPTER 7 
INTER-AGENCY CONFLICTS AND AMBIGUITIES IN THE NMOGS’s EIA 
IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS 
 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter responds to objective two to understand the national policy context and also 
responds to part of objective three to unpack related policy conflicts and ambiguities only 
within inter-agency context. The chapter aims to identify the reasons for, and component of, 
the organisational ambiguities and conflicts in the NMOGS’s ‘twin-track’ EIA 
implementation processes as an explanation for the EIA monitoring problem documented in 
Chapter 6. Chapter five discussed how the sector has a ‘twin-track’ EIA in place (the 
FMENV and DPR EIA systems), with different operating systems and practices. The 
expectation is that the Government department will support their own EIA policy definitions 
and interests. Matland (1995: 168) notes that ‘actors see their interests tied to specific policy 
definition, and therefore similar competing coalitions are likely to form at differing sites and 
the strength of these actors will vary across the possible sites ’. 
  
Consequently, this chapter addresses the following questions: to what extent has the DPR and 
FMENV EIA systems influenced the EIA implementation process? How did the sector 
become entangled in operating twin-track EIAs and why does the situation persist? What 
forms of intervention have been adopted by Government to ameliorate the resulting conflicts? 
And what do stakeholders think about the persistence of two EIA systems? Section 7.2 
assesses the DPR and FMENV EIA systems through their differences and similarities to 
show the extent to which they have been affecting effective EIA implementation in practice. 
Section 7.3 explores how the sector became entangled in practising two different forms of 
EIAs and examines the reasons why this practice persists as well as describing possible steps 
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that have been taken towards resolving the sector’s challenges. This is necessary in order to 
understand the components of, and reasons for, conflicts and ambiguities in the sector’s EIA 
implementation process. Section 7.4 then gives an account of the stakeholders’ views 
regarding the double EIA systems, with an emphasis on whether the two systems are suitable 
for the sector or not, and which of the systems is more robust in order to position the sector 
towards achieving its EIA’s goal.    
 
I have used the term ‘inter-agency’ in this chapter in terms of the interrelationship among the 
GIAs that have been operating differently largely because of their different organisational 
goals. Inter-agency is defined here as ‘the external interaction among organisations and 
between organisations and their environment...’ (Jaffee, 2001: 21). 
 
7.2 Assessing the FMENV and DPR EIA systems 
 
 ‘The advice I used always to tell my clients is that now you have two masters, 
when you do EIA you give to FEPA (present FMENV) and DPR’ (Interview with 
OB Academic University of Ibadan Basel Convention, Control Group 28
th
 
October 2010). 
 
I have noted in the previous chapter and chapter 5 in particular that oil companies must 
satisfy the requirements of two sets of different EIA guidelines in the sector. What has 
remained problematic is the impact of these different EIAs on oil and gas sector projects, thus 
leading to policy ambiguity. This ambiguity of means might occur ‘when there are 
uncertainties...when a complex environment makes it difficult to know which tools to use, 
how to use them, and what the effects of their use will be’ (Matland, 1995, p. 158). It 
transpired from much of the field research that this ambiguity of means has posed tremendous 
challenges for EIA policy implementation in Nigeria. For example, one of the implications of 
operators submitting two sets of different EIA is evident from interview with ‘BE’.   
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‘...the operators are complaining, this is multitask and EIA is expensive and 
sometime different requirements are involved in the process’ (Interview with BE 
Waste Management Society of Nigeria, Control Group 25
th
 August 2010) 
 
 
Apart from the two sets of financial cost, another consequence of these different silos of EIA 
systems is that it takes time for proponents to fulfil the requirements of both systems when 
compared with having just one system. Barnes (2010) reported similar duplication of EIA in 
Canada (though with similar goals), leading to little achievement in environmental 
performance. Nevertheless, one would have expected the NMOGS to be more organised than 
other sectors in Nigeria and to embrace the use of a single EIA in order to address effectively 
the needs of such an economically important in Nigeria. Yet the NMOGS is the only sector 
that operates binary EIA systems. This is supported by the comment of one of the principal 
officers in the FMENV ‘RA’. Of 56 interviewees about 50 participants agree to this statement 
that is about 89% of them.   
‘I do not see the difficulty in DPR coming to us (FMENV) sitting together on the 
panel and reviewing it (EIA) together...we have memorandum of understanding 
with mining sector, with agriculture and other sectors...I think we will get there 
with oil and gas’ (Interview with RA FMENV, Programme Group 2nd September 
2010).  
 
 
Ofunne (2007) and Onwuweaka (2007) further confirm that there is a cordial relationship 
between FMENV and other sectors of the economy, with these sectors operate a single EIA 
system under the supervision of FEMNV. The inability of DPR and FMENV to have a 
memorandum of understanding points to the lack of inter-agency cooperation. According to 
Matland (1995, p.158) ‘one way to limit conflict is through ambiguity...’. However, the 
reverse is the case in the NMOGS, with ambiguity not only encouraging conflict but also 
causing projects to be delayed.  
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One of the presumed advantages of the sector’s EIA ‘ambiguity of means’ in a twin-track 
EIA system is to ensure that operators do not escape Government environmental sanctions. 
This is evident from one interviewee statement:  
‘...to the ordinary Nigerian people it might be said that we have double 
regulations, this means that operators have no option than to implement EIA...If 
they are not caught under the DPR guidelines, they will be caught under the 
FMENV guidelines’ (Interview with PL Academic University of Lagos, Control 
Group 16
th
 September 2010). 
 
 
In the same context, another participant felt that by having double EIA systems in the sector 
environmental standards would be raised to very high levels. In effect, ‘ambiguity should be 
viewed neither as an evil nor as a good...but should be seen as a characteristic of a 
policy...seen as an opportunity to learn both new means and new goals’ (Matland, 1995, pp. 
167 & 171). 
‘The situation of these multiple agencies and double EIAs in particular is to show 
that environment will be protected adequately’ (Interview with DO 2 DPR, 
Programme Group 19
th
 August 2010).   
 
 
Importantly, only 6 participants’ agree to this statement that about 11%. Therefore, the 
ambiguity of means in policy implementation is not present in the NMOGS alone. Clark 
and Jones (2001: 2053) identified that ‘ambiguity of means is common to much EU 
(European Union) legislation...’ Terpstra and Havinga (2001) maintain that when 
political will is absent social relations of autonomy and the required dependency in the 
policy implementation process might be difficult to achieve. 
 
However, apart from the fact that the FMENV and DPR EIA systems differ in practice as 
earlier discussed, they also possess similarities which tend to negatively rather than positively 
effect on EIA implementation and the entire agree to this statement (100%). These 
similarities are – oil and gas companies (through their consultants) mainly sponsor the entire 
- 175 - 
 
EIA process; the use of local consultants is emphasised; and waiver is encouraged. I discuss 
these issues next.  
 
7.2.1. Oil and gas companies’ sponsorship of national EIA procedures  
 
‘EIA process is also bordered on proponents’ facilitation and proponent funding 
the operation...’ (Interview with ON FMENV, Programme Group 2nd September 
2010).  
  
Some have argued that proponents’ sponsorship of EIA procedure can have value (OECD, 
2006) though these accounts do not advocate funding the services of national regulators. 
However, this is exactly the situation in the sector, where corporate interests are responsible 
for EIA process as it is evidenced from the above interview testimony. Another official of 
FMENV shed more light on the impacts of the sector’s present practices.   
‘...at present FMENV and other agencies do not even have a helicopter for 
monitoring...and even when we ask operators not to do something you may not 
know...what is going on...in the offshore because we do not have facilities to go 
there. That is a real problem’ (Interview with RO FMENV, Programme Group 2nd 
September 2010). 
 
 
This situation concurs with Matland’s (1995: 164 & 168) view that ‘the implementation 
program consists of securing the compliance of actors whose resources are vital to policy 
success and ensuring that the process is not thwarted…the policy course is determined by the 
coalition of actors at the local level who control resources’.   
 
The clear implication of the situation is that sponsoring the entire EIA implementation 
process might be influenced, with agency capture becoming evident. Agency capture ‘is a 
process by which the agency-industry (operator) relationship result in selective interpretation 
of qualitative or quantitative information about impacts and collusion between agency and 
- 176 - 
 
their industry clientele to actively subvert the original intention of legislation...’ (Nwafor, 
2006: 601 & 602).      
 
I would argue that the preferred means of funding and resourcing EIA implementation in the 
NMOGS should come from Government and not from corporate interests, so that the claims 
of agency capture are dispelled. The funding arrangements constitute another form of 
ambiguity, because it is not clear why successive governments have allowed the oil and gas 
sector to sponsor the entire EIA process.  
‘The ministry is taking steps to revise that process where oil and gas sponsors the 
entire EIA process...since the international organisation like World Bank have 
asked us to desist from such practice...’ (Interview with RA FMENV, Programme 
Group 2
nd
 September 2010).                
 
 
The government has put in place the ecological fund (that is, a fund meant for the 
management of ecological or environmental problems in Nigeria) as alternative means of 
financing and mitigating environmental problems in Nigeria. Surprisingly, only 5% of this 
fund is allocated for pollution prevention and control, while drought and desertification for 
example consume 60%. Accessing these funds is another problem (Nwankwo and Josiah, 
2012; Ezekiel, 2010). This is one of the reasons why the sector is still reliant on the oil and 
gas industries, while another is the high levels of corruption currently associated with the 
Ecological Fund:   
‘...anywhere they are handling environmental matters you find that money is there 
and there is corruption. There is an issue with Ecological Fund, where somebody 
collects money and disappears. What is an issue is not EIA it is the other side of 
it’ (Interview with PA Academic University of Nigeria, Control Group 6th 
September 2010). 
  
 
Similarly, the present Governor of Anambra state, Mr. Peter Obi, has stated that ‘the 
management of the Ecological Fund is characterised as official corruption...and the Governor 
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of Lagos State Mr. Babatunde Raji Fashola alleged that some states get assistance for 
ecological disasters, while others including Lagos never do so’ (Ezekiel, 2010, pp. 3 & 9).  
 
 
7.2.2. The use of local experts in the EIA process 
 
A common feature of the NMOGS EIAs is their reliance on local consultants, whether it is 
for reports compiled under the FMENV or DPR procedures. One of the Directors in 
Environmental Rights Action (ERA) confirmed that to me that ‘...the Nigerian, not foreign 
experts do EIA...’ (Interview with KN ERA 30th August 2010). While nationality is not an 
issue, the field research indicated that many of the local consultants within the NMOGS do 
not possess adequate skills (generally in the NMOGS about 34% of the participants’ agree to 
that statement) ultimately weakening the translation of EIA into practice.  This is in line with 
broader arguments that EIA systems in developing countries have failed in training, 
environmental information, and diffusion of experience (Wood, 2003b). As one interviewee 
reflected:  
‘A lot of EIA practitioners...do not have the capacity to produce the state of art 
EIAs in Nigeria (Interview with PL Academic University of Lagos, Control 
Group 16
th
 September 2010).  
 
 
Matland (1995, p. 158) argues that ‘implementation should be a phase where principles and 
visions as well as technological knowledge are tested…but ambiguity of means appears in 
many ways, perhaps most obviously in the cases where the technology needed to reach a 
policy’s goal does not exist’. The sector situation becomes more complex and ambiguous, as 
most of the local consultants not only lack adequate skills but also because allegedly many 
are prepared to falsify for their oil and gas paymasters. In this way, the consultants maintain a 
profitable relationship with the operators at the detriment of local communities and the 
environment.  
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‘...the consultants are not sincere and they will not record what they see on the 
field, rather they will work to impress the operator...This is because they want to 
make money. For example, I was the one that represented the Nigerian 
Environment Society on an energy project. I knew the area very well and I 
discovered that the consultant was telling lies, only 40% of his information is 
right’ (Interview with DO NGO Nigerian Environmental Society 10th August 
2010).   
 
Prager (2010) argues that practical application of policy is hindered when the objective data 
on which it is based is limited. The situation in Nigeria, where data are allegedly falsified by 
consultants, is matched by similar occurrences in Tanzania (Kakonge, 1998) and Cameroun 
(Alemagi et al., 2007). In Taiwan, the main reason why EIA reports do not possess the 
required credibility is because they are prepared by environmental consultants hired by the 
operators and lack of data (Jou and Liaw, 2006). This is also the situation in Brazil coupled 
with the fact that limited power is given to environmental group (Glasson and Salvador, 
2000).  
 
The act of ‘using the local consultant’ therefore needs close attention from FMENV and 
DPR. In particular, it is not clear why consultants without the required skills should be 
certified by either Government department. While the developed countries in particular are 
encouraging adoption of international best practice through knowledge exchange, the 
NMOGS still relies on local consultants with limited data analysis and research skills. This is 
a critical failing given the technical complexities of offshore projects. 
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7.2.3. Official encouragement of waiver  
 
‘As I said, because of lack of proper understanding of what EIA is about they just 
do not want to appreciate it...that loophole should not have been there, it should 
have been compulsory whether government or anybody...EIA must be carried 
out…without waiver...’ (Interview with KK Academic University of Lagos, 
Control Group 17
th
 September 2010). 
 
In Nigeria a special ‘waiver’ process exists whereby the President’s office can grant approval 
for the commencement of a potential environmentally damaging project without recourse to 
the EIA process. Several interviewees commented that Nigerian Government should not have 
embraced the principle of waiver, because it undermines and discredits the national EIA 
process. Granting waivers might for example discourage the private sector from conducting 
EIAs. However, it should be noted no NMOGS project has been granted a waiver, as 
compared with other sectors, or with ‘flagship’ developments such as the Abuja stadium.  
 ‘The case of Abuja stadium was determined by President not by the EIA report, 
and this is because the President always has the final say’ (Interview with DG 
Waste Management Society of Nigeria, Control Group 29
th
 August 2010).  
 
Without a clear cut and ambiguous process applied to all developments, implementation can 
come down to political. Indeed, the waiver may be seen as a clear instance of what Matland 
(1995: 163) maintains is ‘the central principle in political implementation...implementation 
outcomes are decided by power’.  
  
In summary, I have shown the extent to which the NMOGS’s EIA procedures have been 
rendered largely ambiguous in practice. Not only has this weakened EIA effectiveness, but it 
has also provoked conflict among and between Government agencies and stakeholders in the 
EIA process. The subsequent section focuses on how the twin-track EIA system came into 
existence and why this situation persists.   
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7.3 The binary EIA system as a source of sectoral policy conflict  
 
 
‘...I have been involved for long, I know the historical factor...DPR existed before 
the FMENV and they have put in place...their guidelines in 1991...the story we 
always tell the DPR is anything environment is for FMENV and the DPR is to 
regulate oil and gas but because of vacuum they take over the environment...’ 
(Interview with OB Academic University of Ibadan Nigeria Basel Convention, 
Control Group 28
th
 October 2010).  
 
 
Only three out of the four participants under the academics sub-group have supported above 
quote. Nigeria’s binary EIA system in the oil and gas sector originates from the country not 
having an established environmental Ministry in the 70s when the Department of Petroleum 
Resources was created. The DPR took advantage of this situation by establishing a precedent 
to manage the NMOGS environmental affairs based on the Petroleum Act, in which under 
section 8 (1) b (iii) the Minister of Petroleum Resource is able to make regulation to curb 
pollution from petroleum industries into water course and the atmosphere, and the DPR later 
on developed environmental guideline in 1991, as discussed in chapter five. [Jordan et al. 
(2003a: 17) note that ‘there were few countries that had environmental ministries in the 
1970s, and they did tend not to be directly involved in the selection and implementation of 
policy’].  
 
Thereafter, when FEPA (latterly FMENV) was established in 1988, DPR did not cede the 
management of the sector’s environmental issues to FMENV, in spite of the fact that the 
Ministry has its EIA system in place and it is supported by an Act as evidenced in chapter 5. 
The binary or twin-track EIA system remains in force as a result of this situation. It has been 
the cause of persistent friction and conflict, with both agencies using different EIA process 
and battling over policy means. One respondent confirmed these institutional difficulties as 
follows:    
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‘...as a matter of fact many years ago, it became obvious that DPR was not keen 
for the FMENV getting involved in the activities of the oil and gas sector...’ 
(Interview with OK Academic Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic 
Research, Control Group 7
th
 October 2010).  
 
 
Matland (1995: 163) notes that ‘though actors have clearly defined goals, but dissension 
occur because these clearly defined goals are incompatible…and equally conflictual battles 
can occur over means…and it is often precisely in the designing of the implementation policy 
that conflicts develop and vigorous battles erupt’. This struggle between FMENV and DPR 
has been fuelled by both Government agencies clamouring for recognition, position and 
power, and defending their organisational interest rather than the sectoral or environmental 
interest; fear of losing administrative turf; and unwillingness to engage in effective 
coordination. This is supported by the following candid comments from an interviewee:-     
‘It is clear that in the entire EIA system there has been almost systematic failure, 
as...the people in government are jumping for positions’ (Interview with AE Legal 
Practitioner Aluko and Oyebode Associates, Control Group 11
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
It appears that FMENV and DPR personnel are more interested in controlling the sector’s 
natural resources rather than managing the environment, given that whoever controls the 
natural resources will invariably control the economic and political resources that flow from 
it. It is on this note that one of the senior officers at Lagos State Ministry of Environment 
maintains that ‘people want to exercise power on a particular aspect of job...’ (Interview with 
ML Lagos State Ministry of Environment, Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010). Similarly, 
one of the Directors in DPR further confirms the situation in the sector of which about 63% 
participants’ share similar view with AD DPR interviews. 
‘...there is rivalry in the sector as everybody wants recognition’ (Interview with 
AD DPR 19
th
 August 2010). 
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It has been argued in more general terms that ‘the struggle over access to and control over 
natural resources might have resulted in conflict over the management of environmental 
issues’ (Hauge and Ellingsen, 2001, p. 36; Galambos, 1992, p. 72). Conflict persists when 
various parties have different interests in and values attached to the environment, but the 
main reasons are organisational concerns, lack of commitment, and fear among the 
stakeholders in terms of social loss (Randolph and Bauer, 1999). More generally, 
Government agencies commitments can be questioned, whenever they are motivated and 
occupied with organisational interest rather than sectoral or environmental commitment 
interest (Howlett, 2011).  
 
Another reason why conflict persists in the sector is fear of administrative re-organisation, 
even though no Ministry government agency or department has ever been scrapped. Indeed, a 
far more established pattern taking place in the country is the growth in government 
organisations and agencies. Both FMENV and DPR are ready to do everything to secure their 
continued existence, even to the extent of duplicating other Ministries’ responsibilities. Both 
organisations have their own established EIA guidelines and schedule of duties, because they 
are very concerned of being amalgamated by government:      
 ‘...nobody wants to be redundant if Federal government finds out that one agency 
is redundant they will scrap that agency...everyone want to be relevant’ (Interview 
with BR Nigeria Maritime Administration Safety Agency, Programme Group 13
th
 
August 2010). 
  
 
It appears that this situation is not limited to the NMOGS alone, but also occurs in other 
sectors of the Nigerian state. For example, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency 
(NDLEA) has been engaging in carrying out some of the National Agency for Food and Drug 
Administration and Control (NAFDAC) activities (Gbadamosi, 2011).  
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Another reason why conflict persists in the sector is the lack of effective co-ordination and 
engaged participations among the policy actors and Government agencies in particular.  
One interviewee reflected (similarly 63% of the participants’ maintain that there is no 
coordination in the sector): 
‘There is no coordination, too many agencies doing the same thing and no one is 
ready to take responsibility’ (Interview with MH NGO Environmental Right 
Action, Control Group 8
th
 September 2010). 
 
 
This has hampered the sector from achieving effective EIA in practice, as it reflects a remote 
top-down approach. As Matland (1995: 156 & 157) notes, ‘for conflict to exist there must be 
an interdependence of actors, an incompatibility of objectives, and a perceived zero-sum 
element to the interactions…and the intensity of conflict increases with an incompatibility of 
concerns and with an increase in the perceived stakes for each actor’.  
 
7.3.1 Interventions to ameliorate sectoral conflict  
 
 
The Federal Government has attempted to resolve these bitter Departmental divisions in two 
ways. The first of these is the use of bargaining mechanisms – as championed by the Nigerian 
Maritime Administration and Safety Agency – and the second have been its efforts to transfer 
the DPR environmental unit to FMENV. As discussed in chapter 3, the core assumption in 
multilevel understandings of implementation is that organisations operate in multifaceted 
system of relationships (Moliterno and Mahony, 2010; Fischer, 2004; Mazey, 1996), which 
prioritises the importance of inter-organisational bargaining (Van de Brande et al., 2011; 
Cram, 1996). Jordan et al. (1998: 1393) have viewed ‘...implementation as an ongoing 
process of bargaining between policymakers and implementers, both of whom have their own 
agendas, resources and sources of legitimacy’. This bargaining mechanism is also related to 
political implementation, as bargaining activity is embedded in politics. Politics is seen as a 
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particular ‘means of resolving conflict that is, by compromise, conciliation and negotiation or 
bargaining, rather than through force and naked power’ (Vestman and Conner, 2006: 228).  
 
The Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) has emerged as an 
effective ‘honest broker’ between FMENV and DPR. One NIMASA respondent closely 
involved in there brokerage discussions, commented:  
‘...we have been able to tell them (DPR & FMENV)...that we are not fighting, we 
are not contesting coordinator-ship with them. What we are saying is that they 
should allow us to do our duties or we do it together’ (Interview with KU 
Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, Control Group 13
th
 August 
2010).  
  
 
Matland (1995, p. 156) states that successful policy implementation requires ‘different forms 
of bargaining mechanisms, including side payments, log rolling, and oversight to reach 
agreements and hold coalitions together’. The interviews indicated that NIMASA has been 
engaging in bargaining of this sort via a variety of channels, so as to foster greater inter-
agency cooperation. NIMASA’s bargaining might therefore exemplify Matland’s view that 
relates to negotiation its purpose is to reach agreement and to hold policy coalitions together.  
 
Yet while NIMASA and FMENV are now working more closely, this is not the case yet with 
the DPR. A NIMASA official commented to me: 
‘The only people that still having problem from the last programme we had 
together was the DPR...with the workshop we had in 2008...at that meeting DPR 
walked out... In 2009, we had another meeting in Abuja and there was level of 
understanding…and this cannot be achieved just in one day...’ (Interview with KU 
Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, Programme Group 13
th
 
August 2010). 
 
  
It seems that a temporary coalition now exists between NIMASA and FMENV; a form of 
‘advocacy between groups’ (Simon, 2010; Birkland, 2005; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1999, 
1993; Jordan et al. 1998) which may greatly benefit mutual interactions and the outcome of 
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the EIA implementation process (Illeris, 2002; Jordan et al. 1998). This conclusion, however, 
is tentative; a finding supported not only by the evidence in the field, but also by the relevant 
literature on the subject, which confirms that bargaining mechanisms are a gradual process 
(John, 1998; Galambos, 1992; Salih, 1992).  
 
Apart from the bargaining mechanism that was championed by NIMASA, the Federal 
Government has also put in an effort to resolve the sector’s conflict by transferring the 
environmental arm/unit of DPR to FMENV. This is evident from the statement below:- 
‘The then Head of State, President Olusegun Obasanjo recognised the sector’s 
conflict that was why he came about restructuring the sector. For example, when 
the DPR environmental unit was transferred to FMENV, what really caused 
problem is the salary issue...what they will pay level 8 officers in DPR is more 
than what a Director take at the FMENV...so the DPR staff went back’ (Interview 
with ON FMENV, Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
 
 
The Government’s efforts towards resolving the problem of twin-track EIA systems in the 
NMOGS can therefore be deemed as completely unsuccessful: because of different salary 
scales, DPR staff returned to their former jobs. Despite the fact that government is fully 
aware of the sector’s conflict, no decisive steps have been taken to ensure that the 
environmental unit of DPR complied with its transfer directive.  
 
In effect, the country’s decision-makers have yet to utilise the information at their disposal to 
achieve the desired simplified EIA system. Thus, it is clear that the sector’s EIA is not only 
ambiguous, as established in the previous section 7.2, but also it is highly conflictual. In 
particular, attempts at mediating the differences between these competing EIA systems have 
accentuated high levels of sectoral conflict. Therefore, ‘the question for an agency is no 
longer how do we eliminate conflict, instead how do we properly manage conflict’ 
(Heidbreder et al., 2011: 3). It appears that ‘intense conflicts are likely to arise whenever 
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organisation has to make an important decision on...either to accept or reject’ changed policy 
responsibilities (Janis and Mann, 1977, p. 46). In the NMOGS, the choice is between 
harmonising the two systems into one and accepting either FMENV or the DPR EIA system.  
 
The following section takes account of stakeholders’ views regarding the twin-track EIA 
system, with the aim to suggest whether this system is valued or should be reappraised. This 
is necessary to establish the relative strength and weakness of the current system from non-
Governmental perspectives (control group), as this should help in identifying where 
improvement is required. 
 
 
7.4 Stakeholders’ views regarding the sector’s binary EIA systems   
 
 
Evaluation is conducted for four major purposes: programme improvement, accountability, 
knowledge generation, and public relations use (Persson and Nilsson, 2007). From a more 
practical point of view evaluation is ‘capable of producing information about consequences, 
improve public awareness, and enhance cause-effect relationship’ (Persson and Nilsson, 
2007; 477; Arts et al., 2001: 177), though it has been given less attention (Persson and 
Nilsson, 2007). As earlier mentioned, evaluation seeks to address practical problems and it is 
further viewed as the act of identifying or judging the worth, value of policy or program 
(Rogers and Williams, 2006; Schwandt and Burgon, 2006; McKie, 2002; Hall and Hall, 
1996; House, 1993). 
 
Here I consider the value attached to the NMOGS’s twin-track EIA systems from two 
perspectives, relying mainly on the stakeholders in the control group (non-Governmental 
stakeholders) views for the purpose of objectivity. Many of the surveyed individuals (16 out 
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of the 18 interviewed that is 89%) considered that the systems should be much more closely 
aligned, as is evident from the following statement:  
‘To the ordinary person it is worthwhile to have double EIA systems. I would say 
from my experience the best thing is to align the two institutions to have one 
guideline’ (Interview with PL Academic University of Lagos, Control Group 16th 
September 2010). 
 
 
Contrary to the above, only two respondents (11%) out of 18 participants interviewed 
under the control group (non-Governmental stakeholders) completely disagreed with the 
idea of aligning the two systems for various reasons. One of them noted that the 
NMOGS’s twin-track EIA system is part of the Government’s strategy to encourage 
division of labour in the sector. This because FMNEV encourages public review among 
others, while DPR guideline emphasises scoping. This is evident from the following 
statement:  
‘Looking at the two guidelines there is no conflict, one agency should just 
supervise one aspect of EIA procedure and project...for example, issue of public 
review is contain in FMENV and they should continue with it and DPR is 
expected to handle scoping’ (Interview with SU Nigerian Environmental Society, 
Control Group 18
th
 September 2010). 
 
In the same context, the second participant among those that disagreed with the 
alignment of the two EIA systems commented that:   
 
‘I think having the two of them working separately is the best for the 
NMOGS...because DPR has a lot to contribute to oil and gas sector as far as 
environmental issues are concerned’ (Interview with KK Academic, University of 
Lagos , Control Group 17
th
 September 2010). 
 
 
At this point, the way out is to reflect on the two EIA guidelines and identify the one 
that is closer to best practice according to the interviewee comments. Going by the 
description of EIA procedure and guideline of the two departments, as highlighted in 
chapter 5, it appears that FMENV EIA procedure is closer to best practice, as it 
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considers the entire EIA process. Conversely, the DPR guidelines still miss out certain 
key aspects (for example public review) and are far from best practice. It is on this note 
that many stakeholders prefer the FMENV EIA system to DPR:  
‘Implementing the Federal Ministry of Environment EIA system is in line with the 
best practice’ (Interview with PL Academic, University of Lagos, and Control 
Group 16
th
 September 2010). 
 
Still on the system that is more robust among the two, it has been established that the 
FMENV EIA is more robust than the DPR system, and this is evident from the statement 
below:-   
 ‘...the EIA process in FEPA (FMENV) is involving and very robust than EIA in 
DPR, they do not do any public review they just read it and pass it somewhere’ 
(Interview with OB Academic University of Ibadan Basel Convention Centre, 
Programme Group 28
th
 October 2010). 
 
 
Therefore, in summary, the issue emerging from this section is that the sector’s present twin-
track EIA systems should be aligned and the DPR should forgo its system for FMENV, since 
the FMENV EIA has been described as more robust than DPR EIA system. Most of the 
sector’s stakeholders maintain that the FMENV EIA system is more detailed. Unlike DPR, 
for example, it involves the key requirement of public participation, making it much more 
acceptable in broader terms.  
 
In the same context, the expectation of the Waste Management Society of Nigeria through 
one of their representative officers is evident from the statement below-  
‘The DPR should leave the role for the FMENV...’ (Interview with BE Waste 
Management Society of Nigeria, Control Group 25
th
 August 2010).  
 
The representative of the Nigerian Environmental Society maintained that DPR should 
completely move away from environmental related issues, and they should focus on oil and 
gas production alone. 
- 189 - 
 
‘...the DPR ought to be department that regulates oil and gas sector production, 
but they (DPR) have become uncontrollable, they are not meant to deal with 
environmental issues’ (Interview with DO Nigerian Environmental Society, 
Control Group 10
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
Similarly, the outcome of UNEP’s environmental assessment in the NMOGS shows that 
there are lapses in the DPR EIA guidelines, titled ‘Environmental Guidelines and Standards 
for Petroleum Industry in Nigeria’ (EGASPIN) (UNEP, 2011). The UNEP’s researchers 
suggest that the government should ‘transfer oversight of the EGASPIN from DPR to the 
FMENV, with the concurrent transfer of staff...’ (UNEP, 2011: 14 & 218). It appears that the 
UNEP researchers are not fully aware of the government’s previous efforts towards 
ameliorating the NMOGS’s binary EIA systems in Nigeria. This implies that high levels of 
conflict are yet to be resolved even in the political domain, and particularly when they are 
related in determining what is reasonable (value-judgement) (Sharman and Holmes, 2010). 
However, going by the stakeholders’ views, it can be concluded that the two systems should 
be aligned. 
 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show that the differences between the sector’s EIA 
systems have resulted in an implementation failure by causing delays in the execution of 
projects. In addition, their similarities have negatively affected the EIA process namely. First, 
when oil and gas companies sponsor the entire EIA process it clearly encourages agency 
capture of Government departments. Second, the use of local consultants has reduced the 
quality of EIA report, as many do not have the required skills and allegations of using 
falsified data are rife. Third, the application of a Presidential waiver is possible in the sector 
and even though it has not been used, it might discourage private organisations from 
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subjecting their projects to EIA. If Government projects are granted a waiver, the private 
sector might not see the reason why its projects should be subjected to EIA. 
 
As I have demonstrated, sectoral conflict between Government departments persists as a 
result of clamouring for position, recognition and power over administrative re-organisation. 
Moreover, Government efforts at resolving the NMOGS’s challenges have not yielded a 
solution. The transfer of the DPR environmental unit to FMENV was unsuccessful because of 
economic and political problems. An attempt at mediating the differences between these 
competing EIA systems by the Government and NIMASA has accentuated high levels of 
conflict with DPR, and so has been only minimally effective.  
 
In view of this dedicated environmental policy responsibilities, it was considered that the 
FMENV EIA system should be further explored to establish the challenges imposed by intra-
agency factors on implementing EIA policy in the Nigerian national context. Consequently, 
the next chapter examines the extent to which resources in terms of financial and human have 
been sufficient for the Federal Ministry to conduct its EIA responsibilities. 
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CHAPTER 8 
INTRA-AGENCY CONFLICTS AND AMBIGUITIES IN THE FMENV’s EIA 
IMPLEMENTATION STYLE 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter responds mainly to objective three: examining the components of and the 
reasons for policy ambiguities and conflicts within intra-agency context and it is divided into 
six sections. Section 8.1 introduces the chapter and section 8.2 assesses the FMENV’s EIA 
implementation style, including the extent to which the Federal Ministry has been involving 
its subsidiaries and the State Ministries in particular, in the EIA implementation process. It 
also considers which of the Federal Government departments and agencies have been actively 
involved in the implementation process. Section 8.3 examines the impacts of the identified 
the reasons for, and components of, conflicts and ambiguities related to the FMENV EIA 
implementation style in order to pinpoint where improvements are required. Section 8.4 then 
explores the extent to which financial resources are sufficient in the sector towards achieving 
effective EIA implementation. Section 8.5 examines the extent to which lack of human 
resource is sufficient in the sector and section 8.6 concludes the chapter.  
 
I have used the term ‘intra-agency’ in this chapter to describe the involvement of GIAs that 
were originally under the same ministry, operating a single EIA system and bounded together 
by the same constitution. The term intra-agency has been further described as internal 
interactions and characteristics of an organisation operating within a closed system (Jaffee, 
2001). In the NMOGS, the Government departments and agencies within this context are 
FMENV and its subsidiaries on the one hand, and the State Ministries of Environment 
(SMENV) on the other. The FMENV subsidiaries are – NESREA, NOSDRA and Department 
of Environmental Assessment and Oil and Gas Division of FMENV.  
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8.2 The FMENV’s EIA implementation style  
 
 
Matland (1995, pp. 158 & 159) argues that ‘the degree of ambiguity inherent in a 
policy affects the implementation process in significant ways, as it influences the 
ability of superiors to monitor activities and the likelihood that policy is uniformly 
understood across the implementation sites...but ambiguity is not limited to goal it 
also affects policy means in many ways...’.  
 
Policy implementation ‘style’ is a central concept in recent studies and it is defined here as 
the administrative approach to implementation of EIAs arising from interaction among 
relevant implementing agencies (May and Winter, 2000, 1999). Thus the effectiveness of 
Government departmental and agency practice shapes their policy implementation style 
(Hertogh, 2001). This section builds on findings from the previous chapter, where FMENV 
was identified as an institution with dedicated environmental policy responsibilities.  
 
Unsurprisingly, the Federal Ministry’s implementation style on EIA is a programmatic or 
bureaucratic approach, where guidelines for procedures are laid down, so as to govern project 
supervision and compliance (Smith et al., 2011). However, this programmatic approach often 
fails to deliver intended policy outcomes (Smith et al., 2011), since on the preceding chapter 
demonstrated ambiguity often results in bureaucratic complications and delay (Pagoulatos, 
2001). This is demonstrated in the following frank interview testimony: 
 
 ‘I have an EIA with FMENV, it is like going through hell, because when you 
make a process so difficult...people will start cutting corners...The FMENV would 
not do what is right and at the end money go into other people pocket and things 
are not done well. I sent the EIA report since February, I have not gotten a reply 
till now (August)...The client is on my neck, the client is making noise everyday 
and now look at the time frame, look at the time wasted’ (Interview TU, FMENV 
&DPR registered consultant, Programme Group 23
rd
 August
 
2010). 
 
On this subject, one State Ministry official noted of Federal procedures: 
‘The FEMNV wants to arrogate all the EIA responsibilities to itself and want to 
claim that it has the exclusive right to implement EIA and you cannot do this 
when the States and Local Government Authority are on board’ (Interview with 
JE Lagos State Ministry of Environment, Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010). 
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In Nigeria and the NMOGS in particular, the FMENV as the apex agency has been very 
active in co-ordinating the EIA implementation process through the Department of 
Environmental Assessment. However, many other agencies within an intra-agency context, 
including the State Ministries of Environment often complain about their comparative passive 
approach. It appears that there are still shortcomings in the FMENV’s EIA implementation 
style, particularly in relevant to all-important coordination issues. Policy co-ordination can be 
achieved in six ways: mutual adjustment, direct supervision, standardisation of the work 
process, standardisation of work output, standardisation of workers’ skills, and 
standardisation of workers’ norms (Matheson, 2009), but it appears that only ‘top down’ 
direct supervision and mutual adjustment are used by FMENV.     
 
Thus, the FMENV is expected to work actively with its subsidiaries, including National 
Environmental Standards Regulations and Enforcement Agency (NSEREA) and the State 
Ministries of Environment, but in reality it does not appear to do so. This partial involvement 
leads to a clear co-ordination problem for EIA implementation. At one level the coordination 
problem and lack of participation is not surprising, because ‘managing the EIA in countries 
with Federal system of government is usually characterised by conflict of roles, mandates and 
responsibilities between different levels of government (Nwafor, 2006, p. 595). 
  
This ‘partial involvement’ can be described with reference to two examples. First, looking at 
the involvement of NESREA – an agency under FEMNV that is directly involved in 
enforcing the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIS) – and second, via the involvement of 
SMENV that are legally charged to be active in the implementation process from the 
beginning to the end. With reference to NESREA, there is evidence of lack of clarity 
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regarding organisational roles between NESREA and Federal Ministry of Environment. One 
respondent commented (about 63% of the participants’ confirm the NMOGS’s high levels of 
conflict, while only 11% maintain that such conflict can be managed):  
‘...NESREA at one time or the other had always come in conflict with the 
FMENV (its parent body) as NESREA feels that it should be the one to handle 
most aspects of…’ (Interview with MS Lagos State Ministry of Environment, 
Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010).  
 
 
As Matland, (1995, pp. 158 & 166) emphasises, ‘policy means are ambiguous when there are 
uncertainties about what roles various organisations are to play in the implementation 
process...in experimental implementation the crucial element is: which participants are active 
and what is their intensity of participation?’. It is evident that NESREA has not been fully 
involved in the EIA implementation process, which has generated further conflict. To resolve 
these issues, a committee was formed to look into the problem between NESREA and 
FMENV. One interviewee commented:  
‘The Minister of Environment set up a committee to review all these 
discrepancies...it is an internal committee...and work is in progress as at 2010’    
(Interview with KV Federal Ministry of Environment, Programme Group 3
rd
 
September 2010).  
 
 
This situation cannot be compared with the occurrence within the inter-agency context, but 
implies that the FMENV’s EIA roles that are very clear in theory have not been strictly 
followed in practice:  
 ‘...the ideal situation is that every sector should cooperate...This problem of lack 
of delineation of responsibility that we have in Nigeria…and people ‘saying this 
agency is doing my job has led to conflict...’ (Interview with PB NESREA, 
Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
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Regrettably, again the main reason for this partial involvement is that both NESREA and 
FMENV see EIA implementation as directly relevant to their organisational interest. This 
confirms Matland’s assertion that ‘policy conflict will exist when more than one organisation 
sees a policy as directly relevant to its interests… ’ (Matland, 1995: 156). Similarly, 
‘ambiguous policies can breed limited accountability and…leaders pursuing their own 
interests’ (Matland, 1995: 167).  
 
For example, one of the Directors in NESREA maintained in the interview that this 
organisation had not been actively involved in the EIA implementation process and that 
currently ‘what we are asking for is for them (FMENV) to give us Environmental Impact 
Statement. However, ‘in the next stage, we would demand that we be fully carried along, but 
the statutory point is that we must have an EIS’ (Interview with GJ NESREA, Programme 
Group 2
nd
 September 2010). Similarly, the FMENV, through one of its principal officers 
agreed that NESREA was supposed to handle enforcement of EIA, but that the Ministry was 
often not minded to involve them in practice, which is evident from the following response:-   
‘We also have the NESREA who deals with enforcement, we are supposed to tell 
the agency that a particular company is not complying, it should go and arrest 
them...There is no clear schedule and proponents are also complaining’ (Interview 
with RO FMENV, Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
 
 
Partial involvement is also evident between the FEMNV and the State Ministries of 
Environment. For example, the EIA review process is originally made up of seven members, 
including an independent consultant, but only one slot is allocated to representative from the 
State ministries of Environment, which has made the process undemocratic. This gives the 
FMENV the upper hand in controlling the process, as decisions on EIA are made via voting. 
‘Participants’ level of activity in a choice situation depends on the intensity of their feelings, 
the number of other demands on their time, their physical proximity to the place where 
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decisions are made, and a host of other variables’  (Matland, 1995: 165). Another respondent 
confirmed this observation, noting that, 
‘On only very few projects that the attention of State Ministries was drawn by 
FMENV...’ (Interview with SL Lagos State Ministry of Environment, Programme 
Group 18
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
The State Environment Ministries’ main goal is for their voice to be heard during decision 
making on EIA, as currently the FMENV dominate the entire EIA implementation and 
review process (especially where a decision is to be made on whether a project should be 
approved or not). 
‘...you have the representative of the FMENV’s Minister…you have four people 
representing the FMENV alone and making them five people with the Minister…’  
(Interview with JE Lagos State Ministry of Environment, Programme Group 18
th
 
August 2010) 
 
 
It appears that the State Ministries of Environment are not comfortable with the present 
voting arrangement where out of seven members in the panel, five represents the interest of 
FMENV including an external member and Minister of Federal Environment, while only one 
member to present the States’ viewpoints. One of the purposes of this review process is to 
verify that the document (EIA Report) is...’sufficient for the purpose of decision-making... 
and the process carefully selects the reviewers, using input from the public involvement...’ 
(Wood, 2003a: 198). It is this unequal representation that propels the State Ministries of 
environment in demanding change to the EIA procedure, and this is evident from the 
statement below:- 
‘...the State Ministries are trying to enact their own EIA law, which would not 
have been necessary if the cooperation existed... ’ (Interview with JE Lagos State 
Ministry of Environment, Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010). 
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In summary, the main reason for conflicts and ambiguities in the sector through the 
FMENV’s EIA implementation style is lack of effective coordination and the partial 
involvement of other government and state agencies.  
 
Interviewees’ testimonies helped me to identify other reasons why the States are now 
demanding their own EIA systems. First, levels of environmental degradation vary from one 
state to another, and second, the States’ Ministries are demonstrably closer to local 
communities and the environment than FMENV. As Matland (1995: 156) notes, ‘disputes 
over policy means can develop over jurisdictional issues or over the substance of the 
proposed means for reaching the goals’.    
 ` 
‘...Just as FMENV makes law, the State Ministries can make the stringent laws 
and they cannot make laws that is less than Federal laws. It depends on the 
peculiarity of the state for example Lagos State...that is why we always tell the 
FMENV that because of peculiarity of Lagos State we cannot follow Federal laws, 
because Federal law is an average. For example, what is happening in Taraba 
State cannot be compared to Lagos State...’ (Interview with RI LESEPA 
Consultant, Programme Group 26
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
In Nigeria, the levels of environmental impact vary from one state to another though high 
levels of environmental impacts from oil companies are peculiar to Lagos and Rivers States 
for example. Some of the participants’ think that it is not justifiable for Lagos and Rivers 
States to have the same EIA legislation with some states like Taraba, where oil and gas 
related environmental degradation are insignificant. It is on this note that the former Director 
of the Environmental Assessment Unit at the State level commented that ‘...the FMENV laws 
should be minimum standard for Lagos State. Lagos State is also at the receiving end of 
upland location. We have the main river discharging on it...so Lagos State has to look inward 
and be able to make some laws that will fit into its own peculiarity so that it can have a very 
sustainable environment’ (Interview with RI LASEPA Consultant, Programme Group 26th 
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August 2010). Similarly, the Director of Research and Environment stated unequivocally that 
States Ministries should be permitted to have their own EIA, given that: 
‘...the State Ministries are eligible to have their law for EIA. Personally, I have 
taken this issue up at the Federal forum, but there is this general misconception 
that EIA is an exclusive matter, to me it is not, even in the country’s 
constitution...environment is under concurrent not exclusive. So state should be 
eligible to have their laws’ (Interview with SL Lagos State Ministry of 
Environment, Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
Another reason why State Ministries are demanding their own EIA is that a state-level 
approach might assist not only in attending to local community issues problems but also 
assist in carrying out effective monitoring. The Director of Environment, Rivers State 
Ministry of Environment maintained that- 
‘...someone that is not wearing the shoe might not know what it looks like...the 
States will really do the implementation effectively because they are most directly 
affected’ (Interview with EE Rivers State Ministry of Environment, Programme 
Group 7
th
 September, 2010). 
 
 
This section demonstrates that while the FMENV’s EIA system is regarded as the most 
robust nationally, it still suffers from being fully translated into practice through its 
implementation style, largely because of coordination difficulties. The effect of these co-
ordination problems is the existence of persistent, low levels of conflict, as some of the most 
closely involved agencies paradoxically have only partial access to all aspects of 
implementation process. It is exactly for this reason that State Ministries have been agitating 
for their own EIA system to be put in place, which I consider in more detail next.  
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8.3 Federal-state level interactions over EIA procedure 
 
 
‘...it is not surprising if the Federal Government wants to flex in muscle...You will 
now want to ask why I used the words flex muscle. We allowed the State 
Ministries to carry out their monitoring with or without us to see what is 
happening...Lagos State is one of the states agitating for their EIA but we at the 
Federal level are intent on denying them…’ (Interview with RA FMENV, 
Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
 
It is clear from the uncompromising statement above that the FMENV is denying the states 
any prospect of having their own EIA procedure, yet both Federal and State levels are still 
working together to manage their differences. This is why one of the principal staff of 
FMENV maintained that-  
‘...there are conflicts but the Federal Ministry of Environment is on top of them 
(Interview with KV FMENV, Programme Group 3
rd
 September 2010).   
 
The reason why FMENV is denying the SMENV from having their EIA is strongly related to 
power politics within Nigerian state. Matland (1995: 152) argues that ‘the state might be 
prevented from having its independent implementation on three grounds: first when there are 
constraints from the top [FMENV] second, when there is constraint from the bottom [State 
Ministries and their subsidiaries] and third, when specific factors defined as decisional 
outcomes and state capacity’. The situation in the States most directly affected by oil and gas 
pollution incidents revolves around these three reasons.  
Thus, the constraint from the top (Federal) is evident in the ways in which the FMENV is 
denying States from having their own EIA. The Federal Government through FMENV views 
that the States in particular (Lagos and Rivers States) are agitating for their own EIA because 
it bestows economic advantages on their local administrations. Based on this, the FMENV is 
sceptical in allowing the States Ministries to have their own EIA system, despite the fact that 
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the country’s constitution permits the States to manage their environment provided their aim 
is to achieve sustainable development. 
‘...the FMENV is seeing EIA as a service to the nation while [we believe] the 
State Ministries of Environment sees it as a revenue generation channel (Interview 
with ME FMENV, Programme Group 16
th
 August 2010). 
 
Again, Matland (1995: 150) points out that ‘flexibility and autonomy might be appropriate 
when the goals of the policy formulators and implementers are the same, but if they differ 
greatly, flexibility and autonomy may lead to policies which result in lower performance of 
official goal’. It seems apparent that FMENV and States goals for EIA implementation differ, 
the latter focuses on achieving sustainable development while the former is allegedly more 
interested in deriving economic benefits. All participants in consultant sub-group disagree 
with state government having their own EIA systems, considering the fact that double exist 
already in the sector.   
‘EIA at the first stage was in the hand of FMENV, but we were told that both 
State Ministries and Local Government Authorities want to be more actively 
involved in the process. The problem is that they are looking for what they could 
benefit in terms of money from the project ….a good example is a refinery project 
in Lekki (Lagos State)... The SMENV wanted to execute that project at Lekki by 
partnering (collaborating) with NOSDRA...level of cooperation is low...everyone 
is looking for way to derive benefit, rather than to work together and achieve 
result’ (Interview with DO Nigerian Environmental Society, 10th August 2010).  
 
A second reason why FMENV is denying the States from having their EIA system is that 
there are low levels of co-operation between States Ministries and their enforcement arms; 
for example between the Lagos State Ministry of Environment (LSMENV) and its 
enforcement arm, the Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency (LASEPA).  
‘...Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency is not even getting along with 
the Lagos State Ministry of Environment’ (Interview with ON FMENV, 
Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
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In an interview, one of the senior staff within Lagos State Ministry of Environment gave me a 
clearer picture regarding why the Ministry and its implementation arm had not been co-
operating.  
‘...the Lagos State Ministry of Environment as a policy maker is responsible for 
EIA issue while Lagos State Environmental Protection Agencies also feel that 
they are the one who are to implement these policies...but we (Lagos State 
Ministry) have always insist that EIA is a policy matter...’ (Interview with MS 
State Ministry of Environment, Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
A third reason why the FMENV does not want to cede powers to the States over the EIA 
procedure is the FMENV’s strong belief that the States do not have an adequate capacity to 
fulfil this task. Certainly, there is a wide difference between the state of facilities at the 
Federal and the State level. One of the senior officers in the Department of Research and 
Environment with Lagos State Ministry of Environment confirmed to me the situation at the 
State Ministries level, commenting that ‘…here now we cannot write a report because of the 
lack of electricity. This is one of the problems we face...the environment is not conducive, 
there is a limit to jobs one can do’ (Interview with JE Lagos State Ministry of Environment, 
Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010). This has contributed to the reason why most 
international organisations are not ready to partner with the States Ministries. This is evident 
from the statement below:-  
‘It may sound funny sometimes that some States claim that they want to carry out 
their EIA and World Bank does not recognise any EIA carried by such 
State...because they do not have the technical know-how to do so...’ (Interview 
with KV FMENV, Programme Group 3
rd
 September 2010).  
 
 
However, in Brazil there is provision for state and local government to make their own laws, 
and Glasson and Salvador (2000) view that the Brazilian EIA system might lead to some 
inconsistencies across the country arising from bureaucratic complications and delay. I would 
argue that the State Ministries in Nigeria should be allowed to make their own laws since 
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such plan is in line with the country’s constitution and importantly, they should do so if only 
they have adequate resources. The next section assesses the extent to which financial 
resources are sufficient in the NMOGS in order to establish how far resource-based issues are 
compromising EIA implementation patterns.  
 
 
8.4. Federal-State level budgetary allocations and patterns of EIA implementation         
 
 
 ‘For us to tackle environmental problems Government will need to allocate 
sufficient funding to the FMENV, considering the fact that the Ministry is 
currently categorised in class ‘C’ which attracts the lowest funding in Nigeria’ 
(Interview with KN NGO Environmental Right Action, Control Group 30
th
 
August 2010). 
 
 
In the sector, about 75% of the participants’ agree that financial resource is not sufficient. 
Adequate ‘financial resources can improve the likelihood of implementation success, because 
finance is the bedrock of implementation including projects management’ (Struyk, 2007: 68). 
Yet adequate resources are not always present, which might result in policy failure 
(Jacobsson and Bergek, 2011; Desia, 2004; John, 1998). In particular, budgets are made 
mostly under scarce/limited resources, and the Government departments cannot always 
expect to receive the full financial resource they request or need (Ostrow, 2000). The 
situation in the NMOGS across all agencies is that budgets are low, as the FMENV is 
categorised as class ‘C’ (that is one of the Federal Ministries that receives the lowest 
budgetary allocation).   
 
This explains why the oil and gas companies have been facilitating the entire EIA 
implementation process, as outlined in chapter 7. Recently, UNEP confirmed that the 
Nigerian Government Agencies are now wholly reliant on Oil and Gas Corporations for 
logistical support (UNEP, 2011). It appears that the FMENV desires change as ‘...in some of 
- 203 - 
 
the budgetary meetings the Director of Environmental Assessment has been asking for 
improvements in the issue of budget to enable them implement EIA’ (Interview with GJ 
National Environmental Standards and Regulation Agency 2
nd
 September 2010). 
‘...right now the budget for this year is not yet released...I think the resources are 
not sufficient for successful EIA implementation’ (Interview with OU Nigerian 
Maritime Administration Safety Agency, Programme Group 11
th
 August 2010).  
 
 
Lack of finance is thus contributing to the intra-agency context becoming more complex. 
This has many disadvantages, as one of the principal officers at the FMENV confirmed: 
‘...we have a lot of project that could have gone for the review but for budget 
constraint... we are having problem with funds not being released while we are 
have over hundreds of projects’ (Interview with RO FMENV, Programme Group 
2
nd
 September 2010). 
  
 
Similarly, the delay in budgetary allocation can be seen as a form of ambiguity of means 
following Matland’s views. Matland, (1995: 158) ‘calls to avoid ambiguity in policy means 
by limiting policy to those areas with an understanding of how actions occur, and those areas 
with known instrumental means to attain desired goals’. The main reason for the delay in 
budgetary allocation in the NMOGS is centred on the fact that a long chain of authorizations 
is required across the Federal Government machinery before budgetary allocation can be 
released (Omankhanlen, 2011). It appears that the process of getting the required approval is 
again affecting EIA implementation practice. It is for this, among other reasons that Nigeria’s 
National Assembly has called for a more rapid disbursement of the country’s annual budget 
(Akogun, 2011). Moreover, and in a broader context, national budgetary funding has been 
described as a ‘perennial battle ground; and conflict is inherent to any budgetary process...and 
the prospects for development often depend on the content of the budget’s provisions’ 
(Ostrow, 2000: 10).  
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The situation of inadequate financial resource within the NMOGS does not relate to conflict 
in the intra-agency context so much confirm as ambiguity of means as defined by Matland 
(1995). This is because the budgetary allocation, once received, is often mismanaged, as 
interviewee within the Federal Government acknowledged:  
‘...even we messed the resources up, we still go about asking for more’ (interview 
with RA Federal Ministry of Environment, Programme Group 2
nd
 September 
2010). 
 
 
Government Departments and Ministries have been urged to embrace a more equitable 
distribution of resources (Olamiriki, 2011). In order to address the problem of 
mismanagement of financial resources in the sector, the Federal Government established anti-
corruption agencies, the Independent Corrupt Practice Commission (ICPC) in 2000 and the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2002 to correct any form of 
abnormality regarding management of public funds in Nigeria. Although I cannot measure 
the extent to which this anti corruption agencies have been effective, this is because that is 
outside the objective of this chapter.  
 
This section has demonstrated that the situation regarding budgetary allocation in the sector is 
complicated, not only because the Federal Ministry in charge of environment is categorised 
as class ‘C’, but also because there is invariably a delay releasing the budget. Compounding 
this problem is that the budgets widely acknowledge as insufficient and is often mismanaged. 
This confirms the ‘top down’ policy implementation presumption that ‘...policy outcomes 
depend on the resources...’ (Matland, 1995: 166). The final section in this chapter examines 
the extent to which human resources are sufficient for monitoring and implementation 
purposes through the contributions of the Federal Government and international 
organisations.  
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8.5 The effect of available human resources on EIA implementation  
 
 
The nature of human resource entails abilities to observe, evaluate, reflect and react to 
organisational conditions...and they often...frustrate management strategies...and for this 
reasons, the human factor has posed the greatest challenge for organisation theory and 
management practice’ (Jaffee, 2001: 22). Likewise, Weimer and Vining (2005: 275) maintain 
that ‘successful policy implementation will be achieved not only when policy is reasonable, 
but mainly when there are committed and skilful people to manage it’. Consequently, one of 
the reasons for developing human resources in the policy implementation sphere is to 
emphasise change, which can be achieved in several ways: improved implementation 
performance and redefining performance standards (Zito and Schout, 2009). This section 
considers the extent to which the national government and international organisations have 
been assisting the sector and FEMNV in particular towards human resource development, 
including the extent to which those resources have been sufficient. I define human resources 
here in terms of personal skills and familiarity with appropriate technology (equipment). This 
section therefore focuses on equipment and technology, the level of personnel commitment 
towards environmental issues, and sources of training. In the organisational literature, ‘a 
technology is defined as the means, activities and knowledge used to transform materials and 
inputs into organisational outputs’ (Jaffee, 2001: 185). With this in mind, interviewees were 
asked the technological applications that were available for monitoring implementation 
outcomes (about 64% of the participants’ argue that skills are not sufficient in the sector): 
‘The equipments are not sufficient some officers do not have even laptop to carry 
out their work as expected’ (Interview with RO Federal Ministry of Environment, 
Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
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This comment would appear to suggest that an important reason why Government agencies 
have not been discharging their EIA implementation duties is their lack of necessary 
equipment. One interviewee – a retired Professor and also an adviser to Federal Ministry on 
environmental-related issues – further emphasises that effective implementation is hindered 
in the sector through inadequate human resources. 
‘...implementation of EIA is in the hand of civil servants...that do not have 
functional laboratories.  An ideal implementation process requires a system that is 
almost University based to be able to carry out research, and civil servants do not 
belong to such system...’ (Interview with PD Federal Ministry of Environment 
Consultant, Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010).  
 
 
Matland (1995: 158 & 166) comments that ‘by definition, where preferences are problematic 
and technology in particular is uncertain...implementation will be experimental. Yet 
Wilkinson and Appelbee (1999: 138) argue that ‘training everybody is unlikely to work... as 
such approach becomes little more than a top-down programmatic intervention... but if the 
context is changed by altering people’s roles, relationships and responsibilities...then the felt 
need to learn by those involved will rise rapidly’. This tends to be confirmed by one 
interviewee’s observation that: 
 
‘....I was in Kaduna refinery recently where I saw standard facilities poorly 
maintained. You begin to ask why things are not done correctly, and the reason 
for lack of achievement is because of lack of commitment and negligence’ 
(Interview with TR, NGO Social Environment Right Action, Control group 
Centre 27
th
 August 2010).      
 
 
The above comment shows that even in few cases where equipment is available, it is not 
functioning due to negligence, lack of maintenance and incompetence among other problems 
e.g. the Kaduna refinery in Nigeria. Wilson and Piper (2010, p. 43) comment that ‘adverse 
impact may be incurred if proposal for, say, option for technologies are not adequately 
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accessed’. According to Matland (1995, p. 161) ‘implementation failure occurs because of 
technical problems...but where the technology for dealing with the problem exist, 
implementation activities are concerned primarily with getting the technology in place 
functioning’ (Matland, 1995: 161).  
‘...to tackle the institutional incompetence, you need to have the ideal staff and up 
to date equipment. Reflecting on our level of development...we do not have 
enough’ (Interview with PB National Environmental Standard Regulation 
Environmental Agency, Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010).  
 
 
In the face of such shortages, the Federal Government has put in place measures including 
sending personnel on training courses. However, these have not been successful so far 
because those targeted for training have either approached retirement or have not been 
directly responsible for monitoring on the ground. This situation might lead to ‘a loss of 
corporate EIA memory as experienced in the U.S. (Wood, 2003a, p. 27), and the act of 
transferring the knowledge or skills might become difficult. This is evident the statement 
below: 
‘We use to have a senior colleague here, who was vastly experienced in EIA and 
represented Lagos State in several EIA panels. He was part of those who designed 
EIA in Nigeria, but he just retired. He was an authority...but the limitation is that 
apart from his way of transferring the knowledge, the institution had not allowed 
him to transfer the knowledge to people. So it is not that we do not have people, 
but instead of 10-15 we just have one man’ (Interview with OE Lagos State 
Environmental Protection Agency, Programme Group 25
th
 August 2010). 
 
 
Similarly, one of the executive officers of Waste Management Association of Nigeria 
maintains that ‘because of frustration in personnel at that Federal Ministry of Environment 
people want to leave’ (Interview with DG Waste Management Association of Nigeria 29th 
August 2010). Presently, large numbers of staff among the Government agencies are learning 
‘on the job’ as an alternative means of carrying out their duties.  
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Provision of ‘on-the-job-training’ can be an important capacity-building measure, following 
the example of youth employment programs (Matland, 1995). Yet the Federal Ministry 
mission statement still does not include ‘on-the-job-training’ as evidenced by this 
respondent’s experience:     
‘Most of us learn on-the-job, with inadequate facilities….The training is not 
sufficient...’ (Interview with RO Federal Ministry of Environment Programme 
Group 2
nd
 September 2010). 
 
  
While some of the Government agencies are placing emphasis on retraining their workforce, 
there are those who are soliciting international organisations for assistance as an alternative 
way of solving challenges related to inadequate human resource. Matland (1995: 161) 
comments that ‘remunerative mechanisms may be used, especially for pulling in outside 
resources, but most actions are induced through normative mechanisms (mutually held 
goals)’. These international organisations [including United Nations Development 
Programme, United Nations Environment Programme and International Maritime 
Organisation among others]  have been helpful not only in training the Government staff, but 
also in releasing funds. 
‘The role international organisations have played in assisting us in terms of 
funding and training is acknowledged...’ (Interview with ML Lagos State Ministry 
of Environment Programme Group 18
th
 August 2010) 
 
 
Nwafor (2006) describes these international organisations as a global EIA facilitator and the 
pacesetter in EIA improvement in developing countries and Nigeria in particular. In the past, 
about 70 Government agencies staff has been trained at the Federal and States government 
level (Nwafor, 2006). One of the participants and a professor who has chaired oil and gas 
EIA public review panel at various time emphasises that (75% of the participants’ confirm 
the significance role international organisations in terms of providing skills for the NMOGS):   
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‘...if not for UNDP, the FMENV would have ceased to do anything...it was the 
World Bank that started it but they stepped back because of misappropriation of 
money...’ (Interview with OK Academic Nigerian Institute of Social and 
Economic Research 7
th
 October 2010).  
 
 
It is clear that the level of training differs among the Government; the national government 
trained some, some learn on the job while others were trained by the international 
organisations. The implication of this is that staff of the same Ministry or Department might 
have different approaches toward the same EIA process, mainly because their levels and 
sources of training differ. This is viewed as a major challenge to uniform implementation 
nationally, as ‘among the actors with different training, there are substantially different 
proposal for implementing this policy and their implementation battles are likely to be long 
and bitter’ (Matland, 1995:. 169). However, presently in the sector, only a handful of staff has 
been trained by the international organisations.     
‘I am World Bank trained. There are few of us like that who had such high level 
training to produce good EIA report...’ (Interview with PL Academic University 
of Lagos, Control Group 16
th
 September 2010). 
 
 
It is therefore evident that Government agencies generally lack adequate human resources, 
despite the expectation that their personnel should know more about EIA implementation 
processes and procedures than those they are regulating. It seems that the reverse is the case 
in the sector, as indicated by the following statement:  
‘...if you want to regulate somebody...you should be ahead of the person to see 
what his doing that is a challenge’ (Interview with RA Federal Ministry 
Environment, Programme Group 2
nd
 September 2010).  
 
 
Nonetheless, in order to take the Government agencies in the NMOGS to the level of 
achieving effective EIA implementation in particular, resources should not be only available 
but sufficient. Provision of adequate resources in terms of financial and human resources in 
particular have remained a major challenge in most developing countries. For example, lack 
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of adequate resources that will enhance effective EIA implementation have reported in 
Pakistan (Saeed et al., 2012); Taiwan (Liaw and Jou, 2006); Ghana (Ofori, 2005; Appiah-
Opoku, 2001); Turkey (Coskun and Turker, 2011); Bangladesh (Ahmmed and Harvey, 2004); 
Sri Lanka (Samarokoon and Rowan, 2008); and Brazil (Glasson and Slavador, 2000).      
 
 
8.6 Conclusion  
  
 
‘Policies with clear and widely supported goals but with unclear means of 
implementation take on experimental characteristics...Implementing policies of 
this type can be technology-force and can lead to the development of entirely new 
capabilities and thus...ambiguity should be seen as an opportunity to learn both 
new means and goals’  (Matland, 1995, p. 167).  
 
 
The proceeding analysis has demonstrated the generally low level of collaboration among 
agencies working with FMENV on EIA implementation. Still, problem-solving is embraced 
and some level of consensus is evident compared with the inter-agency context reviewed in 
Chapter 7. For example, disagreement between NESREA and FMENV was referred to a 
committee, and State Ministries have been attempting to persuade the FMENV to grant them 
their EIA system.  
 
The chapter has attempted to show the extent to which resources have been insufficient in the 
sector, by focusing on financial and human resource based issues considering the importance 
of resources to policy implementation. I have shown that the impact of budgetary allocation 
has been felt not only because of the delay in the process of releasing the budget, but also 
because of budgetary mismanagement. Moreover, the contribution of national government 
and international organisations to human resource development has been insufficient, thus 
affecting EIA implementation. This is because very few Government personnel have been 
trained to date, and those that have are approaching retirement.  
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One of the lessons from this research is that there is no perfect system between FMENV and 
DPR, even though the former’s implementation style was identified in chapter 7 as being 
more effective. Similarly, I have been able to address the question arising from chapter 7; 
pertaining to the reason why oil and gas company sponsors EIA is now clear: the lack of 
financial resources seems to be the key factor in this context. Policy implementation theory 
has thus enabled me to identify both the nature and causes of EIA implementation failures.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter summarises the findings from the thesis and is divided into three sections. 
Section 9.1 outlines the main conclusions in relation to the original objectives of the research. 
Section 9.2 discusses the thesis’ broader contribution to knowledge, while section 9.3 
suggests recommendations to areas that require improvement. 
 
 
9.1 Summary of principal findings 
 
 
The thesis has attempted to address a gap in the literature on EIA implementation in the 
Nigerian maritime oil and gas sector. More specifically, the analysis has been framed with the 
aid of a focus on policy implementation and Matland’s Ambiguity-Conflict Model as a way 
of seeing beyond what previous researchers have reported. 
 
Returning to the first objective is concerned, it can be stated that the sector’s EIA systems 
have failed to address environmental challenges through various key implementation stages. 
This is particularly the case in the domain of mitigation compliance monitoring and public 
participation, and can mainly be attributed to institutional barriers. Financial costs and the 
lack of value attached to public well-being have also contributed negatively to the effective 
implementation of EIA procedures, which are seen in administrative turf by bureaucratic 
actors. Corporate interests are only too happy to allow this messy bureaucratic arrangement to 
continue, arguably encouraging its perpetuation: the current EIA process allows them to get 
away with continued abuses and violations. In this way, ‘local communities’ and ‘local 
environment’ bear the consequences of this political infighting/administrative disorganisation 
arising from twin-track EIA systems.  
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As far as the second objective of the research, it can be stated the domestic institutional 
context has resulted in high levels of inter-agency conflict, and high levels of policy 
ambiguity. A key cause of the ambiguity is that two EIA systems operate in parallel 
nationally due to, in part, the fact that ‘bureaucratic actors see their interests tied to a policy 
definition...’ (Matland, 1995: 168). Recent state-led attempts at mediating the differences 
between these competing EIA systems have only accentuated existing high levels of conflict. 
Notwithstanding recent achievements in terms of raising public and corporate awareness, 
institutional problems have thus prevented the NMOGS’s EIA implementation processes 
from being coherent and integrated in their approaches to environmental challenges and 
difficulties.  
 
In terms of the third objective, it can be stated that there is evidence of conflict over roles, 
responsibilities, duties of Government actors across the whole spectrum of EIA 
implementation activities; this has resulted in high levels of conflict at inter-and intra- 
organisational levels in particular. Not only have the differences between the sector’s EIA 
systems resulted in implementation failure by causing delay in the execution projects and 
creating high levels of ambiguity, but their similarities have also negatively affected the EIA 
process in several ways. Thus, when oil and gas companies sponsor the entire EIA process it 
clearly encourages agency capture of Government departments as ‘he who pays the piper 
dictates (calls) the tune’. Similarly, the use of local consultants has reduced the quality of 
EIA reports as many do not have the required skills, and allegations of using falsified data are 
rife.  
 
The implementation process within the intra-agency context of FMENV, while being 
associated with lower levels of conflict, is still impeded by poor co-ordination and 
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insufficient resources. This confirms Matland’s (1995) statement that ‘outcomes heavily 
depend on the resources and actors present in the micro-implementing environment’ (page 
166). It implies that the formal establishment of a single EIA system will be insufficient per 
se: a more functional and broad-based apparatus that gives joint consideration to political, 
social, economic, and institutional factors may be more beneficial. My analysis has 
demonstrated that the current EIA procedures give inadequate consideration to institutional 
co-ordination, making it difficult for the NMOGS to achieve sustainable development goals.  
 
9.2 Broader contribution to knowledge 
 
 
This research has demonstrated the need for understanding the specificities of national 
contexts in the evaluating EIA implementation, while re-affirming the importance of 
theoretically informed work on regulatory failure – not simply corporate indifference – in 
environmental management. The results of the research also provide a foundation for 
amending, refining and crucially learning from the present policy impasse, while improving 
EIA practice in Nigeria in future. 
 
Furthermore, the research has established that a single matrix of ACM cannot be used to 
explain EIA implementation processes. For example, the situation within the inter-agency 
context is largely grounded on symbolic implementation and partly on political 
implementation. This further substantiates the complexities of the NMOGS’s EIA 
implementation processes as evidenced under the empirical chapters. 
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It has also transpired that the NMOGS’ EIA style is reactive and conflictual. The style is 
reactive in nature because there might be no EIA in the sector which explains the succession 
of large-scale oil pollution incidents. It is conflictual because of the ‘twin track’ EIA systems 
that exist. The thesis has identified high levels of conflict within the inter-agency context and 
low levels of conflict within an intra-agency context. 
 
 
9.3 Policy recommendations  
 
 
‘…as the regulatory framework, it should set ambitious parameters for the use of 
land, the activities which take place on it, and relationship between those activities 
and built, social and natural environments…for this framework to be sufficiently 
ambitious, changes will be needed in the attitudes and behaviours of 
professionals, public and politicians; the professional owes a duty to press for the 
political decision-making to ensure this’ (Wilson and Piper, 2010: 371).  
 
 
As a result of the numerous identified challenges related to effective EIA in the Nigerian 
maritime oil and gas sector, current EIA implementation processes can be improved upon. 
Based on the findings from the previous chapters, Nigeria’s EIA should be addressed through 
the following four interventions:    
 
9.3.1 Encouraging synergies and conflict resolution among relevant Government 
Ministries, Departments, and implementing agencies   
 
It has been argued that conflict might shape or structure the manner in which resolutions 
should be developed (Heidbreder et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2005; Kakonge, 1998). However, 
Wilson and Piper (2010: 252) argue that ‘...it is not yet clear that sufficient attention is being 
paid to identifying and avoiding any conflict...to promote synergies’.  Similarly, deLeon 
(1999: 328) views that ‘mediated negotiation, consensus and conflict resolution should not be 
considered the answer to all implementation conflicts...but by the same token, these exercises 
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should not be dismissed as marginal or irrelevant’. This is because conflicts do not have to be 
destructive if they are well handled; rather they can be the source of creativity and 
innovations (Heidbreder et al., 2011; Abma, 2006). Inter-agency cooperation through 
negotiation and compromise is a reasonable strategy to improve EIA policy implementation 
(Lundin, 2007; Orubu, 2006; Beierle, 1999). Ruth et al. (2011) suggest that implementing 
agencies should embrace effective communication and more integrated approach as a path 
towards achieving sound practice. This is achievable in practice if only the Government 
implementing agencies are prepared to value individual differences. According to Covey 
(2004: 277) ‘valuing the differences is the essence of synergy - the mental, the emotional, the 
psychological difference between people and organisation’.    
 
In this context, the central issue emerging in the NMOGS is ameliorating conflicts among the 
Government agencies, and within these agencies. Currently, inter-organisational relations are 
poor and in order to address this situation, urgent attention is required towards conflict 
resolution (Jaffee, 2001). Government efforts should focus upon building the type of skills 
that encourage consensus (Goebel et al., 2005). Reaching consensus should not side-step 
major issues such as the fact that the ‘commitment to reach consensus through deliberative 
processes may ignore real and messy conflicts...’ (Wilson and Piper, 2010: 73). Reaching 
consensus in this way should help in capacity building, as long as parties concerned are 
willing to learn from one another (Randolph and Bauer, 1999). Forming consensus further 
provides ‘the foundation for effective policy implementation’ (Cohen, 2002: 175). It should 
be noted that achieving consensus goes beyond bringing the two EIA systems together, or 
having a single EIA in place. Rather, the Federal Government needs to provide a functional 
system that gives recognition to the key sustainable development components and which 
actively encourages high level of cooperation among its Departments, Ministries and 
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implementing agencies. This suggests that clear achievable organisational responsibilities 
should be allocated and monitored.  
 
But top-down implementation solutions are not of themselves sufficient. In the NMOGS, 
maritime experts and NIMASA in particular should be actively involved in the EIA process, 
alongside with local community representatives, so as to ensure a demarcation of 
responsibilities that will be embraced in practice (Persson and Nilsson, 2007; Kakonge, 
1998). Close attention should be given to the practicality of the States Ministries, especially 
Lagos and Rivers States being allowed to introduce their own EIA systems (because of their 
peculiarities), provided they have the necessary capacity to do so; given that any tangible 
opportunity or benefit should attract what has been described as ‘no regrets and win-win 
outcomes’ (Wilson and Piper, 2010, p. 373). Moreover, allowing State Ministries to have 
their EIA system would reflect true federalism practiced in the US (Wood, 2003a). The 
popular saying in Nigeria presently is that ‘true federalism’ is the solution to many domestic 
problems, and achieving this should be given the type of recognition and value it deserves. 
 
9.3.2 Improving the political economy of the sector 
 
Stronger political intervention by the Federal Government in the sector is necessary to 
enhance effective EIA implementation (Carley, 2011). This is required to achieve effective 
compliance with the contents of mitigation measures and public participation. Clearly, 
political support is required to make national oil company projects comply with the existing 
regulatory requirements, for example tank farm owners refusing to relocate as directed. In the 
same manner, political intervention is needed by President’s office to make the Government, 
Departments and Ministries function in a more unified and streamlined way, and to uphold 
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the Government’s directives. As Jenkins (2007: 27) maintains, that ‘policy process entails 
compromise, imposition, deal making, and all these can be characterised as political’. It 
should be recalled that ‘politics is not just about elections and parties, as it concerns the entire 
process of public decision-making and government behaviours’ (John, 1998: 1). 
Understanding this type of bureaucratic politics is absolutely essential to successful policy 
implementation (Painter and Jeffrey, 2010).  
 
Similarly, environmental issues should be given greater political priority, and financing this 
aspect in particular should be boosted through an expansion of the Ecological Fund. Oil and 
gas companies should stop sponsoring the EIA implementation process (and monitoring in 
particular), in order to ensure that EIAs are genuinely impartial. Porter et al. (2000) 
emphasise that compliance and effective implementation should be supported through public 
funding. Moreover, the Federal Government should review the sector’s EIA implementation 
machinery. This should address statutory penalties and fines imposed for not conducting 
EIAs, which are currently less than the cost of conducting EIA in the NMOGS. Current 
practice encourages some operators to pay fines rather than conduct EIAs. Generally, the 
issue of ‘twin-track’ EIA systems should be resolved quickly and expeditiously by 
Presidential action.  
 
Lastly, the involvement of local consultants should be encouraged, providing they are trained 
to ensure that ‘work is only undertaken by competent individuals’ (Fuller, 1999: 74). Foreign 
consultants should not be excluded from operating in the NMOGS; indeed, this might 
enhance knowledge exchange or transfer. It has been argued that ‘sustainability is a national 
responsibility...but its goal cannot be achieved without assistance from international 
development partners and regional organisations...’ (Lal, 2011: 48). 
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9.3.3 EIA implementation: Social interactions and democratic issues  
 
Representatives from local communities should be allowed to participate fully in the EIA 
process, as they are critical stakeholders. Based on the multiple challenges related to public 
participation and difficulty in accessing EIA reports, the current 21 days consultation period 
should be increased to 52 days. This is line with Hartley and Wood’s (2005: 339) suggestion 
that consultation period should be increased from three weeks to six weeks in the United 
Kingdom to ‘strengthen participation processes’. Furthermore, the FMENV should take 
seriously issues relating to raising environmental awareness. Improved social outcomes and 
building social capital potentially mark a great achievement for EIA implementation if 
conducted appropriately (Peltonen and Sairinen, 2011; Wilkinson and Appelbee, 1999). It 
should become standard practice for EIA reports to be made publicly available and to be 
displayed in places easily accessible to local communities. EIA reports should be available 
via the internet as Vestman and Conner (2006: 228) comment ‘...people should be 
encouraged to...engage in the political life of their own community’.    
 
EIA public reviews should be given more publicity beyond newspaper publications. 
Information should be passed across to stakeholder group via radio using local language 
stations, as most local communities are illiterate and rely heavily on radio. Likewise, the few 
actual NGOs (that is, NGOs free from Government influence) should be given every 
opportunity to fully participate in the EIA process from consideration of alternatives to 
monitoring. As Beierle (1999: 76) suggests, public participation should be balanced and 
integrated with other important aspects of environmental decision-making process, such as 
evaluations, the environmental conditions of the system of interest, and national regulatory 
context. 
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9.3.4 Adopting best practice 
 
Naturally, identifying and adopting best practice is an important goal for the Federal 
Government of Nigeria, but the NMGOS should need to ensure basic procedure is followed 
first. For example, accurate data should be used and environmental related information 
should be made accessible and transparent in line with the Aarhus principle (Hartley and 
Wood, 2005). Lack of accountability of Government agencies should be remedied. As Covey 
(2004: 46) observed ‘we are what we repeatedly do...excellence, is not an act, but a 
habit...and habit can be learned or unlearned...it is not a quick fix...it involves a process and a 
tremendous commitment’. This suggests that Government agencies should not only do the 
right things first, but they should address their underlying organisational culture before 
adopting the best practice from developed countries. Moreover, Jordan et al. (1998: 1404) 
argue that ‘...implementation is by no means perfect; it might be improved as a result of 
learning and experimentation with new policy tools’. In order for the sector to meet with 
developed world current practices, the use of EIA together with New Environmental Policy 
tools (NEPIs) might be explored.  
 
In line with other countries’ experience, improved co-ordination of SEA and EIA is also 
needed. It is clear that ‘good coordination between planning levels and between SEA and 
EIA is needed to achieve planning for sustainable development, efficient and effective 
decision-making’ (Arts, 2011: 415).    
 
Once basic procedures are being followed, Government policy makers and stakeholder 
groups might consider that EIA be complemented by the addition of other policy instruments 
such as eco-taxes (Sairinen, 2003). This would greatly improve existing environmental 
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management possibilities and offer the chance for the development of second-generation 
instruments that provide for increased flexibility, efficiency, effectiveness, and legitimacy. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
 
 
List of secondary data gathered in  Nigeria: 
 
1. Previous EIA reports on the multinational oil companies’ projects:  
 EIA report for West African Gas Pipeline Project conducted on October 2004  
 EIA report for the Agbami field development June 2004 
 EIA report for the Oil Prospecting Lease 286 project June 2006  
  
2. Previous EIA report on the national oil companies’ projects: 
 Environmental and Social Impact Assessment of Oando Petroleum Delivery 
system from SPM (Single Point Mooring) to marketer’s Jetties at Apapa, Lagos 
conducted on November 2008 
 EIA of the proposed Lister oil Petroleum Tank farm at creek road Apapa, Lagos 
submitted by Lister oil Limited on April 2008 
 EIA of Linetrale Gas LPG (Liquefied Natural Gas) Facilities in Lagos conducted 
on 2008 by Linetral Gas Limited  
 
3. Evidence of Environmental and social problems in the study areas as released by ERA 
(Environmental Right Action)/ Friends of the Earth Nigeria 
 Field report on Shell spill still wrecking havoc in Ejama Ebubu community Eleme 
LGA Rivers State, and this exercise was carried out on 26/7/2010  
 Field report on Shell’s water borehole poison’s community carried out 3/8/10 
 Field report on serious oil and gas leakage along Agip (now ENI) pipeline in 
Ikarama community, Bayelsa State 
  
4. Policy Documents 
 Decree no. 86 – Environmental Impact Assessment Decree 1992 
 Guidelines for review of EIA report in Nigeria 
 EIA sectoral guidelines: oil and gas industry projects 
 Guidelines for EIA: sectoral guidelines for waste management facility 
 National requirements and guidelines on environmental management system  
 Lagos State of Nigeria Official Gazette 
 National oil spill detection and response agency establishment Act, 2006 
 National EIA procedure/existing states instruments of intervention 
 Petroleum Industry Bill 
 Number of projects registered and approved for EIA from 1995- 2005 
 Number of EIAs processed between 1995- 2005 (July) and oil and gas in 
particular. 
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The participants are described on chart and table respectively in appendix 2a and 2b   
 
 
Appendix 2a 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Participants' sub-groups 
2. Participants' groups 
1. Participants Participants 
Control group 
Environmental 
Related 
Associations 
and NGOS' 
1. Nigerian 
Environmental 
Society    
2. Waste 
Mangement 
Society of 
Nigeria 
3.Environment
al Rights 
Action 
4. Social and 
Environmental 
Rights  Action 
 
Academics 
and Legal 
Practioners 
1. University 
of Lagos 
2. University 
of Nigeria 
3. University 
of Ibadan 
4. Nigerian 
Institute of 
Social and 
Economic 
Research  
Programme 
group 
 
 
 
Federal Ministry of Environment 
1.National Environmental Standards Regulations 
and Enforcement Agency 
2. National Oil Spill Detection and Response 
Agency 
 3. Lagos State Ministry of Environment 
4. Rivers State Ministry of Environment 
5. Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency 
Other  agencies under programme  group are: 
6. Department of  Petroleum Resources 
7. Nigerian Maritime Administrative and Safety 
Agency 
8. Minstry of Niger Delta Affairs 
9. Nigerian Port Authority ;and  
10. Consultants 
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Appendix 2b 
 
List of participants within the control and programme groups respectively 
 
Serial 
number 
1-18 
Code for the 
participants 
within the 
control group 
Details of participants within the programme group 
1 DO (NES)  Member of the Nigerian Environmental Society and also a 
senior staff in National Oil Spill Detection and Respond 
Agency. 
2 SU (NES) Member of the Nigerian Environmental Society and also a 
senior staff in Department of Petroleum and Resources. 
3  TR (SERAC)  The Head of Department Legal Issues in Social 
Environmental Rights Action Centre.  
4 EL (SERAC) The Head of Department Environmental and Housing 
Issues in Social Environmental Rights Action Centre. 
5 BE (WMSN)  One of the representatives of Waste Management Society of 
Nigeria and also an assistant director in Lagos State 
Environmental Protection Agency.   
6 DG (WMSN) One of the executive officers of Waste Management Society 
of Nigeria and also on secondment to Nigerian Maritime 
Administration and Safety Agency. 
7 PP (ERA)  Head of Media and Environmental issues in Environmental 
Rights Action Lagos State office. 
8 KN (ERA) Director, Environmental Rights Action, Lagos State office. 
9 MH (ERA) One of the coordinators, Environmental Rights Action, 
Rivers State Office. 
10 AS (GTEI) One of the executive officers of Green Thinking 
Environmental Initiative and formerly director of training 
and education in Federal Ministry of Environment. 
11 AE (LEGAL) Senior associate and environmental lawyer at Aluko and 
Oyebode Associate.  
12 AM (LEGAL) Senior associate and environmental lawyer at Aluko and 
Oyebode Associate. 
13 ES (LEGAL) Associate and environmental lawyer at Aluko and Oyebode 
Associate. 
14 OB 
(ACADEMICS) 
One of the coordinators in charge of Basel Convention in 
Africa and a Professor of Chemistry at the University of 
Ibadan, Nigeria. He was one of the experts that prepared the 
country’s EIA Act in 1992, and also the resident consultant 
to Federal Ministry of Environment and adviser on 
technical matter to National Environmental Standards 
Regulations and Enforcement Agency. 
15 KK2 
(ACADEMICS) 
A Professor of Bio-chemistry at the University of Lagos, 
Nigeria and also EIA consultant. 
16 PA 
(ACADEMICS) 
A retired Professor of Geography, University of Nigeria, 
and he have participated in several oil and gas related EIA 
projects as chairman of the review panel.  
- 285 - 
 
17 OK 
(ACEDAMICS) 
A Professor and presently working with the Nigerian 
Institute of Social and Economic Research and he have 
chaired several oil and gas related EIA review panel 
sections. 
18 PL 
(ACADEMICS) 
A Professor of Chemistry, University of Lagos and he have 
also chaired several EIA review panel sections. 
Serial 
Number 
19- 56 
Codes for the 
participants 
within the 
programme 
group 
Details of participants within the programme group  
19 AD (DPR) One of the principal officers in DPR, presently assisting in 
the area of marketing.   
20 DO2 (DPR) One of the Deputy Managers, Environmental Unit, 
Department of Petroleum Resources. 
21 IY (DPR) One of the Managers, Environmental Unit in Department of 
Petroleum Resources. 
22 MB (DPR) One of the principal officers in Environmental Unit, DPR  
23 RO (FMENV) Senior Administrative officer in Environmental Assessment 
Department, Federal Ministry Environment Head quarter.  
24 ON (FMENV) Assistant Director in Environmental Assessment 
Department, Federal Ministry of Environment HQ. 
25 RA (FEMNV) Assistant Director in Environmental Assessment 
Department, Federal Ministry of Environment HQ. 
26 KV (FMENV) Assistant Director in Environmental Assessment 
Department, Federal Ministry of Environment HQ. 
27 ME (FMENV) A senior staff in Environmental Assessment Department, 
Federal Ministry of Environment, Lagos State Office. 
28 AN (NIMASA) Administrative officer in Department of Marine 
Environmental Management, Nigerian Maritime 
Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA).  
29 HI (NIMASA) Senior Administrative officer in Department of Marine 
environmental Management, NIMASA.   
30 KU (NIMASA) Principal Assistant Registrar in Department of Marine 
Environmental, NIMASA.   
31 BR (NIMASA) Senior Administrative officer in Department of Marine 
environmental Management, NIMASA.   
32 MA (NIMASA) Administrative officer in Department of Marine 
environmental Management, NIMASA.   
33 OU (NIMASA) Principal Assistant Registrar in Department of Marine 
Environmental, NIMASA. 
34  MB2 (NOSDRA) Assistant Director in National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency.  
35 RD (NOSDRA) One of the Directors in National Oil Spill Detection and 
Response Agency (NOSDRA). 
36 GJ (NESREA) One of the principal officers in policy analysis and 
cooperation unit of National Environmental Standards 
Regulations and Enforcement Agency.  
37 PB (NESREA) One of the principal officers in planning and information 
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management unit of National Environmental Standards 
Regulations and Enforcement Agency. 
38 FO (MNDA) One of the principal officers at Federal Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs. 
39 NI 
(CONSULTANT) 
Nigerian maritime oil and gas sector consultant.  
40 TU 
(CONSULTANT) 
Nigerian maritime oil and gas sector consultant. 
41 RI 
(CONSULTANT) 
Nigerian maritime oil and gas sector consultant. 
42 PD 
(CONSULTANT) 
Nigerian maritime oil and gas sector consultant. 
43 MS (LSMENV) Principal scientific officer, Department of Environmental 
Assessment and Research in Lagos State Ministry of 
Environment. 
44 SL (LSMENV) One of the principal officers in Environmental Assessment 
and Research, Lagos State Ministry of Environment. 
45 JE (LSMENV) Senior Administrative officer, Department of 
Environmental Assessment and Research in Lagos State 
Ministry of Environment. 
46 ML (LSMENV) Principal scientific officer, Department of Environmental 
Assessment and Research in Lagos State Ministry of 
Environment. 
47 SS (LASEPA) Deputy Director, Lagos State Environmental Protection 
Agency (LASEPA). 
48 OE (LASEPA) One of the Special Assistants to the General Manager on 
environmental compliance, LASEPA. 
49 OE2 (LASEPA) One of the Deputy Directors, Sanitation and Environmental 
Health Department, LASEPA. 
50 FS (LASEPA) One of the Senior Special Assistants to the General 
Manager on environmental compliance, LASEPA. 
51 EE (RSMENV) Director, Rivers State Ministry of Environment.  
52 MK (RSMENV) Administrative officer, Rivers State Ministry of 
Environment.  
53 JM (RSMENV) Administrative officer, Rivers State Ministry of 
Environment. 
54 HR (RSMENV) One of the principal officers, Rivers State Ministry of 
Environment. 
55 KK (RSMENV) Senior Administrative officer, Rivers State Ministry of 
Environment. 
56 EE2 (NPA) Assistant Director, Health Safety and Environment 
Department in Nigerian Port Authority (NPA)  
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Appendix 2c: Analysing the available data using a descriptive statistics (percentage) 
 
 
 
CODES  STAT
E OF-
ENV 
IMPACTS 
OF EIA 
COOPERATIO
N 
BARRIERS FUND
S 
SKILL
S 
ROLES 
OF THE 
DONOR
S 
DO 
(NES) 
YES  POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
SU 
(NES) 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
TR 
(SERAC) 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
EL 
(SERAC) 
NO NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
BE 
(WMSN) 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES YES NO HIGH 
DG 
(WMSN) 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO YES  HIGH 
PP 
(ERA) 
NO NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
KN 
(ERA) 
NO NEGATIV
E 
LOW  YES NO  NO HIGH 
MH 
(ERA) 
NO NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO YES PARTIA
LLY 
AS 
(GTEI) 
NO NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO  YES PARTIA
LLY 
AE ( 
LEGAL) 
YES NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO NO PARTIA
LLY 
AM 
(LEGAL 
YES NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO NO PARTIA
LLY 
ES 
(LEGAL 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
OB (AC) BOTH BOTH LOW YES NO  YES HIGH 
KK2 
(AC) 
BOTH POSITIVE HIGH YES NO NO HIGH 
PA (AC) BOTH NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO YES HIGH 
OK (AC) BOTH BOTH LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
PL(AC) YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
PROGR
AMME 
GROUP 
CODE 
       
AD 
(DPR) 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES YES YES HIGH 
DO 2 
(DPR) 
YES POSITIVE HIGH YES NO NO HIGH 
IY 
(DPR) 
YES BOTH HIGH YES YES YES HIGH 
MB YES POSITIVE HIGH YES NO NO HIGH 
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(DPR) 
RO 
(FMENV 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
ON 
(FMENV 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
RA 
(FMENV 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO YES HIGH 
KV 
(FMENV 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
ME 
(FMENV 
BOTH NEGATIV
E 
HIGH YES NO YES HIGH 
AN 
(NIMAS
A 
NO NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
HI 
(NIMAS
A 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
KU 
NIMAS
A 
YES BOTH LOW YES NO YES HIGH 
BR 
(NIMAS
A 
YES NEUTRAL LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
MA 
(NIMAS
A 
YES POSITIVE AVERAGE YES NO YES HIGH 
OU 
(NIMAS
A 
YES NEUTRAL LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
MB2 
(NOSDR
A 
YES POSITIVE HIGH YES NO NO HIGH 
RD 
(NOSDR
A 
YES POSITIVE HIGH  YES NO NO HIGH 
GJ 
(NESRE
A 
YES POSITIVE HIGH YES NO NO PARTIA
LLY 
PB 
(NESRE
A 
YES NEUTRAL LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
FO 
(MNDA 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO NO HIGH 
NI 
(CONST 
YES POSITIVE AVERAGE YES YES YES HIGH 
TU 
(CONST 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES YES YES HIGH 
RI 
(CONST 
BOTH BOTH LOW YES YES YES HIGH 
PD 
(CONST 
BOTH BOTH HIGH YES NO NO PARTIA
LLY 
MS 
(STATE 
YES POSITIVE HIGH YES YES YES HIGH 
SL BOTH POSITIVE HIGH YES YES NO NEUTRA
- 289 - 
 
(STATE L 
JE 
(STATE 
BOTH NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES YES NO PARTIA
LLY 
ML 
(STATE 
NO BOTH LOW YES YES NO PARTIA
LLY 
SS 
(LASEP 
BOTH POSITIVE HIGH YES YES YES HIGH 
OE 
(LASEP 
YES POSITIVE AVERAGE YES YES NO HIGH 
OE2 
(LASEP 
YES POSITIVE HIGH YES YES YES PARTIA
LLY 
FS 
(LASEP 
YES NEGATIV
E 
AVERAGE YES NO NO PARTIA
LLY 
EE 
(STATE 
YES POSITIVE AVERAGE YES BOTH BOTH HIGH 
MK 
(STATE 
YES POSITIVE HIGH YES NO NO HIGH 
JM 
(STATE 
YES POSITIVE HIGH YES NO NO NEUTRA
L 
HR 
(STATE 
YES POSITIVE LOW YES NO YES PARTIA
LLY 
KK 
(STATE 
NO NEGATIV
E 
LOW YES NO NO LOW 
EE2 
(STATE 
YES POSITIVE AVERAGE YES NO NO PARTIA
LLY 
 
 
Further Analysis of Available Data 
 
 
 Improving the state of the environment: yes = 38 (68%); no = 8 (14%); and both = 10 
(18%)  
 
 Impact of previous EIA: positive =33 (59%); negative =13 (23%); and both =7 
(13%) and neutral = 3 (5%) 
 
 Level of cooperation among the government implementing agencies: low = 35 (63%); 
high = 15 (28%) and average = 6 (11%) 
 
 Barriers related to EIA implementation: the entire participants agreed that they are 
high = 56 (100%) 
 Sufficiency of financial resources: no = 42 (75%); yes = 13 (23%) and both = 1 (2%)   
 Sufficiency of skills: no = 36 (64%); yes = 19 (34%) and both = 1 (2%) 
 Role of international organisations: high = 42 (75%); low = 1 (2%); partially = 12 
(21%); and neutral = 1 (2%)  
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Appendix 3: Samples of available data  
 
 
Interview 9: with (MH) ‘NGO’ ERA 
Length of time: 1 hour: 10 minutes and 59 seconds 
Date: 8
th
 September 2010 
 
 
1. No, I think because there is a lot of gaps and loopholes. The first major issue is EIA 
legislation, EIA may be written, and people may write EIA without going to the site 
where the project is taking place. I have example of West Africa Gas Pipeline 
(WAGP) project. Which year was that? I did a campaign on it on behalf of ERA in 
2005-2009 in Badagry. The panel of expert from the World Bank find out that it 
appears people do not go to do a clear EIA. Why? That is the normal thing in Nigeria. 
What were the panel observations? You know it was just simple thing to identify the 
owners of the land. What we do is to ask people to stand by their land, if you are not 
there that day; it means you are not the owner of the land. There is no clear historical 
natural way people deal with land. This is what EIA should contain not just doing desk 
approach by copying thing together, and there it was reported that 5,000 and 10,000 
people were affected and we cannot find those people that were affected. Although, 
only few people appeared, but cannot find all the people they are referring to that were 
affected. Does it mean that what you see on the ground contradicts what was in 
the EIA report? Yes, it contradicts what was on the ground. Is that project own by 
the multi-nations or the indigenous companies? It was owned by the Chevron and 
Shell, Chevron and Shell has the major shares, and the Nigerian Gas Company- the 
project start from Lagos to Accra, and these are project that have gone out. There is a 
professor in USA he did resettlement issue, and concluded that this thing has not been 
done. I do not think this has in way helped in environmental development issues in 
Nigeria. I have been working on this issue for the past nine years; Niger Delta is one of 
the worse environments on planet earth. This is because we are still doing the same 
thing that we have been doing since nine years ago. 
2. I think what we have seen with the previous EIA was attempt to cut corners. What do 
you mean by this? To reduce cost and not to do full activities as the process required. 
Is a situation where people do not have access to the report, and the report that is 
voluminous they call you in one day to make input. I think it is 21 days? Yes, 21 
days, but the problem is this you cannot take the document away; you can photocopy 
some few part from the state ministry of environment. Why is it that in the same 
ministry I was told EIA cannot be photocopy at all? That is the issue, we campaign 
for through internet that WAGP EIA should be put on internet and they have done that. 
You can see it on World Bank inspection panel site. That was one time EIA was on the 
website. We still agitate further that the same WAGP EIA should be in our local 
language (Yoruba) that is the executive summary. Have they done that? They said 
they will do it that is the problem. People start to cut corner to reduce cost because the 
system is very flexible. Can we say that this is why EIA has not been fully 
implemented? I think is the major part of reason that the system is so flexible and 
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corrupt, because they do not know the connection between life and environment. 
Whatever that affects the environment affects life. You read this beautiful EIA report, I 
know the consultant that wrote the report, he lived here in Pot-Harcourt and he was 
doing consulting job for UNDP. If you get data from Local Government Authority and 
you know that the Nigeria situation that many secondary data are tinted. The question 
is- does he ever go to field to take random sample, to see how many schools we have. I 
have done research to know whether the social amenities provided by the 
multinationals are still functioning and all these are not working and 70% of them are 
no longer functioning. There might be some impact but with the experience in Niger 
Delta, for me I don’t want say there is no impact, but in line with UNEP findings on 
the amount of damages that has been done to environment.  
3. We have been doing a lot of campaign in the Niger Delta with different groups; we 
have done a lot on what is expected from the community as regards EIA. We have 
discovered that most people do not have idea about EIA process in our community, 
then of the stakeholder is knocked out. We now have ministry that suppose to 
implement EIA law, like FMENV, the DPR, and now nobody know what is going on. 
We also have NOSDRA, NESREA, DPR, and who did what, and what I am asking 
NOSDRA people, do you have right to enforce rule on oil and gas sector apart from 
pollution control, then what is the role of DPR, are you people not conflicting. I was at 
the new Bill where we are working with the National Assembly that is oil sector 
reform bill and did a critic on it. This was started by Yaradua regime; there was 
massive debate on it and Shell is planning to leave Nigeria if that is passed that there 
are many tax they will pay and they have start sell some of their asset and that was the 
time the Nigeria government was thinking of selling most of its asset to the Chinese 
government, though, they have resolved it now. What can you say about the DPR 
and FMENV EIA systems? There is no coordination, too many agencies doing the 
same thing and no one is ready to take responsibility. This is because the person is 
waiting for another person to do it. The issue is that there is no clear coordination, and 
there is overlapping of functions. They do not know role to play. The DPR is 
regulating oil companies and is arm of NNPC (Nigeria National Petroleum 
Corporation), and you now ask DPR to regulate own oil companies, where NNPC has 
51 percent of this share. NNPC own the major shares and you now ask NNPC to 
regulate, it will cut corners. Could that be responsible for the lack of effective 
implementation of EIA? Yes, it is one of the major reasons for the lack of effective 
implementation. For example, if you ask me to put my office fan in one in order to 
minimise electricity and there is heat and I want to enjoy myself. I will put it in five 
and when you come and ask me, I will tell you it is always in one. Please let look at 
another example, but you have not concluded that NOSDRA example. It was an 
issue they (NOSDRA) said civil society is not helping and you people just started. This 
is the first time you are meeting with the civil society and it is a bit unfortunate you are 
taken this position. I have the bill between you (NOSDRA) and DPR, what is your 
role, can you take action, and it was the same issue we discuss in Mali and I was able 
to even discuss with the Minister of environment on how the agencies cannot 
complement each other and he couldn’t say anything. I am sure he hasn’t read the law, 
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and I discuss with his staff. They said the issue is that they are doing it together; you 
know is not convincing when someone say we are doing together. The Nigerian 
national always have answers for anything under the sun. Somebody came from 
NOSDRA and sat me down and say see this process of monitoring EIA that the aspect 
of monitoring cave out for the DPR and the DPR cannot do that as it is self regulation. 
DPR cannot be an unbiased empire in that particular process. What is the 
relationship between NGO’s and governmental agencies? We have been making 
effort, whether we like it or not we have to work with government agencies. They see 
us as an opposition party, we have been organising conference sponsor by the UNDP 
and FMENV on environmental issues, and is yearly issue where we look at 
environmental issues in Nigeria. We also do campaign on how people can use the law. 
I am not from that community I still send my staff to such community, and we need to 
get people involved. There is one EIA now on display by the Rivers State Ministry 
of Environment and is titled Agada oil development by Shell with Agip Total 
Venture; please have you taken a look of that? We have taken a look of the report, 
but we have someone from the community complaining that they taken their lands, 
community are not so interested.  These things are publicly announced in line with 
the Rivers State Ministry of Environment, and there is an EIA report on their 
table for display. Yes, you can announce it on the radio will it be too much for the 
Ministry or proponents to take it upon themselves to take the report to  L.G.A (Local 
Government Authority) and see if there is anything you want to change. The problem 
with us (NGO’s) now is that of funding, the funding to look at EIA, when funding runs 
out; we cannot use funding meant for another issue. What we do is to report and 
monitor environmental issues by putting it on our website and the present 
Commissioner of Environment in the State was one of us before. Can you confirm 
the issue of waivers giving to some projects in the Rivers State, and construction 
turbines in particular? Yes, that is what is happening all over that was what they are 
doing. Shell has finished their own, Agip is constructing their own and the State has 
announced that 120 will be built. That is cooperation between government and oil 
companies at the detriment of the environment and people. Everybody look at if that 
could kill the carbon monoxide and nobody look at the effect of the turbines, even 
Shell has 16 turbines, and nobody knows the implication of those turbines. Is the issue 
of EIA waivers for the construction of turbine applicable to oil and gas projects? 
No, it is not applicable. The other issue I will like to discuss is my friend that uses to 
work with oil industry now with export zone. What he told me was an eye opener that 
they drill in a site and no oil and you have gas coming up and fish get kill that was 
why he left the company. Which oil company was that? I can no say it now. The 
normal thing is after drilling, if they cannot find oil to cap it back and there was no 
EIA that was why they cannot cap it back, because EIA will contain what to do.      
4. That is a tough question, I think is not EIA that is the problem, because we have done 
comparative study of EIA law, and FEPA Act was one of the progressive laws in the 
Sub-Sahara Africa. I think the issue is Nigeria factor. What do you mean by the 
Nigeria factor? There is tendency that government and oil companies always sit 
together against people and environment that is the major problem we have been 
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looking at profit above the environment that is problem against implementation of 
EIA. Even writing EIA people look at how much they will get from EIA that is cutting 
corner. For example, UNEP have spent 10 million Dollar in looking at level of oil spill 
in Ogoni, and when they check mitigation no one know how much they will spend. We 
should do the normal thing from the onset and spend little money and do the proper 
thing. So I think it is the issue of oil companies and the Nigerian government against 
the people. I think the only thing to change from the EIA Act is to ask oil companies to 
open a separate account in the case of oil spill, because they are not ready to follow the 
mitigation measure as there is nobody to force them. Why is it that the regulators 
cannot force these multi-national oil companies to do the right things? We have 
said it before that DPR is the part of the business. We need to have an independent 
external source; even when the government create NOSDRA, we think they will take 
the multinational to follow the procedures, but NOSDRA said their own is only to see 
to oil spill. Is it true that it is oil companies that sponsor the regulators trip during 
monitoring? Very true, I have it on good authority. A DPR monitoring official told 
me that his bills was paid by the oil company, external transport was paid by the oil 
company, flight ticket and honorarium to do the job was paid by the oil company, and 
you cannot expect me to do anything against the oil company, because they took care 
of me and foot my bills. The money they paid me was about four month’s salary at 
DPR. How will this man do effective job as he has sent them notice of when he will be 
coming why he can’t do a random monitoring and go there and do his job instead of 
sending memo two months ahead and go with 200,000 Naira richer. 
5. The resources are not there, but the skills are here. Though we do not have many, but 
some are there. The resources are not there, because there is no laboratory, chopper, 
and etc. For example when we do research on impact of oil on animal it was difficult 
for us to get data from DPR. One of us has to steal by firming the data with his camera. 
Do you know that one of the major roles of DPR is to sponsor oil and gas related 
research, and now that they are working against their establishment guidelines 
what could be responsible for that?  It is the usual government bureaucracy, and 
insecure with exchange of information with the public. Nobody has been able to see 
how NNPC is being run. This is how former Minister Babalola who said NNPC is 
broke and he was redeployed to another ministry. What is going is how they will make 
their pockets rich. There was a time we have to invite DPR to help us talk to the 
community on what is expected from them in line with EIA, and we could not get 
them to come.  
6. I think is very important looking at EIA Act it was very comprehensive. For us the 
government decided that the implementation will be in a smaller job where different 
agencies implementing EIA Act with their over lapping function. What we need is 
good regulator and awareness on the part of the community. What might be 
responsible for the lack of effective implementation of most of these conventions 
that Nigeria has ratified? It is a doctrine of necessity on the Nigeria government and 
elite; there are some project and issue that are necessary that if they are necessary to be 
those bottle necks that keep the process better and they go ahead and do it without 
EIA. I think it is lack of understanding of interconnected of environment and a lack of 
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political will. Why do we ratified conventions and refused to implement them? So 
that we can appear as part of international communities. The Nigeria and Africa 
situation is very peculiar, most of the project we grant waivers are the project for 
export. For example the Trans Sahara Gas Pipeline project, we have been asking for 
the EIA. We know that it was done by foreign company and we went online to mail 
the company and even the World Bank. They said they are not part of that project. We 
always get report through our partners outside Nigeria; they always request for EIA on 
our behalf and send it to Nigeria that is how sometime we get EIA report. Giving my 
experience with inspection panel which is an international organisation. We have not 
had much international institution support in Nigeria in relevant to EIA apart from the 
UNEP work on impact of oil spill in Ogoni land.                
 
 
Interview 14: with (OB) ‘Academic’ University of Ibadan Basel Convention  
Length of interview: 41 minutes and 59 seconds 
Date: 28
th
 October 2010 
 
 
1. I will say partially, I wouldn’t say yes is partial one I have always said that there 
wouldn’t be Ogoni incident if EIA concept had been introduced much earlier. EIA 
was introduced through Decree 86 of 1992 after Nigeria returned from the Rio de- 
Janeiro summit in Brazil and I was one of the federal government delegations. We 
rode on the foray (central idea for any design) of that concept to tell the government 
that if you want to attain sustainable development you need to prevent environmental 
degradation and pollution the best concept for that is EIA concept. Remember that oil 
was discovered in 1956 and environment has no consideration. In 1979 the old EPPD 
(Environmental Planning and Protection Division) of the Ministry of Work and 
Housing that was environmental unit that was the nucleus of what became FEPA 
Ministry of Environment today. So the EPPD and DPR organised the first ever 
petroleum and environment seminar in the Agip and Agip they have a hall there, and I 
was part of that activity. I was the editor of that first seminar and that seminar provide 
a platform to look at various environmental issues in the oil and sector in Nigeria and 
there were usually paper presentations from academia, people from oil sector and 
international, which suppose to be international anyway. This seminar is a bi- annual 
every two years and that has highlighting the problems of gas flaring, contamination 
of water, and soil by oil spill and social economic and adverse consequences and all 
that and government did pay hid and that went on. So I took part 79, 81, 83, 85 and so 
on and EIA was not in place and we didn’t have any environmental policies you know 
policy will derive governance all the same it didn’t exist  so it was an ad hoc people 
were just using the experience in other land so on. With the Koko toxic waste episode 
of the 1988 the Federal government put in place FEPA as the apex organisation for 
environmental and conservation. So what I am trying to say is that a lot of 
environmental degradation and pollution has already occurred before the concept of 
EIA came. In my honesty opinion even the oil industry they are just trying to fulfil all 
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righteous and they just did it for what it was one of the key issue is that the 
commitment in not there and they just want to fulfil all righteousness and yes with 
that they did a lot of studies and not down by the competent people and the 
monitoring was weak. Can we say that those are factors affecting implementation 
of EIA? Yes. We are still coming to that proper. What I will say I will say a partial 
yes, because it starts as ad hoc measure and incrementally as more awareness came 
about government start responding.  
2. Well I will say again partially, and one the reason I said the oil and gas companies are 
just fulfilling righteousness and remember in 1990 - 1991 shell carried out Niger 
Delta environmental survey. I was the president Nigeria Chemical Association and 
also FEPA resident consultant then and they (Shell) want me to be part of that 
because I am the president of Chemical Society and as international expert own my 
own but I decline. I said Shell have been doing so many EIAs and why are you trying 
to reinvent all this is because they don’t trusted all the EIAs and millions spent on 
those EIAs. They were doing NDES (Niger Delta Environmental Survey), because in 
the community people were complaining the community were agitating about the 
damage of their livelihood most of them are into fishing. Are they asking for 
compensation? Yes, they are asking for compensation. Then what was the actual 
instrument they are using as bench mark because you are talking of 1991 and 
EIA came to exist in 1992? They claim that they are using international practices but 
who is the enforcer?  Then most of the people in DPR and so on relies on the 
resources of the oil company for capacity building they are sending to training and 
going to site with Shell helicopter really they are constrained and because that they 
are just tell-guarded (monitoring), when somebody is the one taking you around and 
so on and there a limit to which you can operate.  Does that hinder the effective 
implementation of EIA? Yes. To what extent has the previous EIA impacted on 
the operation of the maritime oil and gas sector? I will say because of the conflict 
between the oil and gas sector and the community affected the people now took 
initiative to demand EIA. You say you want to set LNG project they say where is 
your project because their children are getting enlighten. If only just EIA I think if has 
impacted because people will demand and villages will demand. That as it may, is the 
recommendation implemented? They do most of the multinational with big project try 
to but the problem is sustainable how to sustain the project.  
3. I will say there is some level of cooperation and I think that is kernel on which it has 
been built. It is a participatory process and I think that is one of the high point of EIA 
process because as practitioner which I am you want to do EIA you need to go to the 
grass root you need to move from the village head, state and the federal. Consultation 
is the major issue in data gathering and assessment of the report is also a cooperative 
system whereby if it pipeline project the local government will be represented and 
state in which the project is located or states, the ministry and also bring other 
government agencies who are interest in the work and stakeholders must be 
represented and a lot of expert is used and something that I commend government for. 
What can you say about the level of cooperation between DPR and FMENV EIA 
systems? I will say zero. Sorry sir? Almost zero, I have involved for long I know the 
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historical factor  DPR existed before the FMENV and they have put in place because 
of the exposure the oil industry expose them and took them round and they have put 
place their guidelines in 1992 EGASPIN (Environmental Guideline). Now I have 
been consulting for NNPC, DPR, Shell all that and I analysed the Koko toxic waste 
and FEPA started I was hired as the resident consultant and developed the FEPA 
Green Book Guidelines and Standards for Environment Pollution and Control in 
Nigeria. Then, FEPA wanted to do guideline for oil and gas and my friends in DPR 
like Dr Jerry Nwako they became very hostile although we remain friend they said 
that I am helping NESREA, I mean FEPA that just come on board to develop 
guideline to start competing with them. Then the Director General of FEPA Dr Aina 
is a very smart guy, because guideline has no force of law is advisory so EGASPIN is 
advisory is a guideline not regulations. What Dr Aina did riding on the Rio Janeiro 
summit, Dr Aina is smart guy he brought Ministry of Justice to give it EIA law 
Decree 86 of 1992 that is where they superseded the DPR because DPR was having a 
guideline, and FEPA has a Decree and FEPA is the present Ministry of Environment 
out of the Ministry of Environment we have NSEREA, NOSDRA which looking at 
petroleum issue. What I have been saying there was a lot of opposition from DPR as 
always say I have been consulting for them. The story we always tell them is anything 
environment is for FEPA and you are to regulate oil and gas and because of vacuum 
they take over the environment and now that there is an agency to do that they should 
hand over to them. The advice I use always to tell my clients is that now you have two 
masters, when you do EIA you give to FEPA and the EIA process in FEPA is 
involving very robust than EIA in DPR they don’t do any public review they just read 
it and pass it somewhere. Under normal condition and following the international 
standards EIA suppose to involve public review and what I am about to ask you 
is that does the EIA system in the DPR involve public review? It doesn’t involve. 
What we also do is that we also have to take the report of the public review to the 
locality where the work is done and it work well because if you have not come they 
will say they never see you and social economic and one of the good thing EIA 
Decree say is that you must take the pictures of those who are at the public review and 
they must register and sign as participants and that participatory process and 
consultative process is one of the again the key point of EIA, which to me well 
enforce rigorously it will negate some of the nagging issues. To what extent is the 
institution cooperation being achieved taken the example of DPR and FMENV? 
Let put it this way the EIA has undergone some transformation I wrote the two 
guidelines for oil and gas in 1995 and as well for mining and Professor Alo wrote at 
that time wrote for the manufacturing. Is it under FEPA? Yes, under FEPA like I 
said we are doing that and Ministry of Solid also insisting on EIA for the mining 
sector and that is working fine. In the mining sector solid mineral EIA is working fine 
with Ministry of Environment. I am interested in oil and gas popularly known as 
the DPR baby as some consultants usually call it. That is what I am saying they 
started before FMEVN you don’t want to lose your territory and everybody was 
jealously guiding its territory.  
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4. The problem is by EIA Decree the president has power to exempt certain 
developmental activities look at Abuja national stadium there is always go slow 
around and the environmentalist were shouting Obasanjo just invoked that. There is 
regulatory aspect of that what you find in Nigeria is that government always poor in 
implementing his laws you would find out that most government project will not have 
EIA if it is a government project circumvent it unless if you have good people at the 
herm of affair that is environmental conscious. They are the government and give the 
law forget about it that is a constraint executive fiat, they are not many expect 
government projects. Do you have any example? Yes like the Abuja Stadium. What 
of those within oil and gas? Yes, well for the EIA they will do but it is usually the 
follow up. If you look at Kaduna refinery you see that the effluent there was an after 
taught, the APT came later when they are constructing they didn’t considered the APT 
is gross in-adequate and usually overwhelm and all that. You find that the Rido River 
and River Romi along the Kaduna refinery is heavily polluted and all that. That is 
why I am saying they will do the EIA to fulfil righteousness but the follow up and 
implementation of various project is not always done. Is there any other factor that 
prevents effective implementation of EIA apart from lack of follow up? Yes, the 
foreigner’ investors some time complain about the cost of EIA is very high by the law 
of the land our EIA is to be done in two seasons. By the law of land we have to do 
two EIAs one in the dry season and one during wet season that was what our law says 
in Nigeria. EIA must be done in two seasons and FEPA insist on that I don’t think 
DPR insist on that and then it cost money setting up a panel, doing public review, and 
all that and so no and this cost money and at times because people want to save cost 
and they circumvent it and I had that experience mostly with the Asians and so on. 
What might be the reason for the two EIA seasons in Nigeria? If you are looking 
at Lagos now there is flooding and if you look that Ogun River I have been studying 
the area since late 80’s the land around is in flood plain and Governor Daniel just 
started building things and so on without an EIA and I raise that issue at that time then 
that he wasn’t doing EIA. You go there during the dry season fine and what of during 
the wet season. That is why we always have two seasons EIA, the dry season and wet 
season otherwise you can go locate a facilities in a flood plain the first rain everything 
goes. You will also see that a lot of facilities too if are erecting tank farm and you 
don’t do the seasonal EIA and even at the offshore or along coast line if you have to 
look at high tide and low tide and if you don’t do your seasonal whatever the project 
may not be sustainable and may cut off just through weather variation. Can we 
conclude that all projects that require EIA were conducted twice in Nigeria? No, 
is one EIA but over two seasons and the report will cover two seasons. This is where 
the issue of time will set in? This where experience set in, you know the rainy season 
here for example, April to October so if you want to start and dry season start around 
November, December and now if you give me an EIA to do the rainy season October 
and dry season December, January and the issue of timing is important. Some people 
are impatience why I want to use one year doing EIA. You mention something very 
important earlier in respect to government agencies using the oil companies’ 
facilities and to what extent is this affecting effective implementation of EIA? Is 
- 298 - 
 
not unique to them is a general problem. All over the world? In Nigeria, even in 
NFADAC but they have stop that, in NAFDAC before you are going for an inspection 
it is company you want to inspect that will bring car and there is a limit to how much 
you can do effective. So if the DPR don’t have helicopter for instance they have to 
rely on Oil Company. Likewise FMENV? Yes they have to rely on the oil 
companies. In the oil and gas sector recently is mandatory you must do EIA and 
people must ask. 
5. I will say the skill are there but the resources are limited because of poor funding by 
the government, inadequate funding and infrastructure for compliance monitoring is 
weak these are issues. If they want to go to offshore now they have to rely on the 
people.  
6. They are very helpful, very key area of convention provide international bench for 
green and brown issue, conservation issue pollution control and as in chapter one of 
EIA report all these conventions have to be highlighted. You have to take cognisance 
of them and see how they and apply to the project they are quite key and see how 
project comply under the convention. A good EIA expert must be aware and see how 
project under consideration comply with this convention, they are very germane and 
very important. Let look at the area of implementation, I have been to NIMASA 
where they handle IMO, MARPOL conventions and so on, and I am now in 
Ibadan and I am happy to see that Basel convention centre in Ibadan is not only 
for Nigeria but for the entire Africa now let look at implementation of Basel 
convention. For example Basel convention, what has been done towards the 
implementation of this convention? There four Basel centre in Africa there centre in 
Egypt university of Cairo for the Arabic speaking Africa countries, south Africa for 
the English speaking Africa countries, and one in Senegal but we are the coordinating 
centre. What I am saying is not peculiar to Basel we have a problem in developing 
countries, we don’t domesticate most of the laws most of the laws, we ratified them. I 
am coordinating Basel and we are yet to domesticate the Basel. I have read from the 
newspaper that you have not domesticated Basel convention; this was precisely 
stated in the punch newspaper page 28 dated 29
th
 October 2010, and my plan is 
to find out from you the true situation? Yes, it has not been domesticated, I tell the 
DG that I wouldn’t say it out that you have no right at all you are only bragging. 
Those people have violated the law, because by Basel convention it is not allowed by 
the developed countries to export hazardous waste to the developing countries and 
what I am saying is this we have not domesticate it we can’t incite it. We can only say 
they have violated which is right and one thing the DG has been doing which to me is 
clever is to sending them back, because she cannot arrest them. Cite me I have been a 
practitioner for 30 years.  
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Interview 25: with (RA) FMENV 
Length of time: 50 minutes and 53 seconds 
2
nd
 September 2010 
 
 
1. Yes, the EIA process general helps in improving the state of environment to 
the extent that at the end of its all it makes for sustainable of resources that 
nature earth has given us. For the maritime oil and gas clearly yes. The reasons 
are not far fetch given to EIA as an instrument and being a proactive tool. The 
impact of environment and clearly highlighted and remediated and mitigated 
upon during the process and to those that are known were tackled through 
remediation. Those that cannot be done remain as a residual. Those that can be 
properly manage with adequate environmental management plan and yes it 
does. 
2. Positively yes to those that have had courage to subject oil and gas activities to 
EIA. An EIA activity is good news, I am careful in using my word. For the big 
players they do not have option than to subject their projects to EIA, but the 
marginal players whose fair have been found out to them, yes reluctantly they 
come and when they heat the wall with the community they run out. So it has 
helped positively in not endorsing tension with the host community and 
instance abound. Can you remember any example? Yes in Delta state, there 
is a community that for purpose of confidential I will leave out the operator, I 
will mention the local government and left out the community. The local you 
know Gurutu local government area. A marginal field operator got there and 
they got rough with community they ran down here. After subjecting the 
process to EIA, the community now convinced and is a successful story now 
that they living harmoniously. 
3. It should be cordial and whether is cordial is another thing. I am being frank 
with you, the FMENV as the umbrella institution to saddle environmental 
issues, and DPR is there for oil and gas and few other ones are there you know 
NOSDRA and of late you know NESREA and the Nuclear regulatory agency 
quite a few. The level of cooperation now is a suspect, in the oil and gas 
typical operator will prepare EIA and send it to FMENV. Another institution 
which could have a collaborative relationship that he has submitted his report 
come and let us liaise, but they will insist on his own different submission is in 
public domain. Operator have complained, but then I would not want to go 
much, is left for you to decide, but it ought to be smooth is for you to make 
judgement. What is the relationship between the FMENV and state 
ministry of environment in terms of monitoring and the case of Lagos? 
Beautiful in federal system there is, is not surprise if federation want to flair 
muscle. Before we got to monitoring there is process of sitting down to 
evaluate document. In process of evaluating the document that lead to it a 
permit, it take a go ahead or no go ahead. We actually take a state where the 
project is domicile into account and the local government. Assuming is in 
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Ikorodu, the man in charge of Ikorodu local government have to present in the 
panel, the Lagos state government represented by the state ministry of 
environment together with the other experts will also present to evaluate to 
give or disallowing the permit. Assuming they now give the permit and the 
next stage which is monitoring and the project commences is now for the 
regulator to monitor. The practice here is to get involve all those that get 
involved in the evaluation that leads to issue of permit and tell them is time for 
us to monitor. As a team the local government, state, and federal government 
will be in that team and go back to monitor what they give out as condition for 
that project to take up it is smooth sailing. You will now want to ask why I 
used the word flair muscle. We allow the state government own their own with 
or without us to see what happening. Don’t compare that with our own 
because we have to go there with them. Why is it that state like Lagos is 
agitating for its EIA legislation? Lagos is one of the state agitating for 
environmental policies, we of the federal we are denying them, but we are 
saying that in this issue of environment we have very many interest groups are 
there, the local, state, agencies, NGOs.  In the entire environmental monitoring 
the FMENV have to be in charge of driver sit and nobody gave but the law 
don’t boarder to struggle the driver sit is with us. I used the word flaring 
muscle that should cause problem if everyone knows his/her role. It shouldn’t 
when they raise their intention we call their attention that everyone has its own 
role. 
4. The challenges now, well fairness to the operator of oil and gas in the 
maritime sector. They are in the fore front, in the last 10 to 15 years they have 
gone along way. Well again they complain, I should not weep for them let 
speak like a regulator. The constraints have been as a regulator you should be 
serving sufficiently and serve independently to be able to regulate, so to speak 
those who you are regulating is a major challenge. For instance I as a regulator 
should be to give operator 12 or 24 hours notice and if I am able to do that I 
should just pick my bag leave and start leading to the place without any 
hindrances. The maritime environment you know is challenging, it could be 
whether I could do that is a challenge. You will ask me how then I discharge 
my duties. You need a chopper; sorry it is detailed for another service that is a 
very big challenge. You know that oil and gas is sophisticated sector. You 
know that emerging technology are there and if you want to monitor or 
regulate somebody, you should be a step ahead the person whether is doing the 
right thing. You should be able to detect or his trying to cut corners. You 
should be able to ahead the person to see what his doing that is a challenge. 
What is your view where proponent pays for the entire EIA process and 
sponsors the public review in particular, is that not enough to influence 
the quality of the process? That is form of over horse issue. For the past few 
years that have been the process and it has comprise the process, but it 
difficult to justify that line with the standards. The law says that operators 
have to fund the services rendered to them. Whether it is funded uprightly or 
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after everything, it should be funded. The ministry is taken step to revise that 
and the present trust in the ministry we are trying to bill you for service 
rendered. We bill for monitoring and pay ministry and we organise our 
schedule. It does not take away the big challenge that I told you we have to 
develop having all our instruments on ground. I am not aware of situation 
where by our process is affecting EIA implementation but since international 
communities are asking us to pull away from that trend, the ministry is 
responding adequately. How is that aspect that allows the commander in 
chief to decide on EIA approval affecting the implementation process? 
Again, the law is the law, however your view it is still remain as law, he has 
the last say, how is implemented depend on the person sitting there. The law 
says that with overall larger interest of the people. The definition of overall 
larger interest of the people, he is to decide. For example Abuja stadium, there 
is cry from NGOs and we heard a lot, I don’t believe that was not put before 
us. Again, technocrats like us if we have put it let get this thing done. I don’t 
think Mr President will say no. Another example was the dredging of the 
Niger Delta that the project cut across 4 to 6 states, Bayelsa, Kogi, Niger, 
Anambra and each of this state have not agree and people were saying Mr 
president should exercise the fiat of his power that was the day of chief 
Obasanjo in the late 1999-2000. I view that the issue of double approval by 
the FMENV and DPR could affect EIA process, and what is your view? I 
told you earlier when you ask question on cooperation among different 
institution. I said there ought to be cooperation whether we have that is 
another thing. The operators of oil and gas have complied over time, multiple 
permitting. Assuming the DPR approval did not come out they can do 
anything and vice versa on the same EIA on the same project. We have 
identified it, but don’t push us out of the driver sit is our real function and it 
has been given to us. The government is trying to see how they can harmonise 
it. The something that happen at mining can be brought to bell to oil and gas, 
even the agriculture. What is happening in mining for any project in mining to 
be given yes, the ministry of mining must sit with us in the panel before that 
permit is given. I don’t see any difficulty, even in the power sector somebody 
in that sector sit around with us. I don’t see the difficulty in DPR coming to us 
sitting together and review it and sit on the panel together. We have MOU 
with mining sector, with agriculture and other few sectors. I think we will get 
there with the oil and gas. 
5. For the resources I don’t think of any establishment that will agree that they 
have enough and I told you all the challenges and even we messed the 
resources and we will still be asking for more. The government is trying there 
is need for improvement. Even the test equipments are not there. If I go for 
monitoring of oil and gas and they tell me whether the effluent water and 
where they test before they discharge to environment. I should be able to get 
sample from there, so I will analyse as institute test and without resources we 
cannot do that. For the skills, EIA is a multi-disciplinary department so I don’t 
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know of any sector we have found lacking and they are focus on so sector. We 
have the skills, but it could still be sharpen. Do you have the criteria for 
selecting consultants? The one that prepares EIA we called them consultant 
and the one that sit during the review we called them panellist. Now for the 
consultants those that prepare the report they process through process of 
evaluating them by the pollution control department. When they escape 
through the developers are at the liberty to use them but when they feel they 
have expertise in house they can use them our own is you follow the guideline. 
We know that developers don’t have this expertise in-house because they are 
too busy and they rely on our accredited consultants and they have to state that 
in their report. For the panellist that is the one strictly within our Proview. 
What we do is that we request for the resume of people those in academia, 
some NGO, some retired civil servants particularly those that have been on 
that desk and the practitioners. Occasionally, we update and issue out advert. 
For instance if you are in oil and gas, waste management, social science, 
ecologist will be necessary. We recommend 3 from the initiator that is the 
schedule officer; the deputy director will now pick one from each of the area. 
Statutorily the state government, local government, if it is linear project like 
pipeline each local government and the state that the pipeline have transverse 
will be represented, and it is this experts and this representatives that form 
panellist. I don’t know if your next question will be on permitting system. I 
will just use 30 seconds to run through that. At the end of day they just sit 
down, when the panel is constituted. The developer will be call upon to come 
and defend their project or seek the consultant help. Then, the most important 
thing is that the panellist sees the consultant as the developer. At the end of the 
day the gaps that have been identified and pass it back to them and the 
minister chair the section holding brief for the president. Are the NGOs 
represented? They are not always. Is it because is the panel review not 
technical review? They are all the same thing the only different the two is that 
during the screening process. If is the categorise one you will go through the 
whole EIA process, which is now display the report in the strategy place in the 
country. If it is category two you don’t need that. The public will not 
participate directly, but they will be participating through the local 
government, and state government. These are different phases, whichever 
panel is set up. Then, public review is the one that public have been involved 
and the technical one is only limited to the local government chairman and 
state government. For the first one public are allowed. For the purpose of 
being exact with the NGOs, depending on the interest such project might 
throw up and the NES (Nigeria Environment Society) have been invited to sit 
on the panel. 
6. They play a major role and we will continue to rely on them to continue to 
play a greater role in future. The review of our guideline the international 
organisations have been so helpful. Which guideline? The oil and gas sectoral 
is one of them, bitumen, infrastructure, mining, in the course of reviewing they 
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have been in the fore front in reviewing it providing the resources and 
expertise. We also held a workshop whereby they are invited and presentation 
of such will be passed to the National Council on Environment for adoption. 
So they have been playing a major role and we look forward to see them 
playing more in the future. What of aspect of implementation? I don’t know 
what you are expecting really can you be specific. How would you evaluate 
the implementation of those conventions? Let me talk by saying that there is 
a collaborative synergy with them for example West Africa Pipeline Gas 
(WAPG) project that link Nigeria to Ghana and the rest. They came to Nigeria 
with the World Bank to see to implementation of those conventions. Are you  
referring to the 2004 project that pass through Badagry, and do you have 
comment on that project or how would you evaluate the project in terms 
of performance? There have been a close watch from the international 
communities and us here in Nigeria and the proponents have been taken 
ministry along and I know for that there was a time when they have challenges 
and they report such to the ministry. What sort of challenges? Contractual.  
And not that something that have to do with the public agitating that they 
were not carried along? I am not aware of that when the people of Badgary 
raised the issue and confronted them they told us and the representatives of 
World Bank and it was resolved. The last time because I am not longer with 
that schedule, the World Bank people were here. The challenge during the 
flushing of pipe the interface between the land and sea there was need to 
tackle that challenge and by the time I went back they have addressed that and 
even the Ogun state people are involved in it asking for what to be done for 
them. Who is funding the project? Is international funding. Is it World 
Bank? I am not sure; I know that it has international funding company. Who 
are the proponents? Is WAPCO, they are multi-national, there is Chevron 
there and this is more of multinational, I know Chevron is there and Nigeria 
share is held by NNPC. 
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Interview 30: with (KU) NIMASA 
Date: 13
th
 August 2010 
Length of time: 36 minutes and 13 seconds 
 
1. Yes, it help to improve the environmental impact of Nigeria environment definitely, 
because if the EIA is carryout you know beforehand the impact it will be having on 
the environment whether it is negative or positive you will know. Then, you look for 
alternative way of establishing it where it will environmental friendly especially 
closeness to the people depending on the type industry that want to be sited I think it 
impacted positively.  
2. I can say it impacted both positively and negatively, negatively because you know 
most of these operators after the EIA they defile the law or guideline given to them or 
whatever or the guideline given to them especially in the area of industry you know 
like we have tank farm all over. After giving what to do and thing to put in place they 
may go ahead to defile it. Let take for instance, one of the industry we have around 
here most of the time you see their washing going into the water (ocean). Which 
industry? Petroleum Company and we have gone to them several times they channel 
their waste into the water and you see it has very detrimental effects especially to the 
marine life. You like now unlike before when we have fish now fish has gone away 
and it becoming expensive and you see industry they are impacting very negative to 
the environment and Niger Delta is the case study that why local people have been 
shouting and right now they cannot get anything from their farm. Like this people 
now you cannot expect people that carryout EIA to channel their waste to the water. 
Which people are you still referring to as the same petroleum company?  The 
same petroleum company around my office, you see if the main EIA is carried out the 
FMENV and I don’t think any environmentalist will allow somebody without giving 
instruction at least the limit of and he must be given instruction on how to treat water 
or influence before sending it environment, because may be somebody is not there at 
that time he will say let me just pour the waste instead of wasting money for the 
treatment. Has NIMASA been there? Just like I said several time, up to three our 
officers has been there three to four times to tell them and they will stop, but recently 
we have been able to tell them to some extent and we have to hold meeting with their 
management. You have been there three to four times, are you telling me that 
NIMASA has no sanction or implementation machinery on ground to deal with 
the situation? You know the department is new, we are coming up a lot of things, 
and a committee has just been put in place we are coming up with fines. You know 
you have to get approval before you commence on such and Minister of Transport has 
given approval but is now before the government establishment tender board to 
endorse and immediately after we can then implement.   
3.  Initially it has been a problem but right now there have been some level of synergy. 
for instance on issue of oil pollution that I am particular pertinent about you know we 
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have been having problems this overlapping issue just NIMASA is an institution 
established by government to implement international conventions and one of such 
conventions is OPRC (Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Convention), which 
is supposed to be implemented by each country safety administration, but somehow I 
can say from my own point view the way government understood it because that 
OPRC applies on the issue of some vessel which NIMSA is taking care of it. Most of 
this spill comes from Niger Delta; therefore there is some level of neglect. The 
environment (FMENV) will say they are the owner of environment whether maritime 
or land whatever. I think there are some levels of neglect somehow. From there 
government in a paste to find solution to this problem created NOSDRA (National Oil 
Spill Detection and Response Agency). This agency now thinks they are the all in all 
anything about oil is them. Forgetting that some people are there and as far as I am 
concern they are suppose to oversee that all this thing each agency or responsible 
department is handling them fine. For example we have the DPR handling pipeline, 
we have NIMASA handling from ships. What we have been telling them is that they 
suppose to be a police man and to make sure that NIMASA is doing what they 
suppose to do. Which people are supposed to be a police man? I mean NOSDRA 
just to be a coordinator which the country has made them. They suppose to police to 
ensure that NIMASA does what they ought to do and DPR does what they are 
suppose to do, but they see themselves as people who are to do the job, because you 
cannot just come and take my job because you have been made a coordinator and it 
must be done by you. It has become a big problem, but recently as I said through 
workshop and meting we have been understanding ourselves gradually. I wouldn’t say 
that it total gone off. I know that level of cooperation between NOSDRA and 
NIMASA now anything oil from ship NOSDRA cannot go ahead without contacting 
NIMASA. Unlike before, we have able to tell them through our Director in their 
wisdom that we are not fighting, we are not contesting coordinator-ship with you what 
we are saying is that you allow us to do our duties and we do it together. The only 
people that still having problem from the last programme we had together was the 
DPR they have not really come together. I think general thing are coming together we 
cannot finish it a night. What can you say about the level of cooperation between 
the FMENV and DPR EIA systems? As I said earlier there still some rancour 
between them but I know that continuous synergy through workshop, meeting. The 
only thing is that when you get to that meeting you still have issue of this is my area 
everybody want to hold to what he has you understand but I think with time all these 
things will go down and some of them will be corrected. We told NOSDRA, in fact if 
you look at what they have in place on contingency plan there is no place for 
NIMASA. But with the workshop we had in 2008 and the meeting of 2008 at that 
meeting DPR walk out on them, you DPR own the whole oil and gas and they told 
them that this is their own and they walk out and that will not help the country. We 
are able to tell them at meeting that not working with the mandate and environment is 
very big and let us work together and have the interest of the environment. In 2009 
another meeting in Abuja and there was level of understanding and from there they 
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had meeting together and this cannot be achieved just in one day just like I said 
before.  
4. From my own point of view I think what is happening we want to cut corners. What 
do you mean? I mean in the industry, we are talking of implementation there are 
guideline to follow. Definitely agency will do EIA and some of them might not even 
come to you is only when we find out. For example what NIMASA is doing on ship 
scrapping you know oil carrying ships you have some level of oil in it especially 
when it is abandoned and ready to be scrapped. So scrapping which is part of 
recycling must be done in environmentally friendly manner. We have stopped work of 
some ship scrapping industry without knowledge of the industry and definitely EIA 
was not carried out on them. Some of them said they are aware of NIMASA. Apart 
from cutting corners what are other factors that might be affecting the effective 
implementation of EIA? The other things that affect effective implementation of 
EIA in a oil and gas industry is apart from cutting corner, and procedure is not 
followed as you know that EIA has a procedure to follow. Another one is Nigeria 
factor but I will not like to go into it. At what level does NIMASA get involved in 
the EIA process? NIMASA get involve in EIA, mostly for now when it involves 
shipping outbreak, but like I said earlier this people think is their right they have not 
been involving and the public aspect we always do. We are supposed to be there from 
inception when it involves issue maritime and transportation. What is the level of 
involvement of NIMASA during the public review? Let me be frank with you I 
have not been involving, but some else have been representing NIMASA.  
5. I think they are sufficient, and the skills especially, the only problem I know we have 
in Nigeria is that most time putting a spare peg in a round hole, the experience people 
might not be there at the right time and the right thing might not be done. That can 
hampered effective EIA to be carried out and then the issue of corruption, as some 
industry want to get what they want and they can go to any length and some people 
can compromise. Most Nigerians don’t let say some, but many Nigerians comprise so 
they allow them. Which people are them? The operators may be, if they are and the 
rate of corruption is high. Are the resources sufficient? Human is the part of 
resources you know, capital is part of it. We have data and there are many research 
institutes. What about funds? Government priority and what they put on 
environment is not much all of us knows it the amount on environmental issue is not 
much. 
6. What I see there, the role of international and conventions is only to give you a 
guideline they have the rule for you shipping is an international business you can bend 
corners when it come to your local water. If it is something within your local water let 
say the issue of ballast water, which is not applicable to only local waters, because is 
the same species. The essence of this management of ballast water was to avoid 
transferring species. You find out that most of the species carry from Europe they end 
becoming pollutant to the Nigeria environment. You know we have migratory 
species, some of this species they are not for our environment, and when they adapt 
some they will become nuisance to our environment. What is the level of 
implementation of OPRC and MARPOL convention for example and the way 
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NIMASA has handled them in particular? The level of implementation, in 
MARPOL we are implementing you we have six annexes, we have of oil, noxious 
substances, chemical substance, garbage, and right now Nigeria has effective 
implement annex 1 which is oil. In the area of oil, for you to be effectively 
implement. You must have reception facilities, and we have it snake island to receive 
waste oil. Do you carry out an EIA before installing storage tank? Definitely, 
because government was fully involve in it, and this reception facility is port that will 
provide it and NIMASA own is to see if it is adequate. So we have been going around 
to see what they have quarterly, to be sure that what they put there is enough to 
receive waste from the vessel.  In the same annex 1 we have talking of double hull 
instead of the single hall. How far have you gone on the issue of double hull, are 
we using double hull now in Nigeria? Not now, is just coming into force and we are 
till 2015 to implement it that doesn’t mean you not start doing something. Right now 
Nigeria has stopped registering single hall vessels, and we have giving time for ship 
that are single hall and Nigeria is working with ship owner association. Is it different 
from Africa circle? Africa circle is a company that NPA consulted for the provision 
of reception facilities and the contract is on private partnership relationship and they 
use to collect waste and treat. The indigenous ship owners association they are the 
owners of ship and NIMASA encourage the use of indigenous ship, and we have to 
work in hand to hand with them so that single hall ship will be faced out. We try to 
give time and help them and NIMASA have ship finance and we help them so that we 
can implement that convention and this is regulation 13 G of Annex 1. How do you 
monitor the multinational vessel in strategic place (offshore)? Our surveyors are 
out there, and in environment we have officer that work with surveyors. For example, 
there is a vessel that beech in Lagos Island some of our officers went there to monitor 
to see what is happening. Before multinational brings rig they must come to Nigeria, 
and our people go there during the construction. For example the one that is handled 
by Total our people go to Singapore and ship registering go there too, to monitor and 
before it comes in they will register it. The ones that have been in existence before 
NIMASA what they did were to carry out post environmental auditing. The 
monitoring has been effective and I would be frank with you. Who are these 
surveyors and what are their roles? They are NIMASA staff and their role is to 
ensure safety.    
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Interview 40: with (TU) FMENV & DPR Consultant 
Length of time: 38 minutes and 24 seconds 
Date: 23
rd
 August 2010 
 
1. I would say yes, the reason being that may before 10 years ago or thing like that all 
the problems we have having in the Niger Delta suppose not to be like that if actually 
all what we are doing now we started it then. Then what we look at is when an 
industry is coming everybody want to embrace it you know they look want to look at 
the monetary aspect. Nobody look at the negative aspect this another way of getting 
employment. People coming in with outdated technology and so and they don’t even 
care for environment they we  say they are offering employment and that is why I say 
for now that EIA process is actually is better than what it used to be. 
2. What actually brought EIA in Nigeria is because of Koko toxic waste and that brought 
about establishment of FEPA in 1989, because of such. After that happen in 1989 we 
have not had such an issue again everybody eye is open. I mean the maritime their eye 
is open and everybody is watching. If you look at oil sector, because of EIA the 
pollution is not like before and because of EIA process most of the technology we are 
having is not outdated technology. People are now looking at they are going to subject 
them on this people now want to say since you are giving a base line and this is how 
my place is before you came and they will now say that there is going to be some 
background check, because of that people want to also look at it before they come in. 
Also there is a better awareness people are looking at employment alone, before they 
will be talking of technology transfer. People are also looking at it after all these, what 
will happen. I mean our women will still give in a normal way and because of 
knowledge also even when the government are looking. Community are setting up 
little organisations just to help and make sure that is not giving problem to their future 
generation. Do you have example of such organisation previously set by the 
community? No what happen is that if you come to some of the community now if 
you go to Niger Delta you we see the elite having the consultancy outfit of their own. 
Even if you say you want carry out EIA they want to be part of it or you want to carry 
out a study and they we carry out their own study too. So it getting to that extent too, 
because they believe that the person you are giving job to, may be the person is after 
money alone. They want to do a double check if the person has done the job. 
Somebody call in a cement industry brought in their consultant so this young man 
work with one of the regulators and feel that this people has not done a thorough job. 
So he went to LGA that he wanted to verify what the consultant has done. At least let 
them do something randomly and the company will pay for it. These are the things 
because some time the consultancy may be bought over. What do you mean by 
bought over? What I mean by bought over is this you see corruption is a problem and 
because corruption some people believe that somebody that give you food determine 
what you should eat. That is the problem, I have been in this field for 17 years, and I 
- 309 - 
 
will not say that I have been fulfilled, because of the way I do thing and many people 
don’t do thing that way. I can tell proponent you can go with you work if you are not 
ready to do the right thing. If I give you a recommendation I cannot delete a single 
thing from it and many people can comprise this entire thing. To some people they 
taught they are in the business to get money out of it. This doesn’t give the real 
pictures. When I am trying to do a measure we have move from zero to 10%, but from 
the real sense it suppose to be achieving some like 60 to 70%. 
3. Are you talking about the regulators? Yes the regulators. If you are talking of 
different EIA systems that I want to explain the EIA system and what do you mean by 
different EIA systems. Now DPR do they have their own EIA system? Yes they do. 
FMENV do they have their own EIA system? Yes they do. States government do 
they have own EIA system? Yes they do. I want to know the level of institutional 
cooperation among NESREA, NOSDRA, NIMASA and other implementing 
agencies? Thank you. I think we should start with DPR and FMENV first? I think 
and mean the questions you are raising are vital questions that I was trying to and 
when you say institutional cooperation I was to say regulators and different regulators 
we have they are part of the system. We are now talking of each regulator with his 
own process. These are part of the problem we are having we have double regulations 
everywhere and these are things affecting the quality the federal is fighting state and 
state fighting the federal. So because of that people are hiding under this fight to do 
what is not right. When you say people, are you referring to the consultants or the 
operators? I am referring to both. Okay like for instance you want me to take 
preference. I have EIA with FMENV is like going to hell, you when you make thing 
so difficult understanding people will start cutting corners. When you say cutting 
corners what do you mean? Cutting the corners they would not do what is right and 
the end money goes to other people pocket, but if the process is very clear, just like I 
said if have preference if you want me to go between DPR or FMENV. I go through 
the DPR. Why? That is the question and question is this the time it will take. You can 
imagine you have a time frame and people that owns these project s they work with 
time frame. May be they have borrow money from banks and you know that the EIA 
is two seasons studies no problem, but where you want to start the process, the 
process with the FMENV you have to write the letter of consent who have to tell us 
when you will start the problem okay no problem you fill their form ten thousand 
Naira small money. After you fill the form they will tell you that they want to visit the 
site and there FMENV office in Lagos. Now you are writing somebody in Abuja and 
somebody in Abuja want to come and what is Lagos doing. You know what it mean 
what stop me to tell them that this project is just behind you. The cost will be less, but 
they will tell you that they are coming from Abuja and before somebody come and 
they will give you a bill to come and look at site verification. What do you mean by 
the bill? Hotel and other expenses. Who will pay for the bills? The proponents. So 
by then it does that it depends on the type of project when he has spent three hundred 
to four hundred thousand the next thing after everything they will write their 
recommendations trying to classify it whether is class A, B or C and that is another 
thing on its own, and before the report will come out that is another problem. You will 
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start now following up the file that this person or that person this and that because the 
people that have gone and what is inside and so it is being delayed. So may be you 
spend six months trying to get that and time of reference and before you get approval 
of time of reference is another problem. May be you have loss one season, after the 
approval when you doing the storage or construction somebody will say they want to 
be part of it. Who is somebody? The regulator and you know that if you want to be 
part of it you have to pay their bills and those are bills and those are the things. What 
is the level of cooperation between the DPR and FMENV? By the time you do the 
study you do the first season and you wait for the second season to do the study and 
they want to be there and you now send in a report. I sent a report since February I 
have not gotten the reply until now, a report on EIA to FMENV. Are you also 
certified by the FMENV? That is the issue. I will come to that question you ask. 
Now the client is on my neck the client making noise everyday look at the time frame 
look at waste people will now say that is why you can’t go to build this thing when 
you violate they only mention money you understand and people cut the corners and 
some people don’t have the job to do. You understand what I am saying and these are 
things when you make some too cumbersome like that. Why did I say that I preferred 
DPR there process is clear you know the letter of intent you send it to them, the scope 
of study and they approve and they send somebody to go the field with you. You go to 
the laboratory to make sure that the analysis is done no problem. You go through the 
second season and then put it together and you send your report. This one we are 
talking about may be is a project that has to do with public hearing the FMENV they 
does public hearing that is a lot of money on its own. Does DPR undergo public 
hearing? No they internal presentations or technical review you understand, because 
of that they send recommendation to you and you are not paying anything. Not that 
somebody is going for site verification and all this process make it too cumbersome. 
Now looking at the regulators themselves I would say that there is no cooperation 
among them. Can you imagine the FMENV I will say that is the father of all you 
understand the NSEREA you are mentioning I nearly fight them, NSEREA is under 
FMENV and to tell you what the consultants pass through too. You know FMENV 
has given us accreditation they started long ago and NSEREA was created from the 
FMENV as son from the father. Now the son is saying I don’t know my father and 
those accreditation they did if want to do any about audit you know you have to come 
and do accreditation with us again. Now as a consultant you have to do accreditation 
again with NSEREA. These two agencies are the same thing and they are fighting and 
consultant you want to be in business all they needed to you see double regulations. 
Now you have to go through the process again you are paying to this one every year 
while they are all the same. DPR will say that you get an accreditation with them 
every year. Then the state will come back again and there is no state you will work 
they will tell you if don’t get their permit. Now in Lagos state I have with LASEPA 
and I move towards Ogun state I have with Ogun s state, because I want to be in 
business. In the real sense FMENV permit suppose to serve all these purpose, because 
this is federal. Now because everybody is trying to his own thing you will know see 
that so where is the coordination where is the understanding there will always be a 
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gap, but one thing we have understood is that okay FMENV okay now is now 
requesting, if I have oil project I will just shift myself to DPR in the real sense they 
are the one also to be regulating it. Is it that having the two approvals is not 
important? You see in order to serve your head from all these nonsense I will look at 
it that this project is more of oil, because federal cannot control everything. I will 
move towards the DPR because they are handling oil. If you are talking about 
manufacturing projects you have to go the FMENV. What is the real situation in the 
country now, is it not that both EIA systems approval are important? That is it 
that is what is suppose to be in the real sense they suppose to work together, but what 
if want to move ahead once you go through DPR and you have your permit definitely 
you can send the report to FMENV. If look at it and the problem is that if you send it 
to them and if are not accredited by them they will not accept that report. You can 
now see why some of we consultants generally I will be accredited by FMENV, I get 
my accreditation with the DPR and state so that anywhere this report go to definitely 
when they check their records they will know that this person is accredited and my 
client will be at advantage. Can we now conclude that there is no cooperation 
among the government institutions?  I would say that the level of cooperation is 
very poor. 
4. You see to be sincere with you I don’t see the proponents not ready to implement. If 
you want to be in business you want to do what is right because if you mount pressure 
on them if everything is in other you see them implement. The centre of what we are 
saying is still on corruption. This corruption, is it by the regulators or by which 
people? By the regulators and people in the business. They can implement and issue 
is that is better than before somebody now knows that is at his neck, before the 
country has always been a dumping ground. The other aspect is that when this project 
is on there are things that are need to be place, are we really enforcing and our 
enforcement is very weak and if nobody is enforcing anything everybody go to bed 
and that is part of the problem when there is no enforcement there is no 
implementation. Why is it that the monitoring is poor? Why wouldn’t the 
monitoring be poor it depends on people you want to monitor. If you are monitoring 
to save the environment is a different thing, but if you monitoring to save your pocket 
is different thing. What might responsible for that corruption? You see I still tell 
people that corruption is something we can handle. If we can have leadership you can 
put their feet on ground everybody will follow suit. I will give an example there was a 
time I was working for someone the office open 8’ o clock I get to the office 6: 15 
because I am the one in charge before they know it everybody is there in the office 
because I will be the last person to leave the office everybody and everything follow 
suit. So who is leading you? Can we say that there is lack of political will? Yes that 
is it, thing we need to correct, we are intelligent if we have the right leader, but when 
the driving is towards the negative direction. 
5. Personally I will say yes and why I will say is because this country is bless my brother 
if you here and this programme you are doing there you will notice that the time you 
spend to get materials here and if you put that time there you will over run everybody. 
So we are people that have learned under the hardship so because that if you say the 
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resources are not there I will challenge it, but the only thing is that when the resources 
is being provided are they channel to what you need it for that is the issue. The 
government just release how many billions to NEPA we hear it every day and that 
amount is being release to another place you will see the effect immediately. So the 
resources are there are they are not put in the right channel, the skill is there is that 
skill make people to work.  
6. To me I know that Nigerian we are still credit to this thing and if you look at most our 
document you see that we lift everything they do and just change into Nigeria context, 
their standard and everything we use it to evaluate one or two things. That is the 
extent those things serve us we don’t have local standard our standard are being 
adopted standard from the United Nations and because are signatory to most of these 
we believe that we are part of those people. The issue is that World Bank you will 
notice they release so much money in Nigeria but most of the EIA following World 
Bank standards and so all those things are there we know it. They are document that 
we make use of it, but if you look at they cannot come here to control our system for 
us and if we do something that has to do with them they will scrutinise. That is why I 
told you if you want to do EIA do a standard EIA. The EIA I do for people is to 
satisfy the World Bank and other people not just the regulators alone and is the 
document that can be use to source for fund in that way if you look at it you will also 
look for somebody that can do the right thing. In terms of international conventions 
we are signatory to them, but any time they have a project they make sure they follow 
their own standards, and the things that doesn’t concern them they don’t intervene. 
What can you say about the level of implementation of conventions? It go suit just 
like the one I have explained you see there are some company when you are getting 
big you don’t want someone else to get big. In the country if you want to run down a 
company over night. If there some company they have their own standards because 
they don’t anybody to run them down, and they international standards which they 
follow from their parent company. You can see that all these convention we just have 
them as a written document. The multinational there is a level of cosmetic. What can 
you say about the level of implementation of these conventions? If you want to 
rate it just say poor and in percentage I will just say 30 percent. Do you know any oil 
and gas project that has been sponsored by the World Bank? I don’t know of anyone 
parse, where they come in is this entire developmental project. At what point your 
role as a consultant end in the EIA process? Good question that is a good question 
when you submit EIA to the regulator your roles suppose not to end but most of the 
time is like partially is ended. These are parts of thing we find and the implementation 
the consultant supposes to be retained and make sure that all these are follow suit. Just 
like the audit will do is of recent we are telling them. You should ready to hold me 
responsible for that particular company and hold response that particular company if 
that system is put in place you do a job and you will retain the consultant. 
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Appendix 4 WAGP general mitigation measures in responses to identified impacts 
 
 
 
 Required General Mitigation Measures  
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TOPOGRAPHY, GEOLOGY, AND SOILS 
Impacts to soils caused by horizontal directional drilling 
(HDD) pipeline construction method from the barrier island to 
offshore 
 
  
   
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
Disturbance of surrounding organisms created by 
earthmoving equipment and associated machinery 
 
  
 
  
 
  
    
  
    
  
Disturbance of surrounding habitat, hydrology and biological 
resources from transport of equipment through Lagos 
Lagoon to a newly constructed dock and road to the compressor 
station. 
 
  
 
 
 
  
   
  
     
  
Disturbance of surrounding habitat and species due to the 
transport of pipe from Port Harcourt to the coating facility 
to the ROW staging sites 
 
  
     
  
     
  
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 Required General Mitigation Measures  
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AIR QUALITY 
Changes in air quality due to transport requiring construction of 
a dock, access road, and dredging of a canal to move 
equipment through Lagos Lagoon to the compressor station 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
  
  
Changes in air quality due to transport of pipe segments 
from Port Harcourt to the coating facility to the ROW staging 
sites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
    
  
Changes in air quality from general operation of vessels and 
equipments (e.g., air generator) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
     
 
CULTURAL CONDITIONS 
Incidental destruction or alteration of significant cultural, 
historical or archaeological sites   
             
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 Required General Mitigation Measures  
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SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITION 
Impairment  of maritime traffic from presence, movement, 
and anchoring of barges in Gulf waters; and support 
vessel movement 
       
 
   
  
 
  
PUBLIC AND WORKER HEALTH 
Adverse health risk to general population and construction workers 
due to gas leak from pipeline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
Adverse health risk to general population and construction 
workers due to presence, movement, and anchoring of barges in 
Gulf waters; and support vessel movement 
      
  
     
  
Adverse health risk to general population from mishaps associated 
with passive installation of pipeline in >8m water depth 
      
  
     
  
 
Sources: West Africa Gas Pipeline, 2004 pp. (7)-4-(7)-13 
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